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Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice:
The Warren Court and the
Conservative "Backlash"
Barry C. Feldt
[Clonsiderations of race are now deeply imbedded in the strategy and
tactics of politics, in competing concepts of the function and
responsibility of government, and in each voter's conceptual structure
of moral and partisan identity. Race helps define liberal and
conservative ideologies, shapes the presidential coalitions of the
Democratic and Republican parties, provides a harsh new dimension
to concern over taxes and crime .... In terms of policy, race has
played a critical role in the creation of a political system that has
tolerated, if not supported, the growth of the disparity between rich
and poor over the past fifteen years. Race-coded images and language
changed the course of the 1980, 1984, and 1988 presidential
elections ....
- Thomas Byrne Edsall & Mary D. Edsall'
INTRODUCTION
A century ago, the Progressive reformers who created the
juvenile court embraced a particular ideological construction of
childhood as one of innocence and vulnerability. They also
adopted a scientific conception of social control-positive
criminology-that attempted to identify the causes of
criminality and purported to treat, rather than to punish,
offenders. The juvenile court combined the new conception of
childhood with the new strategies of positive criminology to
create a judicial-welfare alternative to the adult criminal
process for juveniles. The juvenile court affirmed the
responsibility of families to raise their children while
expanding the state's prerogative to act as parens patriae, or
"super-parent," and to exercise flexible social control in the
t Centennial Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1966; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School,
1969; Ph.D. Harvard University (Sociology), 1973.
1. Thomas Byrne Edsall & Mary D. Edsall, Race, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, May 1991, at 53.
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"best interests" of young people. Because of some parents'
perceived limitations, the social control of ethnic and racial
minority offenders was one of the juvenile court's most
important functions.2 From its inception, the juvenile court
sought to assimilate, integrate, "Americanize," and control the
children of the southern and eastern European immigrants
pouring into the cities of the East and Midwest.3 A century
later, the social control of young black males in the devastated
cores of America's post-industrial cities has emerged as one of
the juvenile court's primary functions.
Despite the juvenile court's enormous powers, for the first
two-thirds of the twentieth century, few people questioned the
idea of an informal, therapeutic agency of social control or its
discriminatory implementation. Systematic and critical re-
examination of the juvenile court's cultural and legal premises
emerged only in the 1960s, and culminated in the Supreme
Court's In re Gault4 decision in 1967. By the time of Gault and
the Warren Court's "Due Process Revolution," the Progressive
Era consensus about state benevolence, the legitimacy of
imposing certain values on others, and what rehabilitation
entailed had become matters of intense dispute. Pluralism,
racial diversity, and cultural conflicts challenged the consensus
about the goals of rehabilitation. Empirical evaluations of
rehabilitation programs undermined Progressives' assumptions
that correctional personnel possessed the technical ability to
treat offenders effectively. Civil rights advocates questioned
the benevolence of justice system officials and objected to the
invidious and discriminatory consequences of discretionary
decision making. In the face of these criticisms, the Supreme
Court increasingly emphasized procedural formality and the
rule of law to regulate administrative decision making. In the
ensuing decades, the Court's procedural decisions provided the
2. See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE JUVENILE COURT 55-60 (1999); W. NORTON GRUBB & MARVIN
LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMISES: How AMERICANS FAIL THEIR CHILDREN 173-82
(1982).
3. See, e.g., ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY 75-83 (2d ed. 1977); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND
CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVE IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA
221-22 (1980); STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN
DELINQUENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PROGRESSIVE JUVENILE
JUSTICE, 1825-1920, at 57-58 (1977); JOHN R. SUTTON, STUBBORN CHILDREN:
CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1640-1981, at 122 (1988).
4. 387 U.S. 1, 12-59 (1967).
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political and legislative impetus to transform the juvenile court
from a nominally rehabilitative social welfare agency into a
formal legal institution and fostered a convergence between the
juvenile and criminal justice systems.5
This Article analyzes the social context and changing
jurisprudence of juvenile justice over the past half-century
through the prism of race to provide a "history of the present"-
a historical examination of the recent past to illuminate
contemporary social policies and institutional arrangements. 6
Race and race relations are socially constructed in a dynamic
legal and socio-historical context. They are shaped through
political processes that interpret and explain variations
associated with race and allocate power and resources along
racial lines. 7 The changing role of race in law and politics is
5. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75
MINN. L. REV. 691, 718-22 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation-Part 1]
(summarizing the procedural and substantive convergence between juvenile
and criminal courts); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile
Court-Part II: Race and the "Crack Down" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV.
327, 357-69 (1999) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation-Part II] (arguing that
social structural changes and race account for adoption of more punitive
juvenile justice policies).
6. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 2 (2001). Garland describes a "history of
the present" as an historical, sociological, and penological effort to understand
how contemporary practices acquired their current characteristics.
It is a genealogical account that aims to trace the forces that gave
birth to our present-day practices and to identify the historical and
social conditions upon which they still depend. The point is not to
think historically about the past but rather to use that history to
rethink the present.
Id.
7. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980S, at 55-56 (1994). Omi and Winant
argue that gender represents a distinction with an objective biological basis,
whereas race is a social construct "which signifies and symbolizes social
conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies." Id. at
55-56. Because racial identity is a social construct designed to differentiate
among human groups based on certain characteristics, the formation of racial
identity is a "sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created,
inhabited, transformed, and destroyed." Id. at 55. The construction of racial
identity is implicated both in social structure and in cultural representation.
Id. at 56. Historically and presently, the state and individuals have treated
people differently and structured social inequality in the distribution of
wealth, power, status, and resources, based on ascriptions of race. See id. at
57. At the same time, culture provides an interpretation and explanation of
the social inequalities that exist around the dimensions of race. "[A] racialized
social structure shapes racial experience and conditions meaning." Id. at 59.
"Analysis of such stereotypes reveals the always present already active link
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the organizing principle for this analysis of the changes in
juvenile justice policies.
This Article argues that during the second half of the
twentieth century the issue of race had two distinct and
contradictory influences on juvenile justice policy in particular
and on criminal justice policy in general. The Article's thesis
can be summarized succinctly-first the North went south, and
then the South went north. During the 1950s and 1960s, the
Supreme Court imposed national legal and equality norms on
the recalcitrant Southern states that still adhered to a
"separate but equal" Jim Crow legal regime.8 The social-
structural changes that began several decades earlier
between our view of the social structure-its demography, its laws, its
customs, its threats-and our conception of what race means." Id. at 59-60.
Because the significance of race is endemic in social structure and in cultural
interpretation,
[e]verybody learns some combination, some version, of the rules of
racial classification, and of her own racial identity, often without
obvious teaching or conscious inculcation. Thus are we inserted in a
comprehensively racialized social structure. Race becomes "common
sense"-a way of comprehending, explaining, and acting in the world.
A vast web of racial projects mediates between the discursive or
representational means in which race is identified and signified on
the one hand, and the institutional and organizational forms in which
it is routinized and standardized on the other. These projects are the
heart of the racial formation process.
Id. at 60.
8. See generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICS 490 (2000) (stating that beginning with Brown v. Board of
Education, and reinforced by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, the Court altered the "southern way of life"). "[T]he legal
regime of race was nationalized with a single operative standard for the entire
country. But the effort was not a national one. It was directed exclusively at
the South and was designed to force the South to conform to northern-that is,
national-norms." Id.
Omi and Winant argue that
[iun the 1960s, race occupied the center stage of American politics in a
manner unprecedented since the Civil War era a century earlier.
Civil rights struggles and ghetto revolts, as well as controversies over
state policies of reform and repression, highlighted a period of intense
conflict in which the very meaning of race was politically
contested ....
Issues of race have once again been dramatically revived in the
1980s, this time in the form of a "backlash" to the political gains of
racial minority movements of the past. Conservative popular
movements, academics, and the Reagan administration have joined
hands to attack the legacy and logic of earlier movement
achievements. They have done this, moreover, in a way which
escapes obvious charges of "racism."
OMI & WINANT, supra note 7, at 2.
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motivated the Supreme Court to critically reassess criminal
and juvenile justice practices in response to concerns about
racial discrimination and civil rights. The migration of Blacks
from the rural South to the industrial North and West
increased the urbanization of Blacks and placed the issues of
racial equality and civil rights on the national political agenda.
The Warren Court's school desegregation, criminal procedure,
and juvenile justice "due process" decisions, such as In re
Gault,9 reflected a broader shift in constitutional jurisprudence
to protect individual rights-especially the civil rights of racial
minorities.
The second period of juvenile justice policy changes
emerged in response to Gault's formalization of juvenile court
procedures in 1967 and culminated in the "get tough"
legislation of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Although the
Court focused on juveniles' rights to protect minorities' liberty
interests, its granting of procedural safeguards facilitated the
increased severity of delinquency sanctions, precipitated the
transformation of the juvenile court into a "wholly-owned
subsidiary" of the criminal justice system, and legitimated the
imposition of the punitive sentences that now fall most heavily
on minority offenders. In the mid-1960s, Gault and the
Supreme Court's "Due Process Revolution" coincided with
campus disorders, escalating "baby boom" crime rates, and
urban racial rebellions, which national Republican politicians
characterized as a crisis of "law and order."10 They pursued an
electoral strategy to appeal to white southern voters' racial
antipathy and resistance to school integration and engineered a
conservative "backlash" to foster a political realignment around
issues of race and public policy.II
During the 1970s-1990s, conservative Republican
politicians pursued a "southern strategy," exploited "crime" and
"welfare" as code words for race, and advocated "get tough"
policies that ultimately affected juvenile and criminal justice
policies throughout the nation. National and political divisions
about race enabled conservative Republican politicians to
advocate particular crime and welfare policies for electoral
advantage. During this period, news media coverage put a
9. 387 U.S. at 12-59.
10. See FELD, supra note 2, at 88-90.
11. THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE
IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 7-14 (1992);
KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY 204-08 (1969).
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black face on youth crime, and political campaigns to "crack
down" on youth violence turned juveniles into symbolic "Willie
Hortons."12 The trend toward punitiveness in juvenile justice,
which began in the 1970s with the politicization of crime
policies, peaked in the early 1990s when increases in black
youth homicide rates provided further political incentive to "get
tough" on youth crime through modification of juvenile court's
transfer and sentencing laws.1 3
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the
historical origins of the juvenile court, explores the
discriminatory premises embedded in its processes, and
provides context against which to measure subsequent changes
in juvenile law and policy. Part II assays the macro-structural,
demographic, and racial changes; the constitutional context;
and the political forces that shaped the Supreme Court's
juvenile court decisions in the 1960s. More generally, this Part
addresses why the Warren Court's constitutional "Due Process
Revolution" happened when it did and as it did. It puts
juvenile justice and criminal procedural reforms in the broader
context of the civil rights movement and the quest for racial
equality. Part III analyzes subsequent sociological,
criminological, racial, media, and political dynamics that led to
the "get tough" legislative reformulation of juvenile justice
policies in the 1980s and 1990s. Again, at a more general level,
it asks and answers why the conservative "backlash" that
successfully advocated policies to "get tough" and "crack down"
on crime, drugs, and youth occurred when it did and as it did.14
12. See TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY,
IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF EQUALITY 135-65 (2001); KATHLEEN
HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS: DECEPTION, DISTRACTION, AND DEMOCRACY
(1992).
13. Feld, Transformation-Part II, supra note 5, at 357-69.
14. Garland observes that
[tihe last three decades have seen an accelerating movement away
from the assumptions that shaped crime control and criminal justice
for most of the twentieth century. The central agencies of the modern
criminal justice state have undergone quite radical shifts in their
working practices and organizational missions .... "[P]enal
welfarism"-the institutional arrangements that increasingly
characterized the field from the 1890s to the 1970s, and which shaped
the common sense of generations of policy-makers, academics, and
practitioners-has recently been shaken to its roots.
Garland, supra note 6, at 3; see also FELD, supra note 2, at 189-91 (war on
juveniles); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 81-123 (1995) (war on drugs).
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I. THE PROGRESSIVE JUVENILE COURT
The juvenile court emerged at the beginning of the
twentieth century in conjunction with a host of social changes.
Economic modernization fostered rapid industrialization,
immigration, and urbanization. It also forced changes in family
structure and function that allowed a new cultural perception
of childhood to take hold. The rationalizing forces of
modernization also contributed to the ascendance of positivist
criminology. The Progressive movement addressed many of the
problems associated with this social upheaval by applying the
principles of positive criminology to its criminal justice policies
and incorporating a child-centered theme into many of its
programs. This Part explores how these factors shaped the
character of the juvenile court.
A century ago, economic modernization transformed
America from a rural agrarian, Anglo-Protestant society into
an ethnically diverse, urban industrial one. 15 Industrialization
also altered the social organization of cities. Previously,
residential areas were socially and economically heterogeneous;
most people lived within walking distance of where they
worked; and social, economic, and ethnic residential
segregation did not separate the rich and the poor. 16 Industrial
growth altered the urban landscape. Population density
increased as immigrants from southern and eastern Europe
crowded into urban ghettos surrounding the manufacturing
core to take the newly available jobs in the industrial
15. MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND
THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 14 (1999) ("In the span of seventy
years, an economy dominated by agriculture was transformed into a modern
industrial economy in which a majority of workers were employed in
manufacturing, mining, construction, trade, finance, and transportation.");
PLATT, supra note 3, at 75-83 (discussing the role of women child-savers in
promoting the nation's first juvenile court in Cook County, Illinois in 1899);
ROTHMAN, supra note 3 (discussing the social structural changes associated
with modernization and implications for systems of social control). See
generally ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE
COURT EXPERIMENT (1978) (analyzing the influence of social science research
on formulation of juvenile court's treatment ideology); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE
SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920 (1967) (discussing the impact of
industrialization on social organization and growth of bureaucracy).
16. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 19-20 (1994); SAM B.
WARNER, JR., STREETCAR SUBURBS: THE PROCESS OF GROWTH IN BOSTON,
1870-1900, at 15-21 (1974).
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factories.17 The overwhelming number of immigrants and their
ethnic, language, religious, and cultural differences from the
settled Anglo-Protestant western Europeans combined to
hinder their ability to assimilate.18
The transition from an agricultural to an industrial society
shifted work from the home economy to other work
environments and modified the roles of women and children in
the family.19 The idea of childhood is socially constructed, and
during this period the upper and middle classes promoted an
image of children as vulnerable, fragile, and dependent
innocents who required special protection and supervision.20
17. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 2, at 27 ("Industrial growth spurred
population increases and altered the urban landscape. The immigrant poor
crowded into the urban center surrounding the industrial core . . . ."); MASSEY
& DENTON, supra note 16, at 26 ("Dense clusters of tenements and row houses
were constructed ... to house the burgeoning work force.").
18. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that "new immigrants"
differed in language, religion, political heritage, and culture from the
dominant Anglo-Protestant American and that these differences from the
dominant society hindered their assimilation); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE
AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 94-130 (1955); STANLEY LIEBERSON,
A PIECE OF THE PIE: BLACK AND WHITE IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1880, at 20-30
(1980) (discussing the changing patterns of European immigration and
difficulties of assimilation because of religious, linguistic, and cultural
differences). The deindustrialization of the urban core during the last third of
the twentieth century had profound implications for the black internal
migrants who had succeeded the earlier European immigrants in the
manufacturing sectors in the city centers. See infra Part III.A.
19. Because children have less economic value in an industrial than in an
agricultural economy, the shift of economic functions from the family farm to
industrial environments encouraged a reduction in the number and change in
the spacing of children. See generally CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND
THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 178-209
(1980) (women's changing conception of themselves led to increased control of
reproduction and decline in fertility); JOSEPH F. KETT, RITES OF PASSAGE:
ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790 TO THE PRESENT 114-16 (1977) (noting that
modernization modified the roles of women and children).
20. The idea of childhood is socially constructed and specifies the social,
cultural, and physical characteristics that distinguish children from adults.
DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 16-17 (1993); Janet E.
Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The
Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1091, 1093
(1991) ("[T]he life-stage we call 'childhood' is likewise a culturally and
historically situated social construction .... The definition of childhood-who
is classified as a child, and what emotional, intellectual, and moral properties
children are assumed to possess-has changed over time in response to
changes in other facets of society." (citations omitted)). Western societies only
began to distinguish the period between infancy and adulthood and to
evidence greater concern for the welfare and rearing of children within the
1454
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The Progressive movement emerged in response to the
forces of modernization and industrialization and addressed
social problems ranging from economic regulation to criminal
justice and political reform. 21  Progressives believed that
professionals and experts could develop rational and scientific
solutions to social problems and that public authority could
intervene to solve them.22  Progressives attempted to
past few centuries. The "modern" view of childhood is that children are not
miniature adults, and that childhood is a separate stage of development.
PHILLIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY
LIFE 365-404 (Robert Baldick trans., Vintage Books 1962) (1960), traced the
modernizing conception of childhood to the upper bourgeois and nobility in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These changing views of children
gradually diffused downward through the social class structure over time. By
the early nineteenth century, a newer view of childhood began to alter
child-rearing practices in America. By the end of the century, urban upper
and middle-class parents invested far greater efforts to prepare their children
for adult roles and to restrict their autonomous departures from home. One
commentator has written that during this time
[c]hildren began to be seen as different from adults; among other
things they were considered now more innocent; childhood itself was
perceived as it is today, as a period of life not only worth recognizing
and cherishing but extending. Moreover, simply because children
were being seen for the first time as special, the family's reason for
being, its justification as it were, was increasingly related to the
proper rearing of children.
DEGLER, supra note 19, at 66; KETT, supra note 19, at 111-43. Women,
especially in the middle and upper classes, assumed a greater role in
supervising the child's moral and social development. PLATT, supra note 3, at
75-83.
21. At the turn of the century, social structural changes associated with
modernization sparked the Progressive Movement. HOFSTADTER, supra note
18; WIEBE, supra note 15. Progressivism addressed a broad spectrum of
social, political, and economic issues. See, e.g., GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH
OF CONSERVATISM 195-99 (1963) (economic regulation); ROTHMAN, supra note
3, at 5-13 (criminal and juvenile justice). Progressive reformers legislated for
public health and welfare reform, and embraced many "child-saving" programs
to respond to myriad threats to child development: inadequate and broken
families, dependency and neglect, poverty and welfare, education and work,
crime and delinquency. See, e.g., WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO
WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 108-54 (3d ed.
1984) (urban welfare); SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST?: CHILD
WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 141-61 (1982) (child welfare).
22. Progressives invoked science, rationality, and expertise to legitimate
their programs and to expand their professional authority. BURTON J.
BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM 85-92 (1976). Progressives
believed that they could solve contentious social problems with rational and
scientific methods, and attempted to transform political and moral conflicts
into technical managerial decisions made by experts in administrative
agencies insulated from partisan strife. SUTTON, supra note 3, at 124 ("[A]
characteristic feature of Progressive movements was their tendency to see
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 87:1447
"Americanize" the immigrants and poor through a variety of
agencies of assimilation and acculturation to become sober,
virtuous, middle-class Americans like themselves. 23
Progressives combined their belief in state power with the new
cultural conception of childhood and enacted a number of
child-centered reforms-the juvenile court, child labor laws,
social welfare laws, and compulsory school attendance laws-
that both reflected and advanced the changing imagery of
childhood. 24
social control not as a moral or political problem, but primarily as an
administrative problem.").
23. Progressives sought to use the state to inculcate their values in others.
See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 60 ("The most distinguishing
characteristic of Progressivism was its fundamental trust in the power of the
state to do good."). Because Progressives viewed individual and social welfare
as co-extensive, they saw no need to interpose procedural safeguards to protect
individuals from state benevolence. See also FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE
BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 129-30
(1964).
Lieberson makes the important point that the Progressives' assimilationist
agenda for southern and eastern European immigrants entering the cities of
the North differed sharply from the exclusionary and segregated experiences
of rural Blacks in the South:
Faced with a substantial flow of immigration from new sources,
the educational institutions of the urban North were expected to
provide a central mechanism for assimilation. Universal education,
which admittedly owed its impetus to earlier forces, was to provide
the means for teaching the English language, develop loyalty to the
new nation through an understanding of its history and
opportunities, create the habits of dress, cleanliness, and demeanor
that were desired, and generate a literate population that could vote
wisely and also contribute productively to the labor force.
By contrast, the provision of education for blacks in the South was
made reluctantly and was of relatively poor quality. Preparation for
good citizenship was largely irrelevant as blacks were disenfranchised
and, moreover, the "place" envisioned for blacks in the economic and
social structure of the South was hardly compatible with a classical
education.
LIEBERSON, supra note 18, at 135. Lieberson argues that these differences in
policies of inclusion versus exclusion helped to shape the differences in the
subsequent experiences of Blacks when they moved to the North during the
"great migration" around World War II. Id. at 136.
24. A child-centered theme pervaded many Progressive programs that
were designed to structure child development and to control and mold them
while protecting them from exploitation. See, e.g., WIEBE, supra note 15, at
169 ("The child was the carrier of tomorrow's hope whose innocence and
freedom made him singularly receptive to education in rational, humane
behavior. Protect him, nurture him, and in his manhood he would create that
bright new world of the progressives' vision."); see also LAWRENCE A. CREMIN,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL: PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION, 1876-1957, at 127-28 (1961) (compulsory school attendance laws);
1456
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Positive criminology supplanted the classical formulation
of crime as the product of free-will choices, provided a more
modern and scientific conception of social control, and
attempted to identify the forces that caused criminality.25
Because Progressive reformers attributed criminal behavior to
external and deterministic forces, they de-emphasized
individual moral responsibility for crime, employed medical
analogies to "treat" offenders, and focused on efforts to reform
rather than to punish them.26 Criminal justice personnel
TIFFIN, supra note 21, at 141-61 (child welfare legislation); WALTER I.
TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CHILD
LABOR COMMITTEE AND CHILD LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA 119-42 (1970)
(child labor laws).
25. Criminal justice policies reflect underlying ideological assumptions
about the causes of crime and the appropriate tactics and strategies to reduce
it. FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION
36-42 (1982). Ideologies of crime "structure the ways in which we think about
criminals, providing the intellectual frameworks (whether scientific or
religious or commonsensical) through which we see these individuals,
understand their motivations, and dispose of them as cases. Cultural patterns
also structure the ways in which we feel about offenders .... " DAVID
GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 195 (1990). The classical
criminal law assumed free-willed actors made blameworthy choices to commit
crimes and that they deserved prescribed consequences for their acts.
At the turn of the century, new theories about human behavior and social
deviance caused Progressives to reformulate the ideology of crime and modify
criminal justice administration. Positive criminology asserted that antecedent
forces-biological, psychological, social, or environmental--"determined" or
caused criminal behavior. See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 50-52.
Reflecting the modern rationalizing tendencies, they sought scientifically to
identify the causes of crime and delinquency in order to prescribe an
appropriate remedy. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative
Ideal, in THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LAW AND
CRIMINOLOGY 26 (1964) [hereinafter ALLEN, Legal Values]; DAVID MATZA,
DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 6-7 (Transaction Publishers 1990) (1964).
Positivism attributed criminal behavior to deterministic forces that compelled
the offender to act as he did, rather than to a deliberate choice or exercise of
"free will." Determinism reduced offenders' responsibility for their crimes, and
penologists attempted to reform them rather than to punish them for their
offenses. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 3-7
(1981) [hereinafter ALLEN, REHABILITATIVE IDEAL]. Katherine Beckett
describes the ideology of "penological modernism" as the foundation for both
criminal justice and social welfare practices: "[Dieviant behavior is at least
partially caused (rather than freely chosen). Progressive reformers therefore
identified rehabilitation-operationally defined as the use of 'individualized,
corrective measures adapted to the specific case or the particular problem'--as
the appropriate response to deviant behavior." KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING
CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 8 (1997).
26. MATZA, supra note 25, at 12-21; ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 50-52;
RYERSON, supra note 15, at 22.
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analogized their practices to the medical profession. 27 They
embraced the "Rehabilitative Ideal," which included both a
belief in human malleability and a consensus about the
appropriate directions of personal change. 28
The juvenile court melded the new ideology of childhood
with the new conceptions of social control, introduced a judicial-
welfare alternative to the criminal justice system, and provided
the organizational mechanism to substitute the state as parens
patriae.29 Progressive "child-savers" described juvenile courts
as a benign, non-punitive, and therapeutic agency. 30 The legal
doctrine of parens patriae legitimated state intervention on the
rationale that the juvenile court was a civil rather than
27. MATZA, supra note 25, at 12-21; ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 293-323;
RYERSON, supra note 15, at 105-24.
28. Francis Allen describes the central assumptions of the "Rehabilitative
Ideal":
The rehabilitative ideal.., assumed, first, that human behavior is
the product of antecedent causes. These causes can be identified ....
Knowledge of the antecedents of human behavior makes possible an
approach to the scientific control of human behavior. Finally,... it is
assumed that measures employed to treat the convicted offender
should serve a therapeutic function; that such measures should be
designed to effect changes in the behavior of the convicted person in
the interest of his own happiness, health, and satisfaction and in the
interest of social defense.
ALLEN, Legal Values, supra note 25, at 26. A flourishing "Rehabilitative
Ideal" requires a cultural consensus about means and ends, agreement about
the goals of change and the strategies necessary to achieve them. Progressives
believed that the new social and behavioral sciences provided the necessary
means with which to systematically change people. Id. at 26-27. They also
believed in the virtues of their social order and the propriety of imposing their
middle-class values on immigrants and the poor. ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at
48-49 ("Progressives were equally convinced of the viability of cultural uplift
and of the supreme desirability of middle-class life in cultural as well as
material terms .... The model was clear: all Americans were to become
middle-class Americans.").
In Part III, this Article will argue that some of the recent "get tough"
juvenile justice policies reflect a repudiation of the assumptions of positivism
and the "Rehabilitative Ideal" in favor of classical ideas of crime as the product
of rational choice by responsible individuals who deserve punishment. See
infra notes 487-90 and accompanying text; see also Feld, Transformation-
Part II, supra note 5, at 328-29 (arguing that the juvenile court is premised on
two competing and contradictory legal conceptions of juveniles and adolescent
criminal responsibility; one "views young people as innocent, vulnerable,
fragile, and dependent children," and the other "perceives young people as
vigorous, autonomous, and responsible almost adult-like people from whose
criminal behavior the public needs protection").
29. FELD, supra note 2, at 55-57; ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 205-35.
30. PLATT, supra note 3, at 176-81; SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 3, at 58;
SUTTON, supra note 3, at 232-58.
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criminal agency. Because reformers characterized the court's
intervention as a civil welfare proceeding, they enjoyed greater
flexibility to supervise and treat children. The juvenile court's
"status jurisdiction" enabled them to respond to non-criminal
behavior such as smoking, sexual activity, truancy, immorality,
or living a wayward, idle, and dissolute life. 31
An inextricable relationship exists between procedure and
substance in the juvenile court. Because the Progressives'
juvenile courts separated children from adults and provided a
rehabilitative alternative to punishment, they also rejected the
criminal law's procedural safeguards. 32  Juvenile courts
employed informal procedures, excluded lawyers and juries,
conducted confidential hearings, and adopted a euphemistic
vocabulary to obscure the reality of criminal social control. 33
Juvenile courts imposed indeterminate and non-proportional
sentences which they characterized as treatment and
supervision rather than punishment; the sentences reflected
31. Reformers conceived juvenile courts as a system of social welfare that
controlled young peoples' behaviors that criminal courts previously ignored or
handled informally. PLATT, supra note 3, at 46-74; SUTTON, supra note 3, at
121-53. This broader jurisdiction included not only criminal acts but also a
child's status or life circumstances. See, e.g., RYERSON, supra note 15, at 47
(" [T]he juvenile court reformers were placing their movement among a number
of others which were, in the progressive period, sending numerous
missionaries from the dominant culture to the lower classes to acculturate
immigrants, to teach mothers household management, and to supervise the
recipients of charity."); SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 3, at 151-53. The "status
jurisdiction" embodied the newer conception of childhood, furthered the legal
differentiation between children and adults, and expanded state authority
over child-rearing and family functions. PLATT, supra note 3, at 134-36
(noting that the juvenile court simultaneously affirmed the primacy of nuclear
family and expanded the power of the state to intervene in instances of
parental inadequacy).
32. See ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 212; FELD, supra note 2, at 60-63.
33. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PANEL ON JUVENILE CRIME:
PREVENTION, TREATMENT AND CONTROL, JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE
154 (Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001), which summarizes the Progressive's
conception of juvenile court procedures:
It was to focus on the child or adolescent as a person in need of
assistance, not on the act that brought him or her before the court.
The proceedings were informal, with much discretion left to the
juvenile court judge. Because the judge was to act in the best
interests of the child, procedural safeguards available to adults, such
as the right to an attorney, the right to know the charges brought
against one, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's
accuser, were thought unnecessary. Juvenile court proceedings were
closed to the public and juvenile records were to remain confidential
so as not to interfere with the child's or adolescent's ability to be
rehabilitated and reintegrated into society.
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the offenders' "best interests" and future welfare rather than
past offenses.34  This juvenile court model required a
specialized judge trained in social sciences and child
development. The judge would be assisted by social service
personnel, clinicians, and probation officers to make
individualized dispositions in the child's "best interests."
Progressives believed that by scientifically analyzing the facts
of a child's circumstances, the proper diagnosis and
prescription would emerge. 35 Because they acted benevolently,
individualized their solicitude, and intervened scientifically,
the court's Progressive creators saw no reason to circumscribe
the power of the state.36 Instead, they granted judges broad
discretion to diagnose and treat the child based on her
character and lifestyle rather than on the crime.37
Despite their benevolent rhetoric, Progressive reformers
intended the juvenile court to discriminate. They deliberately
designed it to control the poor and immigrant children and to
distinguish between "our children" and "other people's
34. See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104, 107
(1909). "Juvenile court judges imposed indeterminate and non-proportional
dispositions that could continue for the duration of minority." FELD, supra
note 2, at 70. "Indeterminate" meant that the dispositions had no set limit
and could continue indefinitely until adulthood. Id. "Non-proportional" meant
that no relationship existed between what the child allegedly did and the
length of disposition; the trivial or serious nature of the offense imposed no
limits in advance." Id. The particular "reason or offense that brought a child
before the court affected neither the degree, the duration, nor the intensity of
intervention." Id. Each child's circumstances differed and judges based
dispositions on their future "needs" rather than their past "deeds." Id.
Juvenile courts rejected notions of blameworthiness and deserved punishment
for past offenses in favor of a utilitarian strategy of future-oriented social
welfare dispositions. Id. In theory, judges decided why the child appeared in
court and what the court could do to change the character, attitude, and
behavior of the youth to prevent a reappearance. THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE
CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 83 (1992) ("[The juvenile court] was a social
welfare agency, the central processing unit of the entire child welfare system.
Children who had needs of any kind could be brought into the juvenile court,
where their troubles would be diagnosed and the services they needed
provided by court workers or obtained from other agencies."). Judges decided
each case individually on the basis of unspecified "clinical" factors that did not
necessarily apply to the next. MATZA, supra note 25, at 111-36.
35. MATZA, supra note 25, at 111-36; ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 242-43;
RYERSON, supra note 15, at 42-43.
36. See MATZA, supra note 25, at 111-36; ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 215-
16; RYERSON, supra note 15, at 42-43.
37. ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 238; RYERSON, supra note 15, at 40-41;
SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 3, at 157-80.
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children."38 Their pursuit of the "Rehabilitative Ideal" caused
Progressives to locate the juvenile court on several cultural,
legal, and criminological fault-lines. They created binary
distinctions between the juvenile and criminal justice systems:
either child or adult; either determinism or free will; either
dependent or responsible; either treatment or punishment;
either welfare or deserts; either procedural informality or
formality; and either discretion or the rule of law. As the next
Part explains, during the past three decades, as a result of
structural and racial demographic changes in cities, the
Supreme Court's "constitutional domestication of the juvenile
court," the rise in serious youth crime, and the erosion of the
juvenile court's rehabilitative assumptions, a fundamental shift
has occurred from the former to the latter of each binary pair.
II. THE WARREN COURT AND THE "DUE PROCESS
REVOLUTION" IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
In the decades prior to and after World War II, black
migration from the rural South to the urban North increased
minority concentrations in urban ghettos, made race a national
rather than a regional issue, and provided the political and
legal impetus for the civil rights movement. 39  Broader
structural and demographic changes taking place in American
society, particularly those associated with race and youth
crime, impelled the Warren Court's civil rights decisions,
criminal procedure rulings, and "constitutional domestication"
of the juvenile court during the 1960s.4 0 The constitutional and
statutory recognition of Blacks' civil rights in the mid-1960s
coincided with the "baby boom" escalation in youth crime and
urban racial disorders. By the end of the decade, conservative
politicians began to exploit the issues of crime and race for
electoral advantage.
38. FELD, supra note 2, at 75-76; GRUBB & LAZERSON, supra note 2, at 69
(discussing the selective application of parens patriae ideology in a class-based
society); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 154-55 (discussing the
tension between social control and social welfare and balancing the best
interest of the child with the protection of society); ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at
222.
39. See generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT
BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA (1991); Joe William
Trotter, Jr., Black Migration in Historical Perspective, in THE GREAT
MIGRATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: NEW DIMENSIONS OF RACE, CLASS,
AND GENDER (Joe William Trotter, Jr. ed., 1991).
40. See FELD, supra note 2, at 97-106; POWE, supra note 8, at 437-39.
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A. RACE AND SOCIAL STRUCTURAL CHANGES
The "great migration" of Blacks from the rural South to the
industrial North and West in the decades before and during
World War II increased the urbanization of Blacks and placed
the issues of racial equality and civil rights on the national
political agenda.41 The outbreak of World War I in 1914
curtailed European immigration to the United States and
created a demand for black southern laborers to work in
northern industrial factories. 42 Because World War I increased
demand for industrial production and reduced the flow of
European immigrants to work in northern factories, labor
recruiters solicited rural southern Blacks.43 Between 1910 and
1920, more than 500,000 Blacks migrated to non-southern
states, followed by more than 875,000 in the 1920s.44 During
the period between the World Wars, the mechanization of
cotton-picking and the devastation to cotton production caused
by the Mexican boll weevil combined to decrease southern
demand for black workers. 45 An additional 400,000 Blacks left
41. LEMANN, supra note 39, at 5-7.
42. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 27-29.
43. See, e.g., LEMANN, supra note 39, at 5-6; MASSEY & DENTON, supra
note 16, at 28-29 ("The event that transformed the stream into a flood,
however, was the outbreak of World War I in 1914.").
44. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 29.
45. See, e.g., LEMANN, supra note 39, at 5-6 (noting that in the nineteenth
century, the cotton gin made the growing of cotton commercially viable and
slavery became the economic foundation of the pre-Civil War southern
economy; in the twentieth century, the mechanical cotton picker dramatically
reduced the need for cheap, black laborers and the share-cropping economy
that succeeded slavery); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 29 (stating that
boll weevil devastated cotton crops and contributed to a shift in southern
agriculture from cotton to food and livestock, which were less labor intensive);
MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 52 (1999) ("Blacks had been
disproportionately affected by the shift to mechanized agriculture in the
South, which was contemporaneous with the increased demand for labor in
the growing northern economies."). As recently as 1940, more than three-
quarters of Blacks lived in the South and half resided in the rural South.
LEMANN, supra note 39, at 6. The mechanization of cotton picking spurred the
great migration from rural to urban areas and from the South to the North
and West:
Between 1910 and 1970, six and a half million black Americans
moved from the South to the North; five million of them moved after
1940, during the time of the mechanization of cotton farming. In
1970, when the migration ended, black America was only half
Southern, and less than a quarter rural; "urban" had become a
euphemism for "black."
Id. at 6.
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the south for northern cities during the Great Depression as a
result of worsening economic conditions. 46 Southern racial
hostility, Jim Crow laws, Ku Klux Klan violence, lynchings,
poor segregated schools, and job discrimination provided
additional incentives for many Blacks to join the exodus. 47
Following the Great Depression, opportunities to work in
industries associated with war production during World War II
induced more than 1,500,000 Blacks to leave their rural
southern homes.48 During World War II, 12,000,000 men and
women entered the armed forces, and another 15,000,000
civilians relocated for new defense jobs.49 Between 1940 and
1944, wartime defense contractors integrated their work forces
and the black population in urban areas increased
dramatically.50 From 1940 to 1970, an additional five million
Blacks migrated from the South and reduced the proportion of
Blacks who lived in the South from three-quarters of the black
population to about half.5 1
Blacks almost always moved to cities when they left the
rural South. 52 In 1910, less than one-quarter of Blacks lived in
46. See FELD, supra note 2, at 84; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at
43.
47. See FELD, supra note 2, at 84; see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note
16, at 28-29 (indicating that "push" factors as well as "pull" factors motivated
black migration).
48. See, e.g., GILENS, supra note 15, at 104-05 ("The average black out-
migration from the South between 1910 and 1939 was only 55,000 people per
year. But during the 1940s it increased to 160,000 per year, during the 1950s
it declined slightly (to 146,000 per year), and between 1960 and 1966 it fell to
102,000 per year."); see also ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND
WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 18 (1992) ("The real change began
during the Second World War, when for the first time black Americans were
courted by white society. A shortage of civilian labor forced employers to offer
jobs to workers who previously had been excluded."); LIEBERSON, supra note
18, at 9. Lieberson notes,
In 1920, only a few years before massive new European immigration
was to end, 85 percent of all blacks lived in the South. Three-fourths
were still in the South when the United States entered World War II.
This figure decreased in succeeding decades, thanks to the massive
changes during and after the war, but in 1970 a bare majority of
blacks was still living in the South.
Id.
49. FELD, supra note 2, at 85.
50. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 43.
51. LEMANN, supra note 39, at 6; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note at 16, at
45 (noting that 1,500,000 blacks migrated during the 1950s, and 1,400,000
migrated during the 1960s).
52. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 18 (noting that during the
'great migration," southern blacks flooded Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, and
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cities. 53 By 1940, half of Blacks lived in cities, and by 1960,
more than three-quarters did. 54  In 1870, 80% of black
Americans lived in the rural South; by 1970, 80% of black
Americans resided in urban locales, half in the North and
West. 55 Southern Blacks poured into New York, Chicago, Los
Angeles, Philadelphia, and other northern, midwestern, and
western urban centers during this massive migration.56
When Blacks moved to cities, they lived almost exclusively
in urban ghettos. 57 Although African-Americans comprised
only 2% of northerners in 1910, by 1960, they accounted for 7%
of the northern population and 12% of urban residents. 58 With
the increase in racial diversity outside the South, northern
Whites reacted to the rural southern black migrants in their
midst with fear and hostility.59 Violence, arson, and bombings
reinforced racial discrimination and segregation in housing,
education, and employment; so black concentration and racial
isolation increased even as their urban population grew.60
Residential segregation created and perpetuated the black
ghettos that now exist in virtually every major city.61
Coinciding with the "great migration," Whites began to
move from cities to suburbs in ever larger numbers during the
post-World War II era, leaving Blacks isolated in blighted
other northern and midwestern industrial centers); see also Trotter, supra
note 39 (analyzing the causes and impact of great migration in different
regions of the country).
53. FELD, supra note 2, at 85 fig.3.2.
54. Id.
55. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 18; see also GILENS, supra
note 15, at 104-05.
56. FELD, supra note 2, at 85; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 45.
57. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 45-46.
58. See GILENS, supra note 15, at 105 ("As a consequence of this
migration, African Americans, who accounted for only 2 percent of all
northerners in 1910, comprised 7 percent by 1960, and, perhaps more
importantly, made up 12 percent of the population in urban areas.").
59. See HACKER, supra note 48, at 19; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16,
at 30 (describing an upsurge of racial violence in northern cities between 1900
and 1920 and attacks on individual Blacks).
60. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 33-35; see also LIEBERSON,
supra note 18, at 260 ("[B]lack segregation in the urban North increased from
1900 onward not only because their proportion of the population grew, but also
because the same composition led to more isolation than it had during earlier
decades.").
61. FELD, supra note 2, at 85-86; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at
17-59.
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inner-city ghettos. 62  Federal mortgage, housing, and tax
policies subsidized the construction of privately owned single-
family homes in the almost exclusively white suburbs.63 The
federal interstate road-building program facilitated suburban
expansion even as easy credit enabled more suburban
commuters to purchase automobiles. 64 The combination of
federal housing and highway policies contributed to the
development of predominantly white suburbs that isolated
urban poor and minority residents within the major cities. 65
The federal government simultaneously cut mortgage subsidies
for the construction of urban rental units, and the Federal
Housing Administration reduced the availability of mortgage
and home improvement loans in the sections of cities into
which Blacks were moving.66 Even as federal highway policy
subsidized white suburban dispersal, the location of interstate
highways and housing projects disrupted many black urban
communities and created physical barriers to contain their
expansion. 67 As Whites moved to the suburbs, industry and
employment opportunities began to move from the urban
centers as well.
Despite general post-War affluence and growth, the
disadvantaged status of Blacks called for fundamental social
62. MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON
POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE 133-37 (1989); MASSEY & DENTON, supra
note 16, at 45-46.
63. KATZ, supra note 62, at 134-35 (noting that in the period after 1945,
suburbs grew rapidly as federal mortgages subsidized privately-owned, single-
family homes and building contractors applied mass production techniques to
residential construction and built suburban housing tracts).
64. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 44-45.
65. See KATZ, supra note 62, at 134-35 ("Federal policy ensured that
housing development happened in suburbs rather than within cities and
favored the white middle classes rather than minorities and the poor.");
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 44-45 ("In making this transition from
urban to suburban life, middle-class whites demanded and got massive federal
investments in highway construction that permitted rapid movement to and
from central cities by car.").
66. See KATZ, supra note 62, at 134-35.
67. See id. at 135-36 ("Not only did new highways and expressways
encourage commuting and population dispersal; they also divided cities into
new sections, creating walls between poor or minority neighborhoods and
central business districts."); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 55-56
("During the 1950s and 1960s, local elites manipulated housing and urban
renewal legislation to carry out widespread slum clearance in growing black
neighborhoods that threatened white business districts and elite
institutions.... [Housing] projects were typically built on cleared land within
or adjacent to existing black neighborhoods.").
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and legal reforms. The decades of the 1950s and 1960s
witnessed a basic shift in the understanding of race and racial
identities and the emergence of a more assertive civil rights
movement that initially challenged segregation in the South
and subsequently emerged as a social movement against
racism throughout the nation. 68 Demands for racial equality
and social justice confronted the racist ideology of segregation,
contested the social construction of race, and ultimately
transformed racial politics. 69
In 1948, the Democratic Party convention platform
included a strong civil rights plank in response to northern
Blacks' growing political influence and white liberals'
opposition to segregation.7" In reaction, Strom Thurmond ran
as a segregationist "Dixiecrat" in the 1948 presidential
election.71 He carried Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
68. See, e.g., OMI & WINANT, supra note 7, at 95-100.
69. See id. at 96. The authors argue that during the 1950s, the race-based
Civil Rights movements contested the social construction of race:
It was this process which created what we call "the great
transformation" of racial awareness, racial meaning, racial
subjectivity. Race is not only a matter of politics, economics, or
culture, but of all these "levels" of lived experience simultaneously. It
is a pre-eminently social phenomenon, something which suffuses each
individual identity, each family and community, yet equally
penetrates state institutions and market relationships. The racial
minority movements of the period were the first new social
movements-the first to expand the concerns of politics to the social,
to the terrain of everyday life.
Id.
70. See BECKETT, supra note 25, at 40 ("As a result of black migration to
the North, this [New Deal] alliance included more and more blacks-a trend
that marked a dramatic break from the post-Civil War partisan configuration
and created quite a dilemma for those interested in maintaining white
southern allegiance to the Democratic party."); EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note
11, at 33 ("By 1948, black political muscle, growing opposition to segregation
among white liberals, and the increased dependence of northern city political
bosses on black votes produced the first Democratic convention platform to
include a strong civil rights plank."); LIEBERSON, supra note 18, at 101
("Growing black voting strength in the North, coupled with the concerns of
liberal white voters, to an increasing degree meant that politicians aspiring to
national office could not overlook the implications of their policies toward the
South."); OMI & WINANT, supra note 7, at 16 ("[T]he 1948 confrontation
between integrationists and segregationists within the Democratic Party-a
battle won decisively if not absolutely by the integrationists-symbolized the
consensual shift [toward the desirability of integration]."); POWE, supra note 8,
at 9-10 ("These intellectual, social, and political currents led the 1948
Democratic convention to adopt a civil rights plank and caused a Dixiecrat
revolt, sealing the southern position as narrowly sectional.").
71. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 34.
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South Carolina, and demonstrated the powerful salience of race
as a basis for political realignment in the South and throughout
the nation.72 Although Presidents Truman and Eisenhower
took some steps to address racial inequality, Congress resisted
adoption of anti-discrimination laws, open housing laws,
federal aid to education, or national health insurance. 73 Even
as the nation became more urbanized and racially disparate,
racist southern Democrats in Congress occupied chairmanships
of pivotal committees and blocked legislative initiatives for
racial equality, social justice, and urban programs. 74 During
the McCarthy era and Cold War, advocates for civil rights and
racial reform were put on the defensive by conservative
Congressmen.75 At the same time, however, the legacy of
Hitler's racist crimes and the international competition
between capitalism and communism for the allegiance of the
decolonizing nations of the third world required a national
response to southern racial violence and segregation.76 During
the 1950s and 1960s, the Warren Court's constitutional agenda
on desegregation, civil rights, and criminal procedure aimed to
dismantle the southern caste system of white supremacy and
impose national legal norms on the region. 77 It was only during
the decade between Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 and
the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 that the Court and
Congress adopted national equality norms and eliminated the
legal foundations of racial separation. 78
72. See BECKETT, supra note 25, at 40 (noting the 1948 election and
describing the effect of the Democrats' later attempts to appease the
Dixiecrats); EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 34 ("The 1948 Thurmond
campaign... demonstrated the power of the issue of race to break the lock of
the national Democratic party on the South, a step of critical consequence in a
thirty-two-year long process that would produce a regional realignment in
presidential elections by 1980.").
73. FELD, supra note 2, at 86-87.
74. Id. at 87; see also LEMANN, supra note 39, at 111.
75. FELD, supra note 2, at 87.
76. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 59-60 (1997)
(stating that internationalists "perceived the importance of the newly
emerging colored nations to the struggle between the capitalist nations and
the communist nations for global supremacy; unredressed lynchings, after all,
fit poorly into America's portrayal of itself as the virtuous leader of the Free
World").
77. See POWE, supra note 8, at 490-92.
78. See MENDELBERG, supra note 12, at 79-93; POWE, supra note 8, at
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B. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE PROTECTION OF
"DISCRETE AND INSULAR" MINORITIES
The "great migration" made race a national rather than a
regional issue because it increased the visibility and awareness
of the "American dilemma."7 9 It moved racial inequality to the
center of the nation's and the Warren Court's concerns about
civil rights, crime policy, and social justice. The population
shifts made Blacks an important electoral force in several
swing states, altering the balance of political power, the
constituencies of the respective political parties, and the
characteristics of the justices appointed to the Supreme Court
in the 1950s and 1960s. 80
During the 1937-1938 term, the Supreme Court reviewed
the constitutionality of New Deal laws and distinguished
between the scope of judicial review of economic legislation-
where it gave the legislative branch and the states almost
unlimited authority-and its scrutiny of laws that affected
"personal" rights. In the famous "Footnote Four" of United
States v. Carolene Products Co., the Court announced that,
while it would defer to legislative regulation of economic
matters, it would review more closely legislation affecting
rights enumerated in the Constitution.8' In addition, the Court
79. See, e.g., LEMANN, supra note 39, at 7 ("The great black migration
made race a national issue in the second half of the century-an integral part
of the politics, the social thought, and the organization of ordinary life in the
United States."); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 1008-11 (2d ed. 1962) (arguing that
biological theories of black racial inferiority, racial prejudice, and Southern
practices of segregation and enforced inequality conflicted with the "American
Creed" of democracy, equality, and justice under law and ultimately required
assimilation and integration of Blacks into the mainstream of American
society); POWE, supra note 8, at 44-45 ("The continuing migration of African-
Americans out of the South to the economic opportunities in the North away
from state-mandated segregation made African-Americans a newly potent
electoral force in a number of key states.").
80. See POWE, supra note 8, at 44-49.
81. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938). The Supreme Court in Footnote Four stated that
[tihere may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
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announced that it would strive to assure fairness in the
political process through "exacting judicial scrutiny" of laws
affecting racial minorities and other "discrete and insular
minorities" who might suffer from majoritarian legal
domination of the political processes.8 2 The Court recognized
that those in power might pervert the political process in order
to entrench themselves. 83  Its emerging individual rights
agenda also recognized that "discrete and insular" racial
minorities could be perpetual losers in the political process
because of their vulnerability to scapegoating and race-
baiting.84
The Warren Court increased judicial activism to protect
minority civil rights because "the questions associated with the
black experience in America raised, as no others could, the
spectre of internal conflict between the values of a free and
open political life ... and of fair treatment of 'minorities.' 85
Until the 1960s, law, custom, and extra-legal violence in the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into
the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or
racial minorities, whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.
Id. (citations omitted).
82. Id.; see also, e.g., POWE, supra note 8, at 214-15 ("The theory of
Footnote Four suggests that even if African-Americans in the South could
vote, they could not win elections and might be subject to such prejudice that
legislation hostile to them would be forthcoming."); Robert M. Cover, The
Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287,
1294-97 (1982).
83. Cover, supra note 82, at 1300.
84. See id. Cover notes that
'[d]iscrete and insular" minorities are not simply losers in the
political arena, they are perpetual losers. Indeed, to say that they
lose in the majoritarian political process is seriously to distort the
facts: they are scapegoats in the real political struggles between other
groups. Moreover, in their "insularity" such groups may be
characteristically helpless, passive victims of the political process. It
is, therefore, because of the discreteness and insularity of certain
minorities (objects of prejudice) that we cannot trust "the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities."
Id. (citation omitted in original); see also LIEBERSON, supra note 18, at 51
("Because about 90 percent of all blacks were living in the South at the turn of
the century, and because they could not vote, blacks were more or less wiped
out as a political force in the United States.").
85. See Cover, supra note 82, at 1300.
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South combined to create and enforce a caste system of white
supremacy.8 6  Blacks were the victims of extreme racial
domination through duly enacted "Jim Crow" laws as well as
extra-legal violence.8 7 Southern terrorism flourished because
"law enforcement was almost exclusively local, political, and
non-professional," and because Whites readily resorted to
organized violence when actions to change prevailing racial
mores were threatened. 88 The combination of private terror,
formal legal discrimination, and political exclusion assured
that southern Blacks would remain disenfranchised and
subordinated without national legal intervention.
In 1955, the modern civil rights movement for equal rights,
the right to vote, and the end of legally sanctioned racial
segregation gained national prominence with the Montgomery
bus boycott led by Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.89 The
movement continued throughout the South for the next decade
with a series of protests, demonstrations, sit-ins, and violent
clashes with the defenders of segregation.9"
Because southern domination of Congress in the 1950s
86. POWE, supra note 8, at 490. Powe concludes that the Warren Court
explicitly intended an assault on southern legal and cultural traditions:.
By 1953 the South had created, by law and custom (backed by
whatever force necessary), a caste system based on white supremacy.
From laws against miscegenation, to laws mandating segregation, to
subterfuges maintaining a basically all-white electorate, to the use of
peremptory challenges to ban African-Americans from juries, to the
enforced customs of better jobs for whites, to mandating social
deference ... the southerners lived in a society that told all whites, no
matter how poor, ignorant, or illiterate, that they were better than
any African-American.
Id.
87. See, e.g., GILENS, supra note 15, at 107. During the 1950s southern
Blacks attended segregated schools, rode segregated buses, and used
segregated bathrooms. Id. Blacks could not drink from "white" water
fountains, eat in "white" restaurants, or sleep in "white" hotels. Id. African-
Americans had little voice in government and little hope for fair treatment
from the white police or the white judiciary. Id.; see also HACKER, supra note
48, at 17 ("In the South, physical force was blatant and unabashed. The
whims of a sheriff, an employer, even the driver of a bus, could hold black lives
in thrall.").
88. Cover, supra note 82, at 1303. Cover contends that the southern
political process failed emancipated Blacks because no white groups would
form political alliances with them. Id. at 1302-03. Potential allies were
forestalled because "racist domination required that the politics of the region
be violent and extreme.... [T]error has always been part of southern regional
politics." Id. at 1303.
89. See GILENS, supra note 15, at 108.
90. POWE, supra note 8, at 171-75.
1470
2003] RACE, POLITICS, AND JUVENILE JUSTICE
prevented the adoption of federal remedial legislation, the task
fell to the Supreme Court to pursue racial equality by
dismantling the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson.91 In the 1950s and 1960s, racial justice and urban
social problems presented volatile political issues that the
legislative branch was unable or unwilling to address, and the
Warren Court, of necessity, filled the public policy void.92 The
Court embarked on a course of judicial activism to protect
individual rights, civil liberties, and minorities' interests from
majoritarian impositions. The disadvantaged status of racial
minorities in a society formally committed to legal equality
posed a constitutional dilemma with international
ramifications. The aftermath of World War II and the
consequences of Nazi racist ideology rendered racial
segregation and southern white supremacy inconsistent with
more egalitarian national values.93  In the Cold War
competition with communism for dominance in the decolonizing
countries of the Third World, America's domestic racial
91. See, e.g., Michael J. Kiarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal
Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 94 (2000) (arguing that "the Supreme Court
probably was a better gauge of national opinion on race than was a United
States Congress in which white supremacist southern Democrats enjoyed
disproportionate power because of Senate seniority and filibuster rules"); see
also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1896) (validating the "separate
but equal" doctrine); POWE, supra note 8, at 21 (noting that the Plessy Court
upheld the constitutionality of "separate but equal" as consistent with equal
protection, left racial issues to the state, and denied the law a role in changing
racial attitudes). The implications for the Court of overruling Plessy were
profound. See, e.g., G. Edward White, Warren Court, 1953-1969, in AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 280 (L. Levy et al. eds., 2d ed. 1989). White notes,
Brown involved a major social problem, racial discrimination,
translated into a legal question, the constitutionality of separate but
equal public schools. It posed an issue that no other branch of
government was anxious to address. It raised questions that had
distinctively moral implications: in invalidating racial segregation the
Court was condemning the idea of racial supremacy. And it affected
the lives of ordinary citizens, not merely in the South, not merely in
public education, for the Court's series of per curiam decisions after
Brown revealed that it did not consider racial segregation any more
valid in other public facilities than it had in schools. The Warren
Court had significantly altered race relations in America.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
92. See White, supra note 91; POWE, supra note 8, at 39-41.
93. See POWE, supra note 8, at 47 (noting that the Brown v. Board of
Education Justices "understood, although they did not say so, that segregation
subjugated African-Americans because as practiced in the South its only
meaning was white supremacy, an idea that, at a minimum, World War II had
put to rest as incompatible with what the United States stands for"); supra
note 76.
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relations belied the values of liberty, equality, and democracy it
promoted so vigorously abroad.
Although the NAACP Legal Defense Fund attacked the
"separate but equal" doctrine in a variety of fora, the crucial
battle in the struggle for racial justice and the dismantling of
de jure segregation occurred in the effort to desegregate
schools. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Warren Court
concluded that separate no longer could be equal. 94 Although
Brown ordered states to desegregate with "all deliberate
speed,"95 southern political leaders challenged the "lawfulness"
of the Court's decision and urged "massive resistance" to
judicial usurpation. 96  Despite the Court's efforts to end
segregation in education, massive southern resistance to court-
ordered desegregation in the 1950s, along with the Goldwater
Republican presidential campaign of 1964 and the Wallace and
Nixon campaigns of 1968, demonstrated the salience of race
and "right-wing populism" as political organizing principles. 97
During the initial phases of the civil rights movement, the
goals were to end segregation, to secure equal rights, and to
protect the right to vote.98 The political pressure generated by
94. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); see also White, supra
note 91, at 280 ("The context of the Warren Court's first momentous decisions
was decisive in shaping the Court's character as a branch of government that
was not disinclined to resolve difficult social issues, not hesitant to foster
social change, not reluctant to involve itself in controversy.").
95. Brown, 349 U.S. at 301.
96. See POWE, supra note 8, at 46-47 (indicating that white southern
leaders urged resistance and described Brown as a decision by "a lawless
Court, abandoning the Constitution ('a mere scrap of paper') for the personal
and political values of unelected judges").
97. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 76-79; POWE, supra note 8, at
60-62 (describing how southern congressional Democrats drafted the
"Southern Manifesto" which denounced Brown as an abuse of judicial power
and advocated non-compliance with an unlawful decision and noting that
several of those southern congressmen who declined to endorse the Manifesto
were defeated in the next democratic primary). In the aftermath of Brown,
southern racial moderates virtually disappeared under the pressure of more
hard-line racists. Id. at 162. After George Wallace lost the 1958 Alabama
governor's race to an avowed racist, he vowed that he was "not goin' to be out-
niggahed again," a strategy he refined in subsequent national presidential
campaigns. See id. at 162.
98. TALi MENDELBERG, supra note 12, at 18 (2001). Mendelberg argues
that the norm of racial equality emerged in the United States during the
1950s and 1960s as cultural leaders and influential elites attacked
segregation, lynching and brutality, and the denial of the right to vote:
Cultural leaders increasingly communicated the notion that racial
inequality was an immoral principle. The norm of racial equality
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the civil rights movement and the nationally televised violent
southern reactions to black protests led to the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, banning discrimination in schools,
employment, and public accommodations; the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, prohibiting voting procedures designed to impede
black exercise of the franchise, was passed soon thereafter. 99
The passage of these Acts formally ended the "southern way of
life" and created a national, in other words, northern, legal
standard on matters of race to which Congress and the Court
forced the South to conform. 100 The norm of racial equality
became the dominant cultural value, and the vast majority of
Americans aligned against formal segregation and racist
expressions.' 0 ' The formal norm of racial equality belied a
racially divided society, however, and allowed implicit appeals
to Whites' racial resentments to foster a political
realignment. 02
gained momentum through landmark legislation and court rulings
that signaled that racial equality should now be the injunctive norm.
The norm of racial equality was also furthered by the civil rights
movement, through its moral rhetoric and through actions that
prodded and enabled landmark legislation and discredited the white
southern adherents of the old inegalitarian norm.
Id.
99. See, e.g., GILENS, supra note 15, at 108 (stating that, as a result of
passage of the Voting Rights Act, voter registration of Blacks nationwide
increased from 29% in 1962 to 67% in 1970); POWE, supra note 8, at 174 ("The
Freedom Rides provided the northern public with the initial shocking pictures
of brutality from the South, pictures that would be repeated for the next four
years.").
100. See POWE, supra note 8, at 232 (noting that 104 of the 130
congressional votes cast against the Civil Rights Act were by southern
Democrats 'who fully understood that this bill was aimed directly at the white
South"). According to Powe, "[t]he principle of equality in Brown and
subsequent cases was not only the law as declared by nine men, it was also the
law as adopted by 70-percent votes in both houses of Congress and
enthusiastically signed by the president of the United States." Id. at 234.
101. MENDELBERG, supra note 12, at 18-19 ("In the age of equality, neither
citizens nor politicians want to be perceived or to perceive themselves as
racist. The norm of racial equality has become descriptive and injunctive,
endorsed by nearly every American.").
102. MENDELBERG, supra note 12, at 19 (arguing that "[blecause the civil
rights era came and went without fully resolving the problems of racial
inequality, individuals and institutions are forced to continue to reach
decisions about racial matters, matters that count among the most difficult of
our national problems").
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C. "DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION" IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, the Supreme Court
sporadically used the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause to protect Blacks against racist southern justice in
criminal cases like Moore v. Dempsey, 10 3 Powell v. Alabama,10 4
and Brown v. Mississippi.10 5 These earliest criminal procedure
decisions involved egregious southern injustice, mob-dominated
proceedings, race, and the death penalty. 0 6 The southern
courts regarded the formality of any trial, regardless of its
procedural deficiencies, as preferable to an extra-legal
lynching, whereas the Supreme Court believed that a criminal
trial actually should determine the merits of a defendant's guilt
or innocence. 10 7  The Supreme Court's oversight of the
"fundamental fairness" of southern states' criminal proceedings
became especially important in cases that "were perceived to
103. 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause forbids state criminal convictions obtained through mob-
dominated sham trials); KENNEDY, supra note 76, at 94-100.
104. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (applying a constitutional right to counsel for
defendants in some state cases on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause); see also Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589-90 (1935)
(finding a violation of the Due Process Clause for improper and deliberate
exclusion of black jurors from venire). See generally DAN T. CARTER,
SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1979); KENNEDY, supra
note 76, at 100-04.
105. 297 U.S. 278, 279, 287 (1936) (using the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause to exclude coerced confessions extracted by torture in state
criminal prosecutions); KENNEDY, supra note 76, at 104-07.
106. See KENNEDY, supra note 76, at 92-94; see also Cover, supra note 82,
at 1305 (arguing that "[allthough the Court never treated them as race cases,
there can be little doubt that the decisions in Moore v. Dempsey, Powell v.
Alabama, and Brown v. Mississippi made new criminal procedure law in part
because the notorious facts of each case exemplified the national scandal of
racist southern justice"); Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality
in Constitutional Criminal Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and
Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 377 (2001) (stating that the Court's decisions in
Powell v. Alabama and Brown v. Mississippi "responded in part to the
perception of discrimination against poor and African-American defendants").
107. Klarman, supra note 91, at 69. In explaining the Supreme Court's
willingness to intrude into matters of state criminal procedure, Klarman
argues that
the state-imposed death penalty in these cases was little more than a
formalization of the lynching process .... Because these mob-
dominated trials were more about preventing lynchings than reaching
just verdicts, they represented appealing cases for the intervention of
a legal tribunal that thought the purpose of criminal trials should be
to determine factual guilt or innocence.
Id. at 57.
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implicate broader challenges to white supremacy or that
generated national criticism of the white South's treatment of
black criminal defendants." 0 8 The Court's limited role in
reviewing southern criminal justice marked the beginning of its
efforts to prevent regional deviation from elementary
procedural expectations. 0 9
Although these decisions had limited practical effects on
the routine administration of southern criminal justice, they
served important non-legal purposes. For example, they
offered Blacks the hope that progress was possible. They also
provided cases around which to organize protests and educated
Blacks about their rights. Finally, they exposed northern
Whites to the oppressive nature of the Jim Crow regime. 1 10
The Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions were a
response to the structural and racial demographic changes
taking place at the time.11 They were an attempt to protect
minority citizens and to limit the authority of the states in the
criminal justice arena.112  The Supreme Court's "rights
revolution" was part of a broader human rights orientation
emerging in Western industrialized countries. It emphasized
civil rights for previously stigmatized groups with few political
108. Id. at 71.
109. According to Klarman,
the Supreme Court's race-related criminal procedure decisions of the
interwar period almost certainly were consonant with dominant
national opinion. Most of the country was appalled by these farcical
proceedings in which southern black defendants, quite plausibly
innocent of the offenses charged, were tortured into confessing and
then rushed to the death penalty in mob-dominated trials without
effective assistance of counsel. Black criminal defendants certainly
were not treated this way in the North. While northern blacks were
segregated in ghetto neighborhoods and discriminated against in
employment and public accommodations, the administration of justice
in northern courts was relatively nondiscriminatory.
Id. at 75.
110. See id. at 88. "[L]itigation taught blacks suffering under the
oppressive weight of Jim Crow that they had rights, though they must fight
for their enforcement." Id. at 89. Such litigation also helped to educate at
least some Whites about the nature of the racist southern regime.
By publicizing the worst excesses of Jim Crow, such litigation may
have inspired something of a backlash against the system as a whole,
in the same way that millions of white Americans turned against
segregation and disfranchisement in the 1960s after witnessing the
barbarities of the white supremacy system on display at Birmingham
and Selma.
Id. at 92.
111. See supra notes 42-76 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
1475
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
supporters, such as "criminal defendants, women, the poor,
non-European ethnic minorities, students, homosexuals,
prisoners, the handicapped, and the mentally ill."113 Beginning
with the Court's Brown v. Board of Education1 14 decision in
1954 and culminating in the civil rights movement in the
1960s, equality became the watchword of constitutional and
legislative reform. 115 The feminist, gay and lesbian, and anti-
war political movements drew ideological support from the
Blacks' struggle for justice, adopted similar strategies and
rhetoric, and shared a common critique of dominant cultural
values and power arrangements.
During the "Due Process Revolution" of the 1960s, the
Supreme Court resorted to adversarial procedural safeguards
and judicially created per se rules to limit the state, to
constrain police discretion, to protect peoples' freedom, and to
preserve criminal defendants' liberties."16  Several threads
weave through the fabric of the Supreme Court's "due process"
jurisprudence: an increased emphasis on individual liberty and
equality, a distrust of state power, an unwillingness to rely
solely on good intentions and benevolent motives, and
skepticism about the exercises of discretion in the treatment of
deviants.117
The Warren Court used the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights to restrict governmental
113. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 4; see also White, supra note
91, at 282-83 ("Race relations were the initial context in which the Court
attempted to refine the meaning of equal justice in America .... The
conception of equality embodied by these decisions was that of equality of
opportunity: blacks could not be denied the opportunity of access to public
places.").
114. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
115. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA
OF PROGRESS 103 (1970) ("[A] broadly conceived egalitarianism was the main
theme in the music to which the Warren Court marched."); Howe, supra note
106, at 376-77 (noting that the equality principle reached its peak in the mid-
1960s as part of Court's criminal procedure reforms); White, supra note 91, at
282 ("The Warren Court will be best known for its identification with three
themes: egalitarianism, liberalism, and activism .... [T]he Court
demonstrated a dedication to the principle of equality, a principle that...
'once loosed ... is not easily cabined."').
116. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (protection of
privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary
rule).
117. FRED P. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION: THE WARREN
COURT'S IMPACT ON CRIMINAL LAw (1970).
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intervention in citizens' lives, to extend equality to minorities
and the disenfranchised, and to regularize administrative and
criminal justice decision making. 118 The Court's criminal
procedure decisions followed closely upon its civil rights
opinions because those accused of crimes consisted
disproportionately of the poor, minorities, and the young.1 19
The Court's criminal procedure decisions redefined the
relationship between individuals and the State, endorsed the
adversarial model to resolve disputes, and reflected the crucial
link between race, civil rights, and criminal justice policies. 120
The Warren Court's "Due Process Revolution" was part of a
judicial effort to protect minorities from state officials, to
impose procedural restraints on official discretion, and to infuse
governmental services with greater equality. 121 It completed
the Court's shift from using the Commerce, Contracts, and Due
Process clauses to protect private property and economic
interests to using the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect civil liberties against governmental
encroachment and to provide criminal suspects with procedural
protections.
The Supreme Court used three interrelated constitutional
strategies to decide criminal procedure cases. 122  First, it
118. See id.; EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 110-11.
119. See POWE, supra note 8; Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for
Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F.
518, 525-26.
120. Allen, supra note 119, at 525-31.
121. See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 6, at 57 ("In effect, the new critique of
rehabilitation was the extension of civil rights claims to the field of criminal
justice, a process that had already begun with the Warren Court of the 1960s
and its extension of due process protections to suspects and juveniles."); POWE,
supra note 8, at 386 ("African-Americans were disproportionately affected by
whatever abuses or inequities there were in the criminal justice system.");
White, supra note 91, at 288 ("By intervening in law enforcement proceedings
to protect the rights of allegedly disadvantaged persons-a high percentage of
criminals in the 1960s were poor and black-the Warren Court Justices were
acting as liberal policymakers."); Note, Developments in the Law: Race and the
Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1488-94 (1988) (describing the
equality principle in reform of criminal procedures after Brown v. Board of
Education).
122. See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 117, at 41-66; POWE, supra note 8, at
412 ("[The Court recognized that the Bill of Rights offered national standards
for criminal procedure regardless of how the states wished to conduct trials,
and it quickly applied all the relevant provisions of the Bill of Rights to the
states to create minimum national guarantees of fairness in criminal trials.");
White, supra note 91, at 287 ("The most important series of criminal procedure
decisions, from a doctrinal perspective, were the incorporation doctrine cases,
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"incorporated" many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights into
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause and applied
them to the states.123 This redefined the relationship between
federal constitutional authority and state police practices and
criminal justice administration. Second, it "reinterpreted"
those provisions, by expanding the meanings of those
constitutional rights.1 24  Finally, the Court expanded the
principles of Equal Protection to extend to constitutional
oversight of administrative officials previously immune from
judicial scrutiny. The Court used Equal Protection to redress
imbalances between white and non-white, and rich and poor
defendants in the administration of criminal justice. 125
Promoting equality and protecting minorities from arbitrary
governmental action was a central theme in the Court's
decisions.1 26
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's constitutional
decisions extending procedural rights to criminal defendants,
many of whom were clearly guilty, coincided with the increase
in crime rates in the 1960s. 127 The Supreme Court's decisions
in cases such as Mapp v. Ohio, 28 Escobedo v. Illinois,129 and
Miranda v. Arizona,130 expanded the rights of defendants and
where the Court struggled with the question of whether, and to what extent,
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates procedural
protections in the Bill of Rights, making those protections applicable against
the states."); Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the
Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1324-25 (1977) (noting
that three themes of the Warren Court's "Due Process Revolution" were:
"selective incorporation of Bill of Rights' guarantees"; "equality"; and
"expansive interpretations of constitutional rights that protect the accused").
123. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 48-68 (3d ed. 2000).
124. See id.
125. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that the
Equal Protection Clause grants a right to appellate counsel for indigent
defendants in state criminal cases); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(finding a violation of the Equal Protection Clause where a state statute
essentially denied appellate review for poor criminal defendants).
126. See supra notes 121-22.
127. FELD, supra note 2, at 86-88 (describing the increased crime rates
associated with the demographics of the "baby boom" generation and increased
urbanization of Blacks); GRAHAM, supra note 117, at 67-85.
128. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule to the states).
129. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (finding a Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right
to counsel at pre-indictment police interrogation).
130. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police to provide a warning of rights
prior to police interrogation).
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restricted the authority of police. This elicited criticism from
the public. 131 While earlier criminal procedure cases like
Powell, Moore, and Brown, were disguised cases about race, by
the mid-1960s, many Whites viewed the Court's decisions as
overtly about race because of their association in the public
consciousness with urban riots and rising crime rates. 132
Youth crime increased dramatically in the 1960s as the
children of the baby boom reached adolescence and, by their
sheer numbers, overwhelmed many agencies of social control. 33
Higher rates of crime generally occur in urban environments,
so the "great migration" that substantially increased the
urbanization of Blacks led to higher rates of crime in minority
areas. 134 The Supreme Court's due process decisions occurred
against the backdrop of rising youth crime rates, urban racial
disorders, calls for "law and order," and concern about the
discriminatory impact of discretionary decisions by criminal
justice and social service personnel. The issue of race linked all
of these factors.
131. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 111 ("The reaction of much of
the public, of the law enforcement community, and of a host of moderate to
conservative politicians was intense-and almost invariably hostile.").
132. GILENS, supra note 15, at 107-10; EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at
74-77 (Richard Nixon's "law and order" presidential campaign in 1968 focused
on Supreme Court decisions that he contended "handcuffed" the police and
made the racial connections more explicit.).
133. The number of young persons aged fourteen to twenty-four years
increased by half during this period. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING
ABOUT CRIME 12 (1975). As the children of the baby boom reached their crime
prone teenage years beginning in the mid-1960s, the rates of serious violent
and property crimes increased substantially. Id. at 5-7. The simple changes
in the composition of the age structure of the population accounted for most of
that rise. POWE, supra note 8, at 408 (between 1963 and 1970, the homicide
rate doubled from 4.6 to 9.2 per 100,000); WILSON, supra, at 15-20.
"Perceptions of increasing crime in the late 1960s brought with them a
heightened sense of insecurity and fears of a collapse of public order. These
perceptions were based in part on demographic realities." ALLEN,
REHABILITATIVE IDEAL, supra note 25, at 30.
134. See, e.g., MAUER, supra note 45, at 51-52 ("[Urbanization is generally
equated with higher rates of crime."); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON
HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 66
(1997) ("Homicide rates are highest in the slum neighborhoods of big cities
that exclusively house the black poor. The race of the residents, the
socioeconomic status of the neighborhood, and city size are all associated with
elevated rates of homicide victimization.").
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D. "DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION" IN JUVENILE JUSTICE AND IN
RE GAULT
From its Progressive origins until the early 1970s, the
"Rehabilitative Ideal" and "penal-welfarism" defined the
criminal and juvenile justice systems' policies and practices.' 35
The central tenets of the "Rehabilitative Ideal" include a focus
on the individual offender, justice administration by clinical
specialists and expert professionals, and welfare-oriented,
indeterminate and discretionary decision-making practices. 136
It presumes a general cultural agreement about the
appropriate goals of change and the intervention strategies
necessary to achieve them. 137 Progressives believed that they
could change people and that they knew how people should be
changed. 138 They felt that the new behavioral sciences provided
them with the necessary tools to intervene and change people
135. "Penal welfarism" refers to a "correctionalist commitment to
rehabilitation, welfare and criminological expertise." GARLAND, supra note 6,
at 27. From its Progressive foundations until the early 1970s, penal welfarism
provided the intellectual framework, cultural vocabulary, and the shared
professional understandings that defined the criminal justice policy and
practices:
Its basic axiom-that penal measures ought, where possible, to be
rehabilitative interventions rather than negative, retributive
punishments-gave rise to a whole new network of interlocking
principles and practices. These included sentencing laws that allowed
indeterminate sentences linked to early release and parole
supervision; the juvenile court with its child welfare philosophy; the
use of social inquiry and psychiatric reports; the individualization of
treatment based upon expert assessment and classification;
criminological research focusing upon etiological issues and treatment
effectiveness; social work with offenders and their families; and
custodial regimes that stressed the re-educative purposes of
imprisonment and the importance of re-integrative support upon
release....
In the penal-welfare framework, the rehabilitative ideal was not
just one element among others. Rather it was the hegemonic,
organizing principle, the intellectual framework and value system
that bound together the whole structure and made sense of it for
practitioners. It provided an all-embracing conceptual net that could
be cast over each and every activity in the penal field, allowing
practitioners to render their world coherent and meaningful, and to
give otherwise unpleasant, troublesome practices something of a
benign, scientific gloss.
Id. at 34-35.
136. See ALLEN, supra note 23, at 44-61; ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 53-61.
137. See ALLEN, supra note 23, at 26-27; see also ALLEN, REHABILITATIVE
IDEAL, supra note 25, at 25-41.
138. See, e.g., ALLEN, REHABILITATIVE IDEAL, supra note 25, at 25-41.
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systematically. 139 They assumed the virtues of their social
order and the propriety of imposing their middle-class values
on immigrants and the poor.140 They expected that social
intervention, reform, and rising affluence eventually would
reduce crime and asserted that the State had an affirmative
responsibility to care for and control offenders. 14 1
Several forces combined in the 1960s to erode support for
the "Rehabilitative Ideal." Left-wing critics of rehabilitation
characterized penal programs as coercive instruments of social
control that oppressed the poor and minorities. 4 2 Liberals
believed that treatment personnel's exercise of clinical
discretion resulted in the unequal and disparate treatment of
similarly situated offenders. 4 3 Conservatives advocated "law
139. RYERSON, supra note 15, at 42-43; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at
242-43.
140. ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 48 ("Progressives were equally convinced
of the viability of cultural uplift and of the supreme desirability of middle class
life in cultural as well as in material terms .... The model was clear: all
Americans were to become middle class Americans.").
141. For example, Garland explains that
the state was increasingly assumed to be responsible for the reform
and welfare of offenders. The state was to be an agent of reform as
well as of repression, of care as well as control, of welfare as well as
punishment.... [Tihe criminal justice state became, in part, a welfare
state, and the criminal subject, especially one who was young, or
disadvantaged, or female, came to be seen as a subject of need as well
as guilt, a "client" as well as an offender.
GARLAND, supra note 6, at 39.
142. See AMER. FRIENDS SERVICE COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 83-99
(1971). Radical critics emphasized that no criminal justice programs or
reforms could ameliorate or avoid the inevitable consequences that flowed
from racial inequality and economic and social injustice in the larger society.
CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 25, at 39-40. Moreover, "discriminatory use of
state power was masked by the operation of the individualized treatment
model, which legitimated and extended these abuses, while simultaneously
glossing the harsh realities of punishment with a benign, paternalistic
veneer." GARLAND, supra note 6, at 55; see also MAUER, supra note 45, at 44
(noting that rehabilitation is incompatible with coercive institutions, such as
prison, and that personal change requires voluntary involvement which
cannot be compelled).
143. See ALLEN, REHABILITATIVE IDEAL, supra note 25, at 87-88. The
grant of discretionary power to professionals who made their decisions without
explanation or judicial review reflected the degree of trust the justice system
vested in psychologists and social workers. Despite their coercive authority,
the justice system viewed them in a "more benign, apolitical light. Their views
on normal psychology, on the sources of anti-social behavior, on how families
should function and how individuals should behave, were assumed to be
neutral, clinical judgments based upon scientific understanding and empirical
research." GARLAND, supra note 6, at 36. Liberal disenchantment with the
"Rehabilitative Ideal" reflected a broader disillusionment about the ability of
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and order" and favored punishment over rehabilitation in
response to what they perceived as a breakdown of the social
and legal order.144 They attributed crime and disorder to a
permissive society and advocated firm discipline for the young,
restoration of patriarchy in the family, respect for authority,
and an end to the "coddling" of criminals. 145 The combined
critique of the rehabilitative model from the Left, Right, and
Center produced a narrowing of sentencing factors-from
individualized considerations of the offender to uniform and
proportional sentences based on the nature of the offense. 146
The critique also revived abandoned modes of public and
political penal discourse about retribution and punishment, the
expression of vengeful sentiments, and the imposition of
draconian sanctions. 147
Despite occasional challenges and criticism of some aspects
of juvenile justice, no sustained and systematic examination of
the juvenile court occurred until the 1960s. 148 The Supreme
Court, encouraged by the persuasive critique of the
"Rehabilitative Ideal," began the expansion of procedural
the State to "do good" and its failure to deal justly with its most vulnerable
citizens. See ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 82-84.
144. See discussion infra Part III.C. Efforts to "get tough" included a
succession of "wars" on crime and later on drugs, longer criminal sentences,
increased prison population; and disproportional incarceration of racial
minority offenders. See TONRY, supra note 14, 94-95. For conservatives, the
confluence of rising youth crime rates, civil rights marches and civil
disobedience, students' protests against the war in Vietnam, and urban and
campus turmoil indicated an even deeper moral crisis and breakdown of
traditional society. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 49-52; HACKER,
supra note 48, at 22.
145. See CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 25, at 12-13.
146. See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 6, at 56; see also infra Part III.D
(describing changes in the juvenile justice system).
147. Garland notes
a noticeable change in the tone of official discourse. Punishment-in
the sense of expressive punishment, conveying public sentiment-is
once again a respectable, openly embraced, penal purpose and has
come to affect not just high-end sentences for the most heinous
offences but even juvenile justice and community penalties.
GARLAND, supra note 6, at 9.
148. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
AND YOUTH CRIME (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]; Joel F. Handler,
The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and
Form, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 7, 12-26; David R. Barrett et al., Note, Juvenile
Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 775, 775-76 (1966).
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safeguards to the juvenile court in Kent v. United States. 49
Justice Fortas wrote that "the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated
for children."150 Some procedural due process in judicial waiver
hearings was therefore required. 151
The following year, in In re Gault,152 Fortas concluded that
the entire juvenile justice process violated the Constitution and
required a complete overhaul.' 53 Gault identified two crucial
differences between juvenile justice rhetoric and reality: the
theory versus the practice of "rehabilitation" and the
differences between the procedural safeguards afforded adult
criminal defendants and those available to juvenile
delinquents. 154  Although the Progressive juvenile court
149. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561-62 (1966).
150. Id. at 556.
151. In Kent, the Court concluded that the loss of the special protections of
the juvenile court-closed proceedings, confidential records, and protection
from the stigma of a criminal conviction-as a result of a waiver decision was
a "critically important" action that required a hearing, assistance of counsel,
access to social investigations and other records, and written findings and
conclusions that an appellate court could review. Id. at 553-63. "[T]here is no
place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous
consequences without ceremony-without hearing, without effective
assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons." Id. at 554. See
generally Monrad G. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional
Context of Juvenile Cases, in 1966 SuP. CT. REV. 167, 167-78.
152. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
153. Gault involved the delinquency adjudication and institutional
commitment of a boy who allegedly made a telephone call of the "irritatingly
offensive, adolescent, sex variety" to a neighbor. Id. at 4. Fifteen-year-old
Gerald Gault was taken into custody, detained overnight without notice to his
parents, and required to appear at a hearing the next day. Id. at 4-5. A
probation officer filed a petition, which simply alleged that he was a
delinquent minor in need of the care and custody of the court. Id. at 5. No
complaining witness appeared and the juvenile court judge did not hear any
sworn testimony or prepare any record of the proceedings. At the hearing, the
judge questioned Gault about the phone call and he apparently made some
incriminating responses. Id. at 5-6. Gault was not advised of his right to
remain silent or his right to counsel, and he was not provided with an attorney
by the court. See id. at 5-7, 10. Following his hearing, the judge returned
Gault to a detention cell. Id. at 6. At his dispositional hearing a week later,
the judge committed Gault to the State Industrial School "for the period of his
minority [that is, until 211, unless sooner discharged by due process of law."
Id. at 7-8 (brackets in original). If Gault had been an adult, his offense could
have resulted in no more than a $50 fine or two months' imprisonment; as a
juvenile, however, he was subject to a period of incarceration of up to six
years, the duration of his minority. Id. at 29.
154. See id. at 18-25.
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embraced a relationship of paternalism and informality, the
Warren Court viewed the adversarial process and procedural
safeguards as the appropriate way to structure the relationship
between the individual and the State. 155 Moreover, Gault's
"Due Process Revolution" demonstrated the link between
procedure and substance, because once the Court required
some procedural safeguards at trial, state laws and practices
began to transform the juvenile court from the social welfare
agency that the Progressives intended it to be into a formal
legal institution.156 This "constitutional domestication" 57 was
the first step in the procedural and substantive convergence
between the juvenile and the adult criminal justice systems. 158
The Court perceived a clear need for some procedures to
protect minority offenders. A survey conducted
contemporaneously with Gault reported some limited data
about the 207 larger juvenile courts serving populations of
100,000 or more.159 Seventy-four percent of those courts that
reported the racial characteristics of delinquents responded
that non-white juveniles comprised up to 40% of those against
whom petitions were filed. 160 Five percent of these largest
urban courts reported that non-Whites comprised up to 60% of
their delinquency populations.' 6' Nearly all of the delinquents
charged in juvenile courts appeared without counsel. 162 Other
analyses of juvenile justice administration from mid-century
155. E.g., Allen, supra note 119, at 530-31.
156. E.g., Feld, Transformation-Part I, supra note 5, at 691-92, 695-96;
Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing the American Juvenile Court, in 17 CRIME AND
JUSTICE 197, 197-98 (Michael Tonry ed., 1993).
157. Gault, 387 U.S. at 22.
158. On the "criminalization" of the juvenile court, see, e.g., Barry C. Feld,
Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69
MINN. L. REV. 141, 272-76 (1984). On the "Due Process Revolution" in the
juvenile court, see, for example, Monrad G. Paulsen, The Constitutional
Domestication of the Juvenile Court, in 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 236-42, and
Paulsen, supra note 151, at 168.
159. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 148, at 80.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. Only 3% of the courts reported that lawyers accompanied
delinquents in 40% or more of cases, and only one-tenth (10.8%) reported that
counsel appeared in more than 20% of delinquency cases. TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 148, at 82; see also BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR
CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE JUVENILE COURTS 54-56 (1993)
(analyzing states' implementation of Gault's right to counsel and reporting
that two decades later, juveniles in most states still appeared in delinquency
proceedings without the assistance of counsel).
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also provide evidence of racial bias in the handling of black
juveniles compared with Whites. A study of juvenile court
disposition practices in 1964 reported that black juveniles were
more likely to be referred for formal processing and more likely
to be committed to the state youth authority than white
juveniles who were charged with similar offenses and had
similar prior records. 163 Juvenile court practices were biased in
favor of white, middle-class youths and skewed against lower
socio-economic status and minority youths. 164 Another earlier
study found that, of those committed to a state institution, the
black youths were younger, had fewer prior court appearances
or institutional commitments, committed fewer and less serious
offenses, and received fewer probationary sentences than white
youths. 165 Although the confined black youths appeared to be
less seriously delinquent than their white counterparts, a lack
of placement options other than state institutions accounted for
the differences in patterns of commitments. 166 These issues of
race and fairness in justice administration provided part of the
context for the Gault Court's reappraisal of delinquency
procedures.
In Gault, the Court examined the realities of juvenile
incarceration rather than accepting the rehabilitative rhetoric
of progressive juvenile jurisprudence. In reviewing the history
of the juvenile court, the Court noted that the traditional
rationales for denying procedural safeguards to juveniles
included the belief that the proceedings were neither
adversarial nor criminal and that, because the State acted as
parens patriae, the child was entitled to custody rather than
liberty. 167 The Court rejected these assertions and noted that
the denial of procedural safeguards frequently resulted in
arbitrariness rather than "careful, compassionate,
individualized treatment."168 Although the Court hoped to
retain the rehabilitative benefits of the juvenile process, it
candidly appraised the claims of the juvenile court in light of
the realities of recidivism, the failures of rehabilitation, the
163. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 148, at 82.
164. See William R. Arnold, Race and Ethnicity Relative to Other Factors in
Juvenile Court Dispositions, 77 AM. J. SOC. 211, 211-12 (1971-72).
165. Sidney Axelrad, Negro and White Male Institutionalized Delinquents,
57 AM. J. Soc. 569, 570-71 (1951-52).
166. See id. at 571.
167. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1967).
168. Id. at 18-19.
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stigma of a "delinquency" label, the breaches of confidentiality,
and the arbitrariness of the process. 169 The Court noted that a
juvenile system free of constitutional safeguards had not
abated recidivism or lowered juvenile crime rates. 170 The Court
concluded that, regardless of its therapeutic rhetoric, the
reality of juvenile institutional confinement required
"fundamentally fair" procedural safeguards.171  These
protections included advance notice of charges, 172 a fair and
impartial hearing,173  the assistance of counsel,174  an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, 175 and the
privilege against self-incrimination. 176 The Court limited its
holding to the adjudicatory hearing at which the state
determines that a child is delinquent. 177 It asserted that
169. See id. at 21-27.
170. Id. at 22.
171. See id. at 25-28. In examining the "reality" rather than the "rhetoric"
of institutional confinement, the Supreme Court noted the following:
The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a
"receiving home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an
institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a
greater or lesser time. His world becomes "a building with
whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours . .. "
Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and
classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state
employees, and "delinquents" confined with him for anything from
waywardness to rape and homicide.... Under our Constitution, the
condition of being a [child] does not justify a kangaroo court.
Id. at 27-28 (quoting Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 616 (1954) (Musmanno, J.,
dissenting)). See generally CLEMENS BARTOLLAS ET AL., JUVENILE
VICTIMIZATION: THE INSTITUTIONAL PARADOX 17-47, 259-73 (1976) (empirical
study of punitive juvenile correctional facility); BARRY C. FELD, NEUTRALIZING
INMATE VIOLENCE: JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN INSTITUTIONS 1-38, 131-46, 189-
205 (1977) (empirical evaluation of ten institutional programs for confined
juveniles reporting substantial staff and inmate violence).
172. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 33-34.
173. See id. at 36
174. See id. at 34-42.
175. See id. at 42-57.
176. See id.; see also id. at 22-28 (discussing whether juveniles should be
afforded constitutional protection through procedural safeguards); Irene
Merker Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with
Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA. L. REV.
656, 662-63 (1980) (discussing Gault's holding that constitutional protections
should attach in proceedings that may result in incarceration of a child); Feld,
Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 158, at 154-57 (discussing Gault's
expansion of constitutional rights for juveniles).
177. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 13, 31 n.48. The Court specifically held that
"[we do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constitutional
provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state.
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adversarial procedural safeguards were essential in juvenile
proceedings both to determine the truth-"factual accuracy"-
and to preserve individual freedom by limiting the power of the
state-"prevent governmental oppression"--and that its
decision would not impair the juvenile court's ability to treat
juveniles. 178
The Court based its holdings to grant delinquents the
rights to notice, counsel, and confrontation on the generic
notions of "fundamental fairness" required by Fourteenth
Amendment due process rather than the specific requirements
of the Sixth Amendment. 179 The Court explicitly relied upon
We do not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile 'delinquents."'
Id.; see also Francis Barry McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile
Court: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 457,
459-60 (1981) (discussing the limitations on juveniles' procedural rights). The
Court's holding did not address a juvenile's rights in either the pre-
adjudicatory (i.e., intake and detention) or post-adjudicatory (i.e., disposition)
stages of the proceeding, but narrowly confined itself to the actual
adjudication of guilt or innocence in a trial-like setting. See Gault, 387 U.S. at
13, 31 n.48.
178. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-21. In its subsequent delinquency decisions,
the Court balanced the particular function that a constitutional right served
against its impact on the unique processes of the juvenile court and used the
degree of impairment of the traditional juvenile court's functions as one of the
criteria in determining whether a right would be afforded to juveniles. See,
e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 535-41 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528, 547-50 (1971).
179. The Sixth Amendment provides,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed ... and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The discussion of the notice requirement in Gault
made no reference to the Sixth Amendment's provision for notice; rather, the
Court held that "[d]ue process of law requires notice of the sort we have
described-that is, notice which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in
a civil or criminal proceeding." Gault, 387 U.S. at 32-34. Similarly, although
the Court described a delinquency proceeding as "comparable in seriousness to
a felony prosecution," the Court grounded the right to counsel in a delinquency
proceeding in the "Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" rather
than the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. Id. at 36, 41. Finally, the
Court's analysis of the right to confront and examine witnesses rested on "our
law and constitutional requirements" rather than the specific language of the
Sixth Amendment. Id. at 57. In deciding the applicability of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the majority resorted to an
analytical strategy akin to selective incorporation, finding a "functional
equivalence" between a delinquency proceeding and an adult criminal trial.
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the Fifth Amendment, however, to provide juveniles the
privilege against self-incrimination in delinquency
proceedings. 180 In granting delinquents the privilege against
See id. at 49-50; see, e.g., Louis Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 74-88 (1963); Sanford H. Kadish,
Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 327-33 (1957) (discussing the historical
constitutional debate between proponents of "selective incorporation" and
proponents of "fundamental fairness" and "total incorporation" of provisions of
the Bill of Rights).
The irony of the "fundamental fairness" strategy employed by the Court
in Gault to provide procedural safeguards is that this same strategy later
permitted the Court to deny juveniles a jury trial by finding that the right was
not fundamental. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547-50 (1971); see also infra notes
192-99 and accompanying text. The irony stems from the fact that in the
years between Gault and McKeiver, the Supreme Court decided Duncan v.
Louisiana, which held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was
applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
because it was "fundamental to the American scheme of justice." 391 U.S. 145,
149 (1968).
180. Gault, 387 U.S. at 49-50. The Court stated that
[iut would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment
all statements by juveniles on the ground that these cannot lead to
"criminal" involvement. In the first place, juvenile proceedings to
determine "delinquency," which may lead to commitment to a state
institution, must be regarded as "criminal" for purposes of the
privilege against self-incrimination .... [CIommitment is a
deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will, whether
it is called "criminal" or "civil."
Id.; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428-29 (1979) (holding that
criminal and delinquency proceedings are distinguishable from involuntary
civil commitment because the former are punitive). As a consequence of
Gault's application of the privilege against self-incrimination to delinquency
proceedings, juvenile adjudications no longer could be characterized as either
"noncriminal" or as "nonadversarial" because the Fifth Amendment privilege,
more than any other provision of the Bill of Rights, is the fundamental
guarantor of an adversarial process and the primary mechanism for
maintaining a balance between the state and the individual. The Court, in
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, described the multiple policies embedded
in the Fifth Amendment:
The privilege against self-incrimination ... reflects many of our
fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to
subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice;
our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by
inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates
"a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave
the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and
by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to
shoulder the entire load," . . . our distrust of self-deprecatory
statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a
shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."
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self-incrimination, Gault exemplified the dual functions that
constitutional procedural safeguards perform in juvenile
adjudications: assuring accurate fact finding and protecting
against governmental oppression.181 Gault is an example of the
Warren Court's general strategy of extending constitutional
rights and using the adversary process to limit the State's
coercive powers, to assure the regularity of law enforcement,
and to reduce the need for constant judicial oversight. 182
In subsequent juvenile court "due process" decisions, the
Court further elaborated on the criminal nature of delinquency
proceedings. In In re Winship,183 the Court held that proof of
delinquency must be established beyond a reasonable doubt,
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations omitted). See generally LEONARD W. LEVY,
ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION 405-32 (1968) (analyzing the Fifth Amendment'as a limitation
on state power over the individual).
181. If Gault only had been concerned with the reliability of juvenile
confessions .and accurate fact finding, the Court could have relied on
safeguards other than the Fifth Amendment privilege, such as the
requirement that any confession be made "voluntarily." In both Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), and Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), the
Court considered the admissibility of confessions made by juveniles, used the
Fourteenth Amendment "voluntariness" test, and concluded that youthfulness
was a special circumstance that required close judicial scrutiny. See Gallegos,
370 U.S. at 54-55; Haley, 332 U.S. at 599-601. In Gault, however, the Court
recognized that Fifth Amendment safeguards are not required simply because
they ensure accurate fact finding or reliable confessions, but also because they
serve as a means of maintaining a proper balance between the individual and
the state and prevent governmental oppression:
The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the
question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or
confessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not mere fruits
of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth. The roots
of the privilege are, however, far deeper. They tap the basic stream of
religious and political principle because the privilege reflects the
limits of the individual's attornment to the state and-in a
philosophical sense-insists upon the equality of the individual and
the state. In other words, the privilege has a broader and deeper
thrust than the rule which prevents the use of confessions which are
the product of coercion because coercion is thought to carry with it the
danger of unreliability. One of its purposes is to prevent the state,
whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the
mind and will of the person under investigation and depriving him of
the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his
conviction.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 47 (footnotes omitted); see also Rosenberg, supra note 176,
at 666-68 (discussing the Gault Court's argument that a juvenile proceeding
may be "functionally equivalent" to an adult criminal proceeding).
182. See Allen, supra note 119, at 530-31.
183. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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rather than by lower civil standards of proof. 84 Because the
Bill of Rights does not define the standard of proof in criminal
cases, Winship first held that the Constitution requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in adult criminal proceedings as a
matter of "due process." 85 The Court then extended the same
standard of proof to juvenile proceedings for the same reason. 186
According to Winship, preventing unwarranted convictions and
limiting governmental power outweighed the dissent's concern
that "criminalizing" the juvenile court would impair its
therapeutic functions and erode the "differences between
juvenile courts and traditional criminal courts." 18 7
In Breed v. Jones,188 the Court held that the double
jeopardy protections of the Fifth Amendment precluded
criminal reprosecution of a youth as an adult after adjudication
as a delinquent in juvenile court for the same offense. 189
Although the Court framed the issue in terms of the
applicability of the "double jeopardy" provision of the Bill of
184. See id. at 368.
185. Id. at 364.
186. Id. at 365-67. The Winship Court's requirement of the standard of
proof in delinquency cases differed from that demanded for involuntary civil
commitment of the mentally ill for purposes of treatment, which only calls for
"clear and convincing" evidence. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
In Addington, Chief Justice Burger distinguished between criminal and
delinquency prosecutions, on the one hand, and involuntary civil commitments
on the other, and posited a functional equivalency between criminal trials and
delinquency proceedings:
The Court [in Winship] saw no controlling difference in loss of liberty
and stigma between a conviction for an adult and a delinquency
adjudication for a juvenile. Winship recognized that the basic issue-
whether the individual in fact committed a criminal act-was the
same in both proceedings. There being no meaningful distinctions
between the two proceedings, we required the state to prove the
juvenile's act and intent beyond a reasonable doubt. ... Unlike the
delinquency proceeding in Winship, a civil commitment proceeding
can in no sense be equated to a criminal prosecution.
Id. at 427-28. Chief Justice Burger also noted that proof "beyond a reasonable
doubt" is a critical component of criminal cases because it helps to preserve
the "'moral force of the criminal law,'. . . and we should hesitate to apply it too
broadly or casually in noncriminal cases." Id. at 428 (citation omitted).
187. Winship, 397 U.S. at 375-76 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). According to
the majority, while parens patriae intervention may be a laudable goal to deal
with miscreant youths, "that intervention cannot take the form of subjecting
the child to the stigma of a finding that he violated a criminal law and to the
possibility of institutional confinement on proof insufficient to convict him
were he an adult." Id. at 367.
188. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
189. Id. at 541.
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Rights to state delinquency proceedings, 190 it answered the
question by positing a functional equivalence of defendants'
interests in delinquency and criminal trials. 191
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,92 the Court declined to
extend to juvenile hearings all of the procedural safeguards of
adult criminal prosecutions. 193  McKeiver held that the
constitution did not require jury trials in state delinquency
trials because "due process" required only "accurate
factfinding," which a judge could provide as well as a jury.194 In
concluding that due process required only accurate fact finding,
however, the Court departed significantly from its prior
emphasis on the dual rationales of accurate fact finding and
protection against governmental oppression. 195 In addition,
190. See id. at 520.
191. The Court emphasized,
Although the juvenile-court system had its genesis in the desire to
provide a distinctive procedure and setting to deal with the problems
of youth, including those manifested by antisocial conduct, our
decisions in recent years have recognized that there is a gap between
the originally benign conception of the system and its realities.
i .. [I]t is simply too late in the day to conclude.., that a juvenile
is not put in jeopardy at a proceeding whose object is to determine
whether he has committed acts that violate a criminal law and whose
potential consequences include both the stigma inherent in such a
determination and the deprivation of liberty for many years.
Id. at 528-29. With respect to the risks associated with double jeopardy, the
Court concluded that "we can find no persuasive distinction in that regard
between the [juvenile] proceeding ... and a criminal prosecution, each of
which is designed to 'vindicate [the] very vital interest in enforcement of
criminal laws."' Id. at 531 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479
(1971) (plurality opinion) (alterations in original)).
192. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
193. Even though the Court noted that the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial applied to state criminal proceedings by its incorporation into the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court decided McKeiver solely on the basis of
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and "fundamental fairness." See id. at
543. The Court insisted that "the juvenile court proceeding has not yet been
held to be a 'criminal prosecution,' within the meaning and reach of the Sixth
Amendment, and also has not yet been regarded as devoid of criminal aspects
merely because it usually has been given the civil label." Id. at 541. The
Court cautioned that "[tihere is a possibility, at least, that the jury trial, if
required as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake the juvenile
proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end to what
has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective
proceeding." Id. at 545.
194. See id. at 543.
195. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 42-57 (1967). McKeiver is a "peculiar" decision because it required the
Court both to misread its own precedents regarding the dual functions of
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McKeiver ignored the earlier analyses in Gault that applied the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to
prevent governmental oppression even though it might impede
accurate fact finding. 196 The McKeiver plurality, however,
denied that delinquents required protection against
governmental oppression, 197 invoked the mythology of the
paternalistic juvenile court judge, and rejected the concern that
closed juvenile court hearings could prejudice the accuracy of
fact finding. 198 McKeiver emphasized the adverse impact that a
ptocedural safeguards and the appropriate method of constitutional
adjudication and to ignore its own legal premises in Winship regarding the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 2, at
154-57 (arguing that the jury is an instrument to uphold the "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard in ensuring factual accuracy); FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 82-83 (1982).
196. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text. Justice Brennan's
concurring and dissenting opinion in McKeiver recognized the need for
protection from governmental oppression but noted that it should be secured
by some alternative procedural method such as a public trial that would
render the adjudicative process visible and accountable to the community. See
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 553-55 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). The
McKeiver decision involved two cases, one arising in Pennsylvania and the
other in North Carolina, which raised the issue of jury trials in juvenile
proceedings. Although Justice Brennan concluded that delinquency
prosecutions required only the "essentials of due process and fair treatment,"
he distinguished between the Pennsylvania and North Carolina cases. Id. at
553. Justice Brennan noted that "the States are not bound to provide jury
trials on demand so long as some other aspect of the process adequately
protects the interests that Sixth Amendment jury trials are intended to serve."
Id. at 554. He noted that a jury trial protects the individual against
governmental oppression by providing a mechanism to appeal to the
conscience of the community. Id. at 554-55. Because Pennsylvania permitted
a public trial in delinquency proceedings, Justice Brennan regarded that as
providing a functionally equivalent safeguard for the core values protected by
the jury trial rights. See id. Because North Carolina juvenile procedures, by
contrast, either permitted or required the public to be excluded from these
proceedings, which arose out of demonstrations by black students and adults
against public school discrimination, he dissented. Id. at 556-57.
197. Cf. id. at 547-48 (noting the negative effects of imposing the jury trial
on the juvenile court system and arguing that the defects of the current
system did not raise constitutional issues) (plurality opinion).
198. See id. at 550-51. As the plurality wrote,
Concern about the inapplicability of exclusionary and other rules of
evidence, about the juvenile court judge's possible awareness of the
juvenile's prior record and of the contents of the social file; about
repeated appearances of the same familiar witnesses in the persons of
juvenile and probation officers and social workers-all to the effect
that this will create the likelihood of pre-judgment-chooses to ignore,
it seems to us, every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and
of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates.
Id. at 550. There are many reasons for concern about the accuracy of fact
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constitutional right to jury trials would have on the
informality, flexibility, and confidentiality of juvenile court
proceedings. 199
Gault and its progeny precipitated a procedural revolution
in the juvenile justice system that transformed its original
Progressive conception as a social welfare agency. Progressive
reformers intervened on the basis of the "real needs" of a
child-her social circumstances, environment, and need for
rehabilitation-and viewed formal proof of a crime as
secondary. 200  Although McKeiver declined to extend
delinquents the right to a jury trial, Gault and Winship already
had imported the adversarial model, attorneys, the privilege
against self-incrimination, the criminal standard of proof, and
the primacy of factual and legal guilt as a constitutional
prerequisite to intervention.20' By adopting some criminal
procedures to determine delinquency, the Court shifted the
focus of the juvenile court from the Progressive emphasis on
"real needs" to proof of criminal acts; it formalized the
connection between criminal conduct and coercive intervention
and effectively transformed juvenile proceedings into criminal
prosecutions. Although the Court did not intend its "Due
Process" decisions to obviate the juvenile court's rehabilitative
agenda, in the aftermath of Gault, judicial, legislative, and
administrative changes have fostered a procedural and
substantive convergence with criminal courts. 20 2 For most
purposes, contemporary juvenile courts have become a wholly
finding in a justice system in which the same police and probation officers
testify regularly, and the same child appears repeatedly before the same
judge, who has access to the minor's social history and prior delinquency
record in the course of deciding different aspects of the case at different stages.
See FELD, supra note 2, at 153-57 (describing the inherently prejudicial nature
of such repeated contacts and excessive familiarity).
199. The result clearly was dictated by the Court's concern that the right to
a trial by jury would be the one procedural safeguard most disruptive of the
traditional juvenile court and would require substantial alteration of
traditional juvenile court practices because "it would bring with it . . . the
traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and,
possibly, the public trial." McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550. Ultimately, the Court
realized that such an imposition would render the juvenile court virtually
indistinguishable from a criminal court and would raise the more basic
question of whether there is any need for a separate juvenile court at all. See
id. at 551.
200. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 152-87 and accompanying text.
202. See infra Part III.D.1.
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owned subsidiary of the criminal justice system.20 3 Providing a
modicum of procedural justice legitimated greater punitiveness
in juvenile courts because once states granted even a
semblance of procedural justice, however inadequate, they
more readily departed from a purely "rehabilitative" model of
juvenile justice.204 It is an historical irony that concern about
racial inequality provided the initial impetus for the Supreme
Court's focus on procedural rights in states' juvenile justice
systems, because it was the existence of those procedural rights
that rationalized increasingly punitive penalties that fall most
heavily on minority juvenile offenders.
E. AFTERMATH OF THE "DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION"-RIGHTS,
RACE RIOTS, AND THE CONSERVATIVE RESPONSE
In 1965, the prescient Moynihan Report argued that urban
black male unemployment threatened the social fabric of the
black community. 20 5 The rapid transition from a rural agrarian
to an urban industrial life disrupted black families, and many
unskilled or semi-skilled black males were left unemployed. 20 6
Without the economic ability to head their families, fathers
deserted their wives and children, illegitimacy and welfare
dependency increased, and youth crime surged.20 7
203. See FELD, supra note 2, at 162-65; Feld, Transformation-Part I,
supra note 5, at 722-25; Feld, Transformation-Part II, supra note 5, at 350.
204. See FELD, supra note 2, 106-08.
205. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND RESEARCH,
THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965), reprinted in LEE
RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS
OF CONTROVERSY 51, 65-67 (1967) [hereinafter MOYNIHAN REPORT] (warning
that black male unemployment threatened the black community and proposed
economic and job training policies to reduce black joblessness).
206. See KATZ, supra note 62, at 26 (noting that the rapid transition of
Blacks from rural agricultural to urban industrial life accelerated
deterioration of the black family); LEMANN, supra note 39, at 172-76.
207. See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE
INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 20-62 (1987) [hereinafter
WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED]; GILENS, supra note 15, at 19-22. The
Moynihan Report noted that
[alt the heart of the deterioration of the fabric of Negro society is the
deterioration of the Negro family.
It is the fundamental source of the weakness of the Negro
community at the present time. ...
... [U]nless this damage is repaired, all the efforts to end
discrimination and poverty and injustice will come to little.
MOYNIHAN REPORT, supra note 205, at 51. At the time it was issued, both
black and liberal critics attacked the Moynihan Report for "blaming the
victims," but three decades later, the structural and economic problems
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Liberals and conservatives interpreted the increases in
crime, welfare, and social activism very differently. Liberals
focused on the social-structural conditions of racial and
economic inequality to explain crime and poverty.20 8
Conservatives rejected the causal roles of inadequate housing,
education, job training, and income and argued that people
became criminal or were poor because of their own bad
choices. 20 9  Despite the underlying structural, racial,
demographic, and political complexities of the 1960s, many
conservative critics of the Warren Court simplistically
attributed campus turmoil, rising crime rates, and urban racial
disorders to the Court's decisions that expanded rights for
criminal defendants and put a moratorium on the death
penalty.210 The public increasingly associated the Democratic
Moynihan identified-black male unemployment, out-of-wedlock childbirth,
racial isolation, concentrated poverty, and violent crime-remain among the
primary issues of urban, welfare, and criminal justice policy. KATZ, supra note
62, at 185-235; WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE
WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1997); see also infra Part III.A (discussing
the macro-structural, economic, and racial changes in American cities).
208. See, e.g., POWE, supra note 8, at 495; see also KATHERINE BECKETT &
THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 51-54 (2000).
209. See, e.g., POWE, supra note 8, at 495. Powe notes that
[tielevision brought into every home the senseless violence, the
wanton looting, the buildings burning. Liberal Democrats held with
the Kerner Commission that the riots were symptomatic of America's
developing into two societies, one white and one black, separate and
unequal. Republicans, joined by southern Democrats, blamed the
riots on the rioters and liberals, especially judges, who excused the
criminal behavior.
Id.; see also BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 52-54.
Beckett argues that the competing views of crime reflect a political contest
about the balance of social welfare and social control as elements of public
policy:
As the civil rights, welfare rights, and student movements pressured
the state to assume greater responsibility for the reduction of social
inequalities, conservative politicians attempted to popularize an
alternative vision of government-one that diminishes its duty to
provide for the social welfare but enlarges its capacity and obligation
to maintain social control .... The conservative view that the causes
of crime lie in the human "propensity to evil," rests on a pessimistic
vision of human nature, one that clearly calls for the expansion of the
social control apparatus.
BECKETT, supra note 25, at 10.
210. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam)
(holding that the imposition of the death penalty in certain cases is
unconstitutional); MAUER, supra note 45, at 53 (noting that according to
George Wallace, the Supreme Court ordered integration, encouraged civil
rights, and bent over backwards to help criminals).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 87:1447
party with the interests of Blacks and with the Warren Court's
"rights revolution."21 By the early 1970s, this confluence had
important implications for race relations, domestic politics, and
crime and welfare policy.
During the second half of the 1960s, the focus of the civil
rights movement shifted from southern segregation and legally
sanctioned inequality to even more difficult issues of structural,
economic, and social inequality nationwide.212 By the late
1960s, the Court and federal judges began to prescribe
remedies for racial inequality that had far-reaching impacts on
local schools, housing, and jobs. 213 By pitting the interests of
Blacks and working-class Whites against each other, however,
the Supreme Court's "rights revolution" also set in motion the
forces that would erode the political foundation for federal
intervention to protect civil rights.214 In addition, the Court's
"rights" decisions in the 1960s addressed a host of other
contentious issues about sexual privacy, contraception,
defendants' rights, the death penalty, and school prayer.215
211. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 55-56.
212. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 62, at 53 (noting that the civil rights
struggle became a "quest for economic justice and political power"). Lieberson
argues that until the mid-1960s, Blacks and white liberal members of the civil
rights coalition could overlook some of the injustices and potential conflicts in
the North because of the conditions in the South:
With such dramatic events as lynchings, poll taxes, legally enforced
Jim Crow policies, and the like, attention could be diverted to issues
that did not create any splits within a coalition between white liberals
and blacks. It was possible for northern whites to advance the black
position by vigorously assaulting the treatment of blacks in the
South. These issues posed no danger to the coalition because they
had essentially no impact on their northern white constituency.
LIEBERSON, supra note 18, at 116.
213. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 55-110.
214. See id. at 7. Edsall and Edsall note that the changing agenda of the
civil rights movement polarized the two political parties over matters of race:
That [civil rights] agenda shifted away from an initial, pre-1964 focus
on government guarantees of fundamental citizenship rights for
blacks (such as the right to vote and the right to equal opportunity),
and shifted toward a post-1964 focus on broader goals emphasizing
equal outcomes or results for blacks, often achieved through racial
preferences. These broader objectives were strenuously opposed by
conservatives and by the Republican party. Opposition from the right
intensified insofar as such objectives required government action to
forcibly redistribute private and public goods-goods ranging, on the
one hand, from jobs to education to housing, and extending, on the
other, to valued intangibles such as cultural authority, prestige, and
social space.
Id.
215. Id. at 44-46.
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These decisions coincided with mounting opposition to the war
in Vietnam and the claims for rights by gays, lesbians,
feminists, and other activists groups.2 16 Beginning in the mid-
1960s, under pressure of federal mandates, AFDC welfare rolls
expanded and the proportion of black recipients increased. 217
Poverty, welfare dependency, and race thus became closely
linked in the minds of politicians and the public.218
America was racked with discord in the 1960s. The "baby
boom" generation born after World War II had created a
demographic bulge. As a result, rates of crime and juvenile
delinquency began to escalate as the cohort moved through the
age structure.2 19 Moreover, urban riots rocked American cities
216. See id. at 48. The authors discuss a powerful chain of events linking
race, Court decisions, and an ensuing white conservative "backlash"-urban
riots, the black power movement, increases in black crime, an upsurge in
illegitimacy and black applicants for welfare, the shift of civil rights
enforcement over housing and school busing from the South to the North, the
anti-war movement and the counter-culture lifestyle, the rise of the women's
movement, conflicts between black demands for jobs and white-controlled
unions and city government, and the like. Id. In addition, "[t]he Supreme
Court was forcing to the forefront the whole set of highly controversial issues
which would become the topic of the intensely politicized social/moral 'values'
debate-sexual privacy, birth control, criminal defendants' rights, school
prayer, obscenity-and eventually, abortion and the death penalty." Id. at 69.
217. GILENS, supra note 15, at 18-19.
218. See, e.g., id. at 104-11. The great migration of Blacks from the rural
South swelled the urban northern black population in the post-war decades.
Originally, the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
welfare program granted states considerable latitude in setting the benefit
levels and determining who met eligibility requirements, and southern states
with larger black populations typically provided very low benefits and
excluded many black mothers from receiving even these meager benefits. Id.
at 17-19. Changes in the legislation and the amount of the federal matching
grant increased the percentage of African-American AFDC recipients from
14% in 1936 to 46% in 1973. Id. at 106; see also EDSALL & EDSALL, supra
note 11, at 106 (between 1965 and 1975, the number of families receiving
AFDC welfare benefits increased 237%); KATZ, supra note 62, at 23 ("[Ploverty
appeared as an urban problem that most seriously afflicted blacks. The fusion
of race, poverty, and cities became the tacitly accepted starting point among
radicals, liberals, and conservatives for debates about policy and reform.").
Among the political parties, the public increasingly associated Democrats with
the new liberal and rights agenda, which included matters of race. See
EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 94-98.
219. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11 at 52 (observing that between
1960 and 1966, crime increased 60%; that between 1966 and 1971, it increased
an additional 83%; and that between 1960 and 1970, the black homicide arrest
rate increased 130%); FELD, supra note 2, at 81-83; POWE, supra note 8, at 275
("In the summer of 1966, thirty-eight riots destroyed ghetto neighborhoods
from Providence to Cleveland to San Francisco although none approached the
scale of Watts. That would wait a year for the 'long hot summer' of 1967
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as Blacks reacted violently to decades of segregation,
deprivation, and alienation. 220 In 1964, a white police officer in
Harlem shot and killed a fifteen-year-old black youth and set
off the largest race riot since World War 11.22 1 The following
summer, five days after President Johnson signed the 1965
Voting Rights Act, Watts exploded in riot and television
viewers watched Blacks battle police, shout "Burn, Baby,
Burn," and loot stores. 222 Thirty-eight riots erupted in 1966,
and during the first nine months of 1967, 164 urban race riots
occurred and augured the possibility of a national race war.223
The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,
popularly known as the Kerner Commission, attributed the
riots to a legacy of racial discrimination in employment,
education, social services, and housing.224 Established in the
aftermath of the riots, the Kerner Commission warned that the
United States was moving "toward two societies, one black, one
white-separate and unequal."225  Because of the history of
black segregation, discrimination, and poverty, the Commission
cautioned that continuing current policies would "make
permanent the division of our country into two societies; one,
largely Negro and poor, located in the central cities; the other,
predominantly white and affluent, located in the suburbs."226
Finally, the Kerner Commission noted that the news media's
routine failure to report positively about Blacks exacerbated
divisions between the races. 227
where by the end of September there had been 164 riots, a fifth of them large
enough to bring in state troopers."); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH
VIOLENCE 8-10 (1998).
220. See HACKER, supra note 48, at 22; NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL
DISORDERS (KERNER COMMISSION), REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION OF CIVIL DISORDERS 109-12, 203-06 (1968) [hereinafter KERNER
COMMISSION].
221. See, e.g., POWE, supra note 8, at 274-75.
222. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 48-50.
223. See, e.g., LEMANN, supra note 39, at 190 ("[I]t seemed at least possible
that a full-scale national race war might break out."); POWE, supra note 8, at
275-76 (observing that three years of riots left more than 200 dead, thousands
wounded, and property damage in the tens of billions of dollars and the
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1968, provoked more than a
hundred urban riots).
224. KERNER COMMISSION, supra note 220, at 203-06.
225. Id. at 1.
226. Id. at 22.
227. Id. at 383 ("By failing to portray the Negro as a matter of routine and
in the context of the total society, the news media have, we believe,
contributed to the black-white schism in this country.").
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Despite the Kerner Commission's sympathetic findings
about the structural "root causes" of urban crime and racial
disorder, crime and welfare emerged as potent political issues
in the 1960s. The riots changed many Whites' perceptions of
the legitimacy of Blacks' grievances, enabling Whites to
attribute crime and welfare dependency to individual choices
rather than to structural forces. 228 This provided the context
for subsequent political appeals based on race in public
policies-a context that led to a strengthened conservative
opposition.229
A similar negative shift occurred in Whites' perceptions of
poverty, welfare, and race during the 1960s, as circumstances
converged to sour the public mood.230  Violent race riots
replaced the non-violent southern civil rights movement. 231
228. HACKER, supra note 48, at 22. Hacker notes,
Whites ceased to identify black protests with a civil rights movement
led by students and ministers. Rather, they saw a resentful and
rebellious multitude, intent on imposing its presence on the rest of
the society .... As the 1970s started, so came a rise in crimes, all too
many of them with black perpetrators. By that point, many white
Americans felt they had been misused or betrayed. Worsening
relations between the races were seen as largely due to the behavior
of blacks, who had abused the invitations to equal citizenship white
America had been tendering.
Id.; cf. GILENS, supra note 15, at 109-10 (arguing that "the impact of the riots
on white Americans' attitudes toward blacks remains subject to debate").
229. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 144-48; OMI & WINANT, supra
note 7, at 114-32.
230. Cf. GILENS, supra note 15, at 116-21 (discussing the "racialization" of
poverty in the news in the mid-1960s).
231. See GARLAND, supra note 6, at 97 ("Televised images of urban race
riots, violent civil rights struggles, anti-war demonstrations, political
assassinations, and worsening street crime reshaped the attitudes of the
middle-American public in the late 1960s."); POWE, supra note 8, at 277-78
(observing that "black power" advocates frightened white voters).
Lemann describes the magnitude of the structural and social changes
associated with the great migration and the political implications associated
with the racial transformation of the cities:
[T]he migration hardly created a harmonious, racially synthesized
country. It was disruptive; it engendered hostility. The fabric of city
life in the United States changed forever. Some of the bitterness of
race relations leached into city politics. The ideal of high-quality
universal public education began to disappear. Street crime became
an obsessive concern for the first time in decades. The beginning of
the modern rise of conservatism coincides exactly with the country's
beginning to realize the true magnitude and consequences of the
black migration, and the government's response to the migration
provided the conservative movement with many of its issues.
LEMANN, supra note 39, at 200.
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"Black power" activists supplanted the clergy and ministers
who had led the movement. 232 Crime rates soared just as the
Supreme Court extended constitutional rights to criminal
defendants. 233 Increased illegitimacy rates of Blacks coincided
with the expansion of the welfare rolls.234 Student protesters
against the Vietnam War began a broader political and social
revolution in sexual mores and drug use that threatened
traditional middle-class values. 235 All this turmoil left white
voters vulnerable to appeals to racial resentments, exploitation,
and demagoguery. 236 So it was no coincidence that, in 1966,
Republicans made electoral gains after blaming liberals' "soft
social programs" and the Warren Court for the rise in racial
radicalism, urban riots, and rising crime rates.237
The post-War decades of rapid social change paved the way
for a reactionary political response. The deep anxieties about
the breakdown of the family, gender roles, and other
institutions created a longing for discipline, formal social
controls, and "traditional values."238 The mantra of the 1960s
232. See HACKER, supra note 48, at 68-69.
233. GRAHAM, supra note 117, at 71-85.
234. GILENS, supra note 15, at 104-11.
235. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 38.
236. Cf. id. at 72. The authors note that
[t]he riots, the welfare rights movement, the black power movement,
student disorders, the sexual revolution, radical feminism,
recreational use of drugs such as marijuana and LSD, pornographic
magazines and movies, and higher taxes merged in varying degrees in
the minds of many voters with liberalism and with the Left....
... It was, however, the fusion of race with an expanding rights
revolution and with the new liberal agenda, and the fusion, in turn, of
race and rights with the public perception of the Democratic party,
and the fusion of the Democratic party with the issues of high taxes
and a coercive, redistributive government, that created the central
force splintering the presidential coalition behind the Democratic
party throughout the next two decades ....
Id.
237. See HACKER, supra note 48, at 56 ("Conservatives believe that for at
least a generation, black people have been given plenty of opportunities, so
they have no one but themselves to blame for whatever difficulties they face.");
POWE, supra note 8, at 278 (noting that in the 1966 election, Republicans
gained forty-seven House seats and three Senate seats and that California
voters elected Ronald Reagan governor by a landslide).
238. See GARLAND, supra note 6, at 195. Garland notes that
a reactionary politics has used this underlying disquiet to create a
powerful narrative of moral decline in which crime has come to
feature-together with teenage pregnancies, single parent families,
welfare dependency, and drug abuse-as the chief symptom of the
supposed malaise. This call for a return to order has led to the
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youth culture-"sex, drugs, and rock and roll"-and the anti-
war, civil rights, and feminist movements all challenged
authority and the status quo. By contrast, proponents of
"traditional values" asserted the primacy of family, country,
work, sexual restraint, rigid gender roles, authority, and social
stability.239 Because the conservative emphasis on "traditional
values" arose in reaction to the movements for civil rights and
gender equity, it acquired a racial connotation and appeared
hostile to claims for minority rights.240 As a result, for decades,
liberal Democrats could not credibly discuss many moral and
social issues that concerned the national electorate without fear
of offending their civil rights constituencies. This reluctance
created a "values barrier" with large segments of the
population and ceded to the right a host of policy issues that
implicated race.
imposition of extensive new disciplines and controls, though it has
been a feature of these developments that they have been targeted
against particular social groups rather than universally imposed....
[T]he individual freedoms granted by late modern morals and
markets ... have been shored up by a new structure of controls and
exclusions, directed against those groups most adversely affected by
the dynamics of economic and social change-the urban poor, welfare
claimants, and minority communities.
Id.; see also EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 71 (arguing that "[g]hetto
riots, campus riots, street crime, anti-Vietnam marches, poor people's
marches, drugs, pornography, welfarism, rising taxes, all had a common
thread: the breakdown of family and social discipline, of order, of concepts of
duty, of respect for law, of public and private morality"); OMI & WINANT, supra
note 7, at 121-24 (suggesting that the cultural upheavals of the 1960s elicited
fear in many Americans-those whom Nixon dubbed the "silent majority"-
about the imminent collapse of the "American Dream," a loss of military
hegemony, economic prosperity, and cultural dominance). The New Right's
aggressive assertion of religious and cultural traditionalism provided a
reassuring verity in a time of uncertainty. Id.
239. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 262-63.
240. See id. at 258-59. The authors note that
[iun the late 1960s and early 1970s, the raising of the "traditional
values" banner over such issues as law and order, the family, sexual
conduct, joblessness, welfare fraud, and patriotism was seen by
liberals, and by blacks-with some accuracy-as an appeal to racist,
narrow-minded, or xenophobic instincts, an appeal designed to
marshal support for reactionary social policies. The conflation by the
political right of values issues with attempts to resist racial
integration, with attempts to exclude women from public life, and
with attempts to discredit the expansion of constitutional rights to
disadvantaged minorities, fueled an often bitter resistance by the left
and by blacks to the whole package of traditional values.
Id. at 259.
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III. THE CONSERVATIVE BACKLASH: STRUCTURAL
CHANGE, MEDIA SENSATIONALISM, "GET TOUGH"
POLITICS, AND THE REFORMULATION OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE
By the early 1970s, urban riots, escalating rates of "baby
boom" crime, dissatisfaction with the "treatment model" in
penology, and the emerging "politics of crime" prompted calls
for a return to classical principles of criminal law.241 Between
1964 and 1974, the number of homicides doubled,242 and
produced a markedly more conservative public opinion about
punishment and the response to crime.243 During this period,
conservative politicians discovered the salience of "law and
order" and other racially coded phrases as a way of describing
social issues with racial implications.244 By the early 1970s,
both liberal and conservative critics of rehabilitation and
indeterminate sentencing began to swing the penal policy
pendulum toward retribution, determinate sentences, and
principles of "just deserts."245 Research on career criminals
241. BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 10-11; GARLAND, supra note 6,
at 195.
242. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 134, at 58.
243. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 111-12 ("By 1977, the
percentage describing court treatment of criminals as too harsh or about right
had fallen to a minimal 11 percent, and those who said the courts were not
harsh enough had risen to 83 percent.").
244. Id. at 69-73; MENDELBERG, supra note 12, at 90-98.
245. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 4-6 (1976). During the
1970s, Progressives' optimistic assumptions about human malleability and the
efficacy of rehabilitation foundered on empirical evaluation studies that
questioned both the effectiveness of rehabilitative programs and the scientific
expertise of those who administered the enterprise. ALLEN, REHABILITATIVE
IDEAL, supra note 25, at 33-59. In the 1970s, determinate sentences based on
present offense and prior record increasingly supplanted indeterminate
sentences for adults as "just deserts" and retribution displaced rehabilitation
as the underlying rationale for criminal sentencing. Id. By the mid-1980s,
about half the states enacted determinate sentencing laws, ten eliminated
parole boards, and many more used guidelines to structure sentence length
and in/out confinement decisions, levels of supervision for probationers and
parole release decisions. MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6-13 (1996).
Proponents of "just deserts" reject rehabilitation as a justification for
sentencing because criminal justice practitioners lack the technical ability
either to implement the treatment model successfully and consistently, or to
predict recidivism accurately and reliably. See, e.g., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE,
supra note 142, at 34-47; VON HIRSCH, supra, at 27-32; ANDREW VON HIRSCH,
PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE
SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 3-18 (1985) [hereinafter VON HIRSCH, PAST OR
FUTURE CRIMES]. Proponents of "just deserts" objected that indeterminate
sentences vest too much discretionary power in presumed clinical experts who
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provided an empirical rationale for "selective incapacitation"
and an additional reason to base sentencing decisions on the
seriousness of offenses and criminal history rather than the
characteristics of the offender.246 Evaluations of treatment
cannot justify their differential treatment of similarly-situated offenders based
on either validated classification schemes with objective indicators or
consistently successful outcomes. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the
Principle of the Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes,
68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 835-36 (1988) [hereinafter Feld, Punishment, Treatment].
Therapeutically individualized sentences result in inequalities and racial
disparities among those who commit the same offenses. STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE, supra note 142, at 83-96. Individualized and disparate sentences for
similarly situated offenders violate fundamental norms of distributive justice
and penal proportionality. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 59. Just deserts
sentencing, with its strong retributive foundation, punishes offenders
proportionally according to their past behavior rather than on the basis of who
they are or whom clinicians predict they may become. HIRSCH, PAST OR
FUTURE CRIMES, supra, at 31-39. Determinate and presumptive sentencing
laws assert the moral superiority of backward-looking penalties and define
and sanction similarly situated offenders based on relatively objective and
legally relevant characteristics such as seriousness of the offense, culpability,
or prior criminal history. Id.
Similar jurisprudential changes occurred in sentencing and waiving
delinquents, as "just deserts" concerns spilled-over into the juvenile justice
system as well. See infra Part III.D. In the context of waiver decisions,
assessments of individual offender's "amenability to treatment" or
dangerousness historically predominated. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile
Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile
Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 484-85 (1987)
[hereinafter Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes]. As a result of the influence of
"just deserts" jurisprudence, increasingly, the present offense and prior record
came to control these decisions. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 2, at 208-35; Feld,
Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra, at 486-87; Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and
Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189,
213-15 (1998) [hereinafter Feld, Responses to Youth Violence]. Similar changes
also occurred in the sentencing of ordinary delinquents as state laws and
judicial practices emphasized offense criteria rather than a child's "best
interests." See, e.g., FELD, supra note 2, at 245-86; Feld, Punishment,
Treatment, supra, at 835-36; Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra, at 220-
43; Julianne P. Sheffer, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes:
Reconciling Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice
System, 48 VAND. L. REV. 479, 484-86 (1995).
246. See generally, 1 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS" (Alfred
Blumstein et al. eds., 1986). Beginning in the 1970s, longitudinal research
focused on the development of delinquent and criminal careers. See, e.g.,
MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972).
Many youths engage simultaneously in both trivial and serious law violations,
and police arrest and process them primarily as a function of the frequency,
rather than the seriousness, of their delinquency. See DONNA M. HAMPARIAN
ET AL., THE VIOLENT FEW: A STUDY OF DANGEROUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS
128-30 (1978). Career offenders do not specialize in particular types of crime;
serious crime occurs within an essentially random pattern of delinquent
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effectiveness raised substantial doubts about clinicians'
abilities to coerce behavioral changes, highlighted the
subjectivity inherent in therapeutic justice, and called into
question "what works" in correctional reform.247
The shift of sentencing policy to emphasize offense criteria
and the "just deserts" critique of rehabilitation produced
strange philosophical and political bedfellows: liberals
behavior. Joan Petersilia, Criminal Career Research: A Review of Recent
Evidence, 2 CRIME & JUST. 321, 350-53 (1980). The small group of chronic
offenders commits many of the offenses, however, and most of the violent
crimes perpetrated by juveniles. Id. at 345-46. For virtually all purposes,
most of the significant differences in frequency and seriousness of delinquency
occur between those juveniles with one or two delinquent contacts and those
with five or more offenses. Id. at 343-44. Chronic offenders' probabilities of
subsequent criminal activity remained quite high and continued into
adulthood. Id. at 349-53. A number of subsequent longitudinal cohort studies
confirm the relationships between chronic, serious, and life-course persistent
career offending. See, e.g., BLUMSTEIN ET AL., supra, at 55-95; HAMPARIAN ET
AL., supra, at 128-30; PAUL E. TRACY ET AL., DELINQUENCY CAREERS IN TWO
BIRTH COHORTS 273-98 (1990). The research on criminal careers reports that
while most youths desist after one or two contacts, chronic offenders exhibit a
substantial probability (between .70 and .80) of continuing to commit crimes
into adulthood. WOLFGANG ET AL., supra, at 161-63. These studies suggest
that sentencing policies can better identify serious offenders by their
cumulative persistence rather than by the nature of their initial offense; the
number of contacts a youth has with the justice system provides the most
reliable indicator of future criminality.
The criminal career research initially offered the prospect that sentencing
policies might significantly reduce or prevent crime through "selective
incapacitation" of the most active career offenders. BLUMSTEIN ET AL., supra,
at 195-97. Unfortunately, selective incapacitation strategies founder on the
inability prospectively to predict whom the high base-rate offenders will be.
Jan Chaiken et al., Predicting Violent Behavior and Classifying Violent
Offenders, in 4 UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE: CONSEQUENCES
AND CONTROLS 217, 281 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1994);
Jacqueline Cohen, Incapacitation as a Strategy for Crime Control: Possibilities
and Pitfalls, 5 CRIME & JUST. 1, 37-42 (1983). Although longitudinal studies
can identify career offenders retrospectively within the heterogeneous mass of
young offenders based on their persistence, we lack the indicators or ability to
predict in advance which youths will become career criminals. See Chaiken et
al., supra, at 281. Moreover, given the likelihood of errors, overprediction, and
"false positives," to preventively incarcerate people on the basis of what they
might do in the future rather than for what they already have done poses
extraordinary ethical and legal problems. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON
HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND RESTRAINT OF CRIME
60-70 (1995).
247. See, e.g., ALLEN, REHABILITATIVE IDEAL, supra note 25, at 57-58;
MAUER, supra note 45, at 48-49; Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions
and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974) ("With few and
isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far
have had no appreciable effect on recidivism.").
1504
20031 RACE, POLITICS, AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 1505
concerned about excessive discretion and discriminatory
decisions, civil libertarians concerned about individual liberty
and autonomy, and conservatives who denounced treatment as
"soft on crime."248  Conservatives questioned the practical
feasibility of rehabilitation and argued that indeterminate
sentences released dangerous offenders who deserved lengthier
sentences. 249 Because liberals had criticized the failures of
rehabilitation and indeterminate sentences as arbitrary and
discriminatory criminal justice policies, they lacked a coherent
alternative to conservative proposals to "crack down" on
criminals. 250
The period between the 1960s and the 1980s also marked
an upsurge in the role of race in domestic politics-starting
with the civil rights movement's struggle for equality and
culminating in the conservative reaction embodied by the
Reagan administration.251 In the contested politics of race,
248. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text. Garland observes
that "[tihe movement for determinate sentencing reform created an unusually
broad and influential alliance of forces. The campaign included not only
radical supporters of the prisoners' movement, liberal lawyers and reforming
judges, but also retributivist philosophers, disillusioned criminologists and
hard-line conservatives." GARLAND, supra note 6, at 60. Left-wing critics
rejected prisons and the entire apparatus of the criminal justice system as a
repressive institution to maintain the status quo. See, e.g., MAUER, supra note
45, at 45. On the other hand, Beckett and Sasson argue that
since the late 1960s, conservative politicians, together with the mass
media and activists in the victim rights movement, have kept the issue
of crime at the top of the nation's political agenda. Focusing on the most
sensational and violent crimes, these actors have promoted policies
aimed at "getting tough" and "cracking down."
BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 4.
249. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
250. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 61 ("Over time, the liberal concern with
just deserts, proportionality and minimizing penal coercion gave way to more
hard-line policies of deterrence, predictive restraint and incapacitation, and
eventually to expressive, exemplary sentencing and mass imprisonment-
policies that were completely at odds with principles and intentions of the
original liberal reformers."); see also BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 55
(arguing that rehabilitation fell into disfavor because conservatives advocated
punishment to deter crime, while liberals criticized it as discriminatory and
abusive).
251. See, e.g., OMI & WINANT, supra note 7, at 5. Beckett argues that "the
New Right wed traditional conservative economic policies and anticommunism
to a conservative stance on contemporary 'social issues,' especially those with
racial implications." BECKETT, supra note 25, at 42. Part of the New Right's
anti-state populism aimed to dismantle programs designed to reduce racial,
economic, and gender inequalities and to strengthen the state's power of social
control. Id. at 42-43.
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racial ideologies affect public policies and social structures that,
in turn, influence the social organization of communities and
the distribution of economic opportunities.252  Social
inequalities affect behavior and the prevalence of crime.253
Because social inequalities are structured around race, they
shape Whites' attitudes and beliefs about racial minorities. 254
By the 1980s, the structural transformation of cities, increases
in youth homicide and gun violence, and news media depictions
of violent black youths fueled political calls to "get tough" on
youth crime.
Doubts about the ability of juvenile courts either to
rehabilitate chronic and violent young offenders or to protect
public safety bolstered policies to "crack down" on youth crime
and to prosecute larger numbers of youths as adults. In the
1980s and early 1990s, most states amended their juvenile
codes either to simplify the transfer of young offenders to
criminal courts, or to require juvenile court judges to impose
longer, determinate, or mandatory sentences on those youths
who remained within an increasingly punitive juvenile
system.255 Both strategies de-emphasize rehabilitation and the
circumstances of the offender, stress personal and justice
system accountability and punishment, and base decisions on
the seriousness of the present offense and prior record. 256
Cumulatively, these changes reflect a fundamental inversion of
juvenile justice jurisprudence and sentencing policies-from
rehabilitation to retribution, from an emphasis on the offender
to the seriousness of the offense, from a focus on a youth's
"amenability to treatment" to punishment, and a transfer of
sentencing discretion from the judicial to the legislative and
executive branches.
A. MACRO-STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE ECONOMY
AND CITIES
Macro-structural, economic, and racial demographic
changes that occurred in American cities during the 1970s and
252. OMI & WINANT, supra note 7, at 74-76.
253. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 134, at 79-87.
254. See, e.g., OMI & WINANT, supra note 7, at 74-75.
255. See infra Part III.D.
256. See, e.g., PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT
JUVENILE CRIME: RESEARCH REPORT 59-61 (1996); Feld, Responses to Youth
Violence, supra note 245, at 189-261.
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1980s and the escalation in black youth homicide rates at the
end of the 1980s facilitated the politics of crime that produced
the "get-tough" juvenile -justice policies of the early 1990s. In
wealthy and democratic countries, a correlation exists between
homicide rates and social and economic inequality-the greater
the income and wealth disparities, the higher the rates of
killings-and the United States is among the most
economically stratified in western society.257  One factor
contributing to "get tough" policies was the epidemic of crack
cocaine, which spurred gun violence and youth homicides. 258 A
second factor was media coverage that disproportionately put a
black face on young criminals and reinforced the white public's
fear and animus. 259  The proximate cause of "get tough"
legislative changes was the success of conservative politicians
who used crime as a "code word" to make racial appeals for
electoral advantage.260
Between the prosperous post-War years and the early
1970s, employment in the automobile, steel, construction, and
manufacturing industries provided semi-skilled high school
graduates with good-payingjobs. 261 These opportunities proved
especially beneficial for black men who moved to northern cities
and provided the foundations of stable, two-parent, black,
257. BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 33. Not only does a
relationship exist between inequality and homicide rates, but the relationship
is even stronger "between economic discrimination and the homicide rate:
countries that practice 'deliberate, invidious exclusion' on the basis of ascribed
characteristics such as race have the highest rates of killings." Id. The high
homicide rates in the United States reflect, in part, the country's pronounced
inequalities in wealth distribution and historical racial discrimination. Id.
People who aspire to the cultural goals but who experience blocked access to
the means to achieve those goals "experience bouts of frustration, despair, and
outright anger and become more prone to destruction of both self and other."
Id. at 34; see also, ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 134, at 34-50 (comparing
transnational crime rates and discussing the singularity of U.S. homicide
rates among comparable countries).
258. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 2, at 206-07; MASSEY & DENTON, supra
note 16, at 174; Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug
Industry, 86 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 10, 34-35 (1995) [hereinafter
Blumstein, Youth Violence].
259. ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE
WHITE MIND 81-84 (2000); LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, OFF
BALANCE: YOUTH, RACE & CRIME IN THE NEWS 4-5 (2001), available at
http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/media/media.pdf (last visited Feb. 13,
2003).
260. MENDELBERG, supra note 12, at 134-65.
261. KATZ, supra note 62, at 128-29; WILSON, supra note 207, at 25-34.
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working-class communities. 262 Mass production techniques,
consumer demand, and low energy costs produced more than a
quarter-century long period of sustained economic expansion
and prosperity.263 The post-War period of material well being,
economic growth, and public confidence supported social
policies of inclusion, social welfare, and indirectly sustained
support for the "Rehabilitative Ideal."264 As long as economic
growth expanded the size of the "pie" and members of the
middle class felt that they received their share of the benefits,
the general public supported the social and penal welfare
policies adopted by liberal elites.265
Starting in the early 1970s, the transition from an
industrial to an information and service economy reduced job
prospects for semi-skilled workers in the manufacturing
sectors, and economic opportunities in the post-industrial city
increasingly depended on skills and education. 266 Moreover,
because of differences in the timing of the "great migration,"
the experiences of urban Blacks differed from those of earlier
European immigrants and placed them at a significant
economic and structural disadvantage during the post-
262. See, e.g., HACKER, supra note 48, at 101 ("This period saw the
emergence of a stable black working class, under-pinned by two-parent
families and orderly neighborhoods.").
263. FELD, supra note 2, at 192-94.
264. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 49 (noting the relationship between
material conditions and public support for rehabilitative programs).
265. Id. at 51 ("If the general public was more punitive than its
representatives and less convinced by correctionalism than were liberal elites,
it was, nevertheless, not especially excited about the issue."); EDSALL &
EDSALL, supra note 11, at 105 (noting that economic contraction undermined
popular support for governmental intervention, because "[siteady economic
growth, which had made redistributive government policies tolerable to the
majority of the electorate, came to a halt in the mid-1970s, and, with
stagnation, the threat to Democratic liberalism intensified").
266. The transition to a post-modern society produced a bifurcation of
economic opportunities based on education and training. GARLAND, supra
note 6, at 78 (noting that the revolution in technology "gave rise to the
'information society' that we now inhabit; made possible the cities and suburbs
in which we dwell; linked the four corners of the globe into a single accessible
world; and created new social divisions between those who have access to the
high-tech world and those who do not"); KATZ, supra note 62, at 124-25
(describing the post-industrial city as a study in contrasts-the shiny towers of
revitalized commercial centers near the closed factories of the industrial
districts, wealthy "yuppies" living in gentrified older neighborhoods and
impoverished minorities living in concentrated poverty). The post-industrial
city reflected a "transformation of the economy, of demography, and of space.
Each had profound consequences for the nature and extent of poverty." Id. at
128.
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industrial transition. 267 Between 1969 and 1984, employment
in the manufacturing sectors of the economy decreased from
26% to 19% of the workforce, while full-time employment in the
service sectors-e.g., finance, insurance, and real estate-
increased from 13% to 28% and surpassed manufacturing
employment. 268 Beginning in 1973, and for the first time since
the post-World War II period of sustained growth, inflation-
adjusted real hourly wages stagnated and then declined-by
267. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 62, at 51 (summarizing the differences in
experiences for the immigrants from southern and eastern Europe and those
of southern Blacks). Katz notes that
blacks faced circumstances that differed fundamentally from those
found earlier by European immigrants. They entered cities in large
numbers as unskilled and semiskilled as manufacturing jobs were
leaving, not growing. The discrimination they encountered kept them
out of the manufacturing jobs into which earlier immigrants had been
recruited. One important goal of public schools had been the
assimilation and "Americanization" of immigrant children; by
contrast, they excluded and segregated blacks. Racism enforced
housing segregation and residential concentration among blacks
increased at the same time it lessened among immigrants and their
children. Political machines had embraced earlier immigrants and
incorporated them into the system of "city trenches" by which
American cities were governed; they excluded blacks from effective
political power until cities had been so abandoned by industry and
deserted by whites that resistance to black political participation no
longer mattered.
Id.; see also LEMANN, supra note 39, at 103 (summarizing differences in urban
racial transition and "the deterioration of education, law enforcement, and
other essential institutions, and then the exodus of the black middle class and
the descent into real disorganization"); LIEBERSON, supra note 18, at xi
(arguing that the immigrants from South, Central, and Eastern Europe faced
different and less severe impediments to their upward mobility than did the
subsequent black migrants from the rural South). Lieberson emphasizes the
role that segregation has played in affecting the life-chances of Blacks versus
the European immigrants:
[B]lack residential segregation is very high, much higher than that
experienced by various white groups in the same cities. This is
extremely important because residential isolation is of consequence
for a wide variety of other events, such as school isolation, restriction
of opportunities because of minimal contacts with whites, marking
the black population as distinctive and different, and the restricted
opportunities to live near all sorts of employment found at greater
distances from the black ghettos.
LIEBERSON, supra note 18, at 10-11; see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note
16, at 2 ("[BIlack segregation is not comparable to the limited and transient
segregation experienced by other racial and ethnic groups, now or in the
past.").
268. KATZ, supra note 62, at 128; see also LEMANN, supra note 39, at 201-
02 ("The economic base of black America, which had switched from agriculture
to unskilled industrial labor in the 1940s, switched again in the sixties ... the
industrial age for African-Americans lasted for not even a full generation.").
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2.8% in 1974 and 0.7% in 1975.269 The "rights revolution"
included women under the employment provisions of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, and the women's movement increased the
entry of women into the workforce that further eroded the
traditional hierarchy and the economic position of white
men.270 Moreover, the globalized economy and the overseas
challenge to the domestic automobile and steel industries
constituted a race-neutral development with profound racial
consequences. 271 Under the pressures of a globalizing economy,
low-skill, entry-level jobs began to migrate overseas.
The post-industrial transition to a service and information
economy impeded the ability of semi-skilled high-school
graduates to achieve the "American Dream."272 The domestic
automobile and steel industries where working-class Americans
and unions had previously experienced their strongest gains
were among the primary victims of the economic deterioration
of the late 1970s and 1980s. Blue-collar white workers who
saw their own high wages, benefits, and middle-class status
eroded strongly resented liberal affirmative action programs to
expand apprenticeships, jobs, and seniority to Blacks. 273 White
269. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 105.
270. Id. at 108 ("[Tlhe women's movement-in combination with financial
pressures making the one-earner family increasingly untenable-produced a
major alteration in family structure, as labor force participation among
married women grew steadily from 35.7% in 1965, to 41.4% in 1970, to 45.1
percent in 1975, to 50.7% in 1980.").
271. See id. at 27 (noting that the "political consequences of a globalized
economy provide a case study of how race interacts catalytically with
seemingly race-neutral development to produce a powerful reaction"). The
effects of declining industrial productivity and global competition eroded jobs,
wages, and employment security. Id. at 201-02.
272. See GARLAND, supra note 6, at 81-82 (noting the development of "a
different kind of employment pattern: one that leaned towards low-paid, part-
time, usually female workers, or else highly skilled, highly trained graduate
employees"); OMI & WINANT, supra note 7, at 114-15 ("The issue of
'deindustrialization' gradually moved to the center of economic debates, as
workers faced plant shut-downs, redundancy, and limited high-tech
occupational opportunities.").
273. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 199 (noting that "[bilue-collar
workers who had been under pressure by the civil rights movement to share
the benefits of high wages and middle-class status felt that they had less and
less to give to their own families, let alone to new groups seeking
apprenticeships, jobs, and seniority"); GARLAND, supra note 6, at 76 (observing
that changing material conditions affected blue-collar and middle-class
support for generous welfare and rehabilitative criminal justice policies); OMI
& WINANT, supra note 7, at 116 (noting that the conservative attack on
affirmative action policies and the charges that the state engaged in "reverse
discrimination" were understood in terms of racial competition).
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workers' anxiety and anger over their economic vulnerability
and the perceived inability of government policies to address
their concerns made them receptive to politicians who
scapegoated Blacks. 274
The new economy placed a premium on education and
produced a widening earnings gap between high school and
college graduates. 275 In 1975, a college graduate only earned
about 25% more than did a high-school graduate. 276 Two
decades later, the income differential was almost 100%,
because college graduates' earning capacity increased
substantially while high-school graduates' earning capacity
decreased about 25%.277 Significantly, between 1975 and 1988,
the average earnings of entry-level college educated workers
increased from 132% to 180% of those of high-school graduates,
but only 13.2% of Blacks aged twenty-five to thirty-four had
274. For example, Entman and Rojecki argue that Whites' economic
uncertainties and alienation provided political incentives to make racial
appeals and increased the salience of such campaigns:
First, they bolstered Whites' susceptibility to anti-Black political
appeals. Without a sophisticated understanding of such topics as
labor economics, class mobility patterns, and public finance, the
potential salience and apparent reasonableness of coded racial claims
about wasteful welfare spending, high taxes, and threatening crime
grew.
Second, White anxiety encouraged certain elites to mount an
active racial project scapegoating Blacks (and, in some cases, other
out-groups like immigrants). Here capital punishment and longer
prison terms were cases in point. Whatever the effect of death
penalties and stricter sentencing on Black crime rates, the crucial
impacts of global competition, economic growth, and other such forces
on employment opportunities and thus crime cannot easily be
controlled or even discussed. And the mainstream culture provides
such a plentiful stock of myths, symbols, and homilies about
individual responsibility. In this context, it made sense for some
political leaders to craft a racial project emphasizing capital
punishment and longer sentences, along with cutting welfare,
affirmative action, and related policies that disproportionately affect
Blacks-remedies conveniently congruent with some of the most vivid
images on the nightly news.
ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 76.
275. See KATZ, supra note 62, at 128-29 (the number of jobs which
employed people with less than a high school education declined between 52
and 219% in cities in the 1970s).
276. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, LOSING GENERATIONS: ADOLESCENTS
IN HIGH-RISK SETTINGS 26 (1993) (noting earning differentials by race, gender,
and education); see also WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS, supra note 207, at
25-34 (1996).
277. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE,
POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 126 (1992); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 276, at 25-26.
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college degrees, compared with 24.5% of Whites, and the gap
was widening.278  Those better paying jobs that employ
disproportionately more white workers-professional,
technical, and managerial-grew at a faster rate than those
that employ proportionately more black workers-machine
operators, service, clerical, and household workers. 279 These
economic dislocations also had regional and political
ramifications. Jobs and industries declined in the Northeast
and Midwestern "frostbelt" industries-steel, rubber, and
automobile-while the emergent high-technology industries
expanded in the more conservative "sunbelt" states of the
South and West 2 80
During the post-World War II period, government
highway, housing, and mortgage policies encouraged suburban
expansion around urban centers.281 This spatially transformed
many cities, and contributed to the growth of predominantly
white suburbs around increasingly poor and minority urban
cores.2 8 2 As black migration from the rural South to the urban
North transformed the larger older cities, Whites
simultaneously began to move from cities to the suburbs.28 3
Between the end of World War II and 1960, about one-third of
all Blacks who had remained in the South migrated to other
parts of the country; by 1960, the majority of all Blacks lived in
central cities.28 4  Federal housing policies and interstate
278. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 245; Edsall & Edsall, supra note
1, at 81 ("From 1976 to 1988 the percentage of blacks aged eighteen to twenty-
four enrolled in college fell from 22.6 to 21.1, while the percentage of whites
rose from 27.1 to 31.3.").
279. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 231-36.
280. OMI & WINANT, supra note 7, at 114.
281. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text; see also GARLAND,
supra note 6, at 84 (noting that the automobile and the accompanying
construction of highways and the large-scale migration of Whites from cities to
suburbs constitute major developments in post-War urban social ecology);
KATZ, supra note 62, at 134 ("After 1945, suburbanization accelerated.
Massive increases in automobile ownership, the federal highway program, and
federal housing policies that underwrote suburban mortgages and redlined
cities composed one set of factors speeding its development."); LEMANN, supra
note 39, at 118 ("The interstate highway program was encouraging the flight
of the white middle class to the new, sterile, soulless suburbs .....
283. See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
284. KATZ, supra note 62, at 131 ("From the end of World War II to 1960,
one-third of the southern black population moved to other regions. During the
1950s, the proportion of blacks residing in central cities grew from 41 percent
to 51 percent."); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 18.
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highway construction, combined with bank mortgage and real
estate sales practices, spurred the growth of predominantly
white suburbs ringing the poor and minority urban cores.285 In
the 1950s and 1960s, urban renewal and highway construction
disrupted and destroyed many urban black communities. 286
The isolation of Blacks in urban ghettos did not happen by
chance or simply reflect their housing preferences. To the
contrary, public policies and private institutional arrangements
created racial segregation, and they continue to exacerbate the
harmful consequences of concentrated poverty to the detriment
of the economic and social welfare of black Americans. 287 The
prevalence of concentrated poverty among Blacks can be
attributed to deliberate public policies to "contain" and isolate
them.288 For example in 1980, 70% of poor Whites lived in non-
poverty areas compared with only 16% of poor Blacks. 289
Conversely, fewer than 7% of poor Whites lived in areas of
concentrated poverty compared with 38% of poor Blacks. 290
285. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 19-59. During the 1960s,
"urban renewal" projects eliminated about 20% of the housing available in
central cities in which Blacks resided. BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at
39; see also MAUER, supra note 45, at 123 (noting that social interactions
between the races in the North was even more limited than occurred in the
South where, despite the caste system, there was contact within communities).
286. KATZ, supra note 62, at 136.
287. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 8; WILSON, THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED, supra note 207, at 20-62. Massey and Denton note that
residential segregation has been instrumental in creating a structural
niche within which a deleterious set of attitudes and behaviors-a
culture of segregation-has arisen and flourished. Segregation
created the structural conditions for the emergence of an oppositional
culture that devalues work, schooling, and marriage and that stresses
attitudes and behaviors that are antithetical and often hostile to
success in the larger economy .... Residential segregation is the
institutional apparatus that supports other racially discriminatory
processes and binds them together into a coherent and uniquely
effective system of racial subordination.
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 8; see also Robert J. Sampson & Janet L.
Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the
United States, 21 CRIME & JUST.: A REV. OF RES. 311, 338 (1997) (noting that
"even given the same objective socioeconomic status, blacks and whites face
vastly different environments in which to live, work, and raise their children").
288. See Sampson & Lauritsen, supra note 287, at 338 ("Opposition from
organized community groups to the building of public housing in 'their'
neighborhoods, de facto federal policy to tolerate extensive segregation against
blacks in urban housing markets, and the decision by local governments to
neglect the rehabilitation of existing residential units ... have led to massive,
segregated housing projects .... ).
289. See MAUER, supra note 45, at 168-69.
290. See, e.g., BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 37 (noting that in
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Moreover, as a result of deindustrialization during the 1970s
and 1980s, economic inequality increased as black family
income dropped from being 61% of white family income in 1970
to 54% in 1992.291 In short, Blacks are far more likely than
Whites to be poor and, if they are poor, to be forced to live in
areas of concentrated poverty. Whites' perceptions of Blacks
sustain housing, education, and welfare policies that facilitate
the growth of urban slums and, in turn, the adaptive behaviors
of these "undeserving" poor reinforce Whites' apprehension of
minorities as dangerous and threatening.292  Thus, racial
segregation, cultural isolation, and concentration of poverty are
the results of a host of disparate public policy decisions that
then reinforce the appeal of these policies for many voters and
politicians.
The structural changes in the economy and the changing
demographics of the nation altered the political balance during
this time. Between 1970 and 1986, the suburban population,
which is overwhelmingly white, grew from 40% to 45% of the
nation's total population.293 Because the majority of black
voters are highly concentrated in urban areas, they have
relatively limited influence over politicians who represent
predominantly white districts. 294  The emergence of the
New York City, 70% of poor Blacks and Hispanics live in high-poverty
neighborhoods, whereas 70% of poor Whites live in non-poor neighborhoods);
KATZ, supra note 62, at 207 (noting that during the 1970s, "[tihe total black
population in 'extreme-poverty' areas soared by 148 percent during these
years, compared to a 24 percent rise among whites").
291. BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 33-34 (reporting on the racial
and ethnic nature of class inequality and the effects of inequality in
democratic and wealthy countries on homicide rates).
292. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 62, at 125 ("[C]hildren of the urban poor
attended decaying public schools whose corridors sometimes required police
patrols; many escaped as soon as the law allowed and most of the rest left with
minimal skills, unprepared for either higher education or the better jobs
offered by the new economy."); KENNEDY, supra note 76, at 14 ("A substantial
number of voters both fear and resent the so-called 'undeserving' poor,
particularly those among them who are colored, a sector of the population that
many perceive as especially dangerous and unworthy."); MASSEY & DENTON,
supra note 16, at 13 ("By building physical decay, crime, and social disorder
into the residential structure of black communities, segregation creates a
harsh and extremely disadvantaged environment to which ghetto blacks must
adapt.").
293. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 227. As a result of "white-flight"
from the central cities, where most poor Blacks live, the urban proportion of
the total population decreased from 35.2% to 31.6%. Id.
294. See HACKER, supra note 48, at 211 (noting that "black voters tend to
be concentrated in segregated areas, which means they have little sway over
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suburban population as a virtual electoral majority enables the
predominantly white voters to address their own public sector
service needs-schools, parks, police, and roads-through local
and county government while weakening their ties to the
increasingly black cities.295 Suburban Whites' ability to satisfy
their public service needs through local tax expenditures and
the division between urban and suburban municipalities has
reduced the incentives for Whites to contribute to the
governmental largesse that sustains programs for Blacks and
the poor at the state or federal levels. 296
1. Deindustrialization and the Black "Underclass"
Macro-structural economic changes associated with the
politicians in other districts," and that "the majority of lawmakers in the
United States have few if any black residents in their constituencies").
295. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 29 (noting that "the growth of
suburbia and of suburban government provides a means to address public
concerns, while confining services and benefits to local residents"). While
voters support public funding for education, recreation, health, and safety,
many Whites discovered that
they can become fiscal liberals at the local level. They can satisfy
these demands through increased suburban and county expenditures,
guaranteeing the highest possible return to themselves on their tax
dollars, while continuing to maintain policies of fiscal conservativism
at the federal level. Suburbanization has permitted whites to satisfy
liberal ideals revolving around activist government, while keeping to
a minimum the number of blacks and the poor who share in
government largess.
Id. at 228. See also PHILLIPS, supra note 11, at 467 ("All across the nation, the
fastest growing urban areas are steadily increasing their Republican
pluralities, while the old central cities-seat of the New Deal era-are casting
steadily fewer votes for Democratic liberalism.").
296. Edsall and Edsall argue that
[t]he most important of these segregating forces is the ascendance of
the suburban electorate to virtual majority status, empowering an
overwhelmingly white segment of the voting population to address
basic social service needs (schooling, recreation, libraries, roads,
police and fire protection) through local suburban government and
through locally generated revenues, and to further sever already
weak ties to increasingly black urban constituencies.
EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 217.
To the extent that investment in public services and, especially, public
schools is imperative to address the circumstances of the underclass, the
urban-suburban divisions reduce Whites' self-interest in making such a
commitment. For example, in 1986, the twenty-five largest central-city school
districts enrolled 27.5% of all black students and 30% of all Hispanic
schoolchildren, but only 3.3% of all white children. Edsall & Edsall, supra
note 1, at 85; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 158 (noting that
"contemporary racial segregation gives white politicians a strong interest in
limiting the flow of public resources to black-controlled cities").
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post-industrial transition had a deleterious impact on urban
minority residents. 297 The greatest job losses occurred in those
higher-paying, lower-skilled sectors of the manufacturing
economy to which urban minorities previously had greatest
access.298 Job growth occurred primarily in the suburbs and in
those sectors of the information and service economies that
required higher levels of education than most urban minority
workers possessed.299 As a result of the economic, spatial, and
racial reorganization of cities, an urban "underclass" living in
concentrated poverty and in racial, social, and cultural isolation
was created over several decades. 300
The structural transformation of inner cities reduced
young black males' employment prospects, increased rates of
out-of-wedlock childbirths among poor black women, and
precipitated the decline of two-parent black families.30 1 The
297. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 62, at 130 ("Economic stagnation, the
disproportionate growth of low-wage jobs, the declining minimum wage, the
mismatch between better jobs and the education of the urban poor, and shifts
in occupational structure have worsened poverty within America's cities.");
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS, supra note 207, at 25-110.
298. See KATZ, supra note 62, at 128; WILSON, THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED, supra note 207, at 39-46.
299. See WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 207, at 100-03.
300. See generally KATZ, supra note 62, at 199 ("Blacks' detachment from
'the standardized institutions' feeding the primary labor market reinforced
their entrapment in the underclass."); Michael B. Katz, The Urban
"Underclass" as a Metaphor of Social Transformation, in THE "UNDERCLASS"
DEBATE: VIEWS FROM HISTORY 4 (Michael B. Katz ed., 1993) ("By the late
1970s, the specter of an emergent underclass permeated discussions of
America's inner cities."). Edsall and Edsall note that
[t]he concentration among the black poor of single motherhood, crime
and withdrawal from the labor market-combined with an intensified
geographic isolation-has made it possible to partially segregate this
segment of the population from the political, social, and economic
mainstream. Poor black urban neighborhoods.., are avoided by
whites and increasingly abandoned by middle-class blacks; the
engines of the local economy in such neighborhoods are
disproportionately government welfare payments and criminally
generated income. Perhaps most important, the emergence of the
underclass and of an expanding body of the black urban poor has
created a growing perception of a society in which the poor are no
longer linked to the larger social network .... The black urban poor
have increasingly come to constitute a divergent and threatening
segment of society from which ties to the mainstream through work,
neighborhood, and shared communal values have been severed.
EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 244.
301. See, e.g., WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 207, at 72-
84; WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS, supra note 207, at 87-110. More than
three decades ago, then-Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan
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deindustrialization of the urban core decreased employment
opportunities for unskilled and semi-skilled workers in the
manufacturing sectors and thereby reduced the pool of
"marriageable" black men who could support a family.30 2
Unwed childbearing and female-headed households proliferated
among poor black women as marriage to unemployed or
unemployable black males became less attractive. 30 3
Following passage of civil rights legislation in the mid-
1960s, many middle-class Blacks took advantage of their
economic opportunities and left the ghettos.30 4 Their absence
deprived those who remained of the economic and social
resources necessary for social stability, which amplified the
effects of concentrated poverty and social isolation.30 5
2. Crack Cocaine and Black Youth Homicide
By the end of the 1980s, the emergence of a black urban
underclass, the introduction of crack cocaine into the inner
cities, and the proliferation of guns among youths produced a
warned of the adverse impact of male unemployment in the urban black
community. See MOYNIHAN REPORT, supra note 205, at 51; supra notes 205,
207 and accompanying text. Since Moynihan issued his prophetic warnings,
many of those dire predictions have come to pass: black male unemployment,
out-of-wedlock childbirth, racial isolation, concentrated poverty, and urban
violent crime have increased. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 118.
302. See WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 207, at 145-46.
303. See MARIAN WRIGHT EDELMAN, FAMILIES IN PERIL: AN AGENDA FOR
SOCIAL CHANGE 13-14 (1987); see also GARLAND, supra note 6, at 83 (noting
that the rise in children born to single women occurred in families of all races;
by the early 1990s, nearly one-third of all children were born to unmarried
women, and the proportion rose to more than two-thirds among black
families).
304. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 7 ("The out-migration of middle-
class families from ghetto areas left behind a destitute community lacking the
institutions, resources, and values necessary for success in post-industrial
society.").
305. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 231 ("The clear majority
(over 60 percent) of black Americans are living conventional work lives.
Between a third and two-fifths (30 to 40 percent) of black America, however,
exists at or below the margin of regular employment, minimal income, and
personal security."); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 7-8; WILSON, THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 207, at 56-57. Because Whites generally
perceive Blacks as violent, however, Whites also resist integration and thereby
hinder the mobility of middle-class Blacks to escape high violence
communities. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 134, at 86 ("Black violence
thus functions as a double burden on the black middle class, both a direct
threat to personal security and a barrier to integration because a social
reputation for violence is imputed to all men with dark skin.").
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sharp escalation in black youth homicide rates. 30 6 The unique
increase in black youth homicide provided the immediate
political impetus to "get tough" and to "crack down" on youth
crime. 307 Because rates of offending vary by race, the political
decision to "get tough" on youth violence effectively meant
targeting young black men.30 8 The public perceives the "crime
problem" and the juvenile court's clientele primarily as poor,
urban black males. 30 9  Politicians have manipulated and
exploited these racially tinged perceptions for political
advantage with demagogic pledges to "crack down" on youth
crime, which has become a code word for harsher penalties for
black males. 310
The Federal Bureau of Investigation reports that the arrest
rates for serious crime overall, juvenile crime, and violent
juvenile crime have all followed roughly similar patterns-
increasing from the mid-1960s until 1980, declining during the
mid-1980s, and then increasing to another peak in the early
1990s, when they fell again. 31' Between 1965 and 1980, the
306. See, e.g., ZIMRING, supra note 219, at 3-10; Blumstein, Youth Violence,
supra note 258, at 16-20, 24-29; Phillip J. Cook & John H. Laub, The
Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST.: A REV. OF
RES. 27, 51-58 (1998). A number of social structural factors contributed to an
overall increase in crime in the 1980s. See GARLAND, supra note 6, at 90
(citing "(i) increased opportunities for crime, (ii) reduced situational controls,
(iii) an increase in the population 'at risk,' and (iv) a reduction in the efficacy
of social and self controls as a consequence of shifts in social ecology and
changing cultural norms" as the main factors).
307. The politicization of crime policies and the connection in the public
and political minds between race and youth crime provided a powerful
political incentive for changes in waiver policies and juvenile court sentencing
policies that coincided with escalating rates of youth crime and violence in the
late 1970s and again in the late 1980s. See FELD, supra note 2, at 197-218;
infra Parts III.C-D.
308. Feld, Transformation-Part H, supra note 5, at 367-68 (noting that
political efforts to "get tough" have a disproportionate impact on black male
offenders).
309. See FELD, supra note 2, at 203-08 (contending that the concentration
of gun violence within the urban black male population creates a misleading
perception of juvenile courts' larger role in dealing with generic youth crime).
310. See BECKETT, supra note 25, at 84-88; see also infra Part III.C.2.
311. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 2, at 197-202. Blumstein notes that
[t]he homicide rate in 1980 was at a peak value of 10.2 per 100,000
population, and by 1985 it had fallen to a trough of 7.9. It then
climbed a full 24% to a peak of 9.8 in 1991, and has been declining
markedly since then, reaching a level of 6.3 in 1998, a level that is
lower than any annual rate since 1967.
Alfred Blumstein, Disaggregating the Violence Trends, in ALFRED BLUMSTEIN
& JOEL WALLMAN. THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 13 (2000) [hereinafter
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overall juvenile violent crime and homicide rates doubled,
followed by a second, sharp upsurge between 1986 and 1994. 312
The rapid escalation in juvenile violence in the late 1970s, and
especially in the late 1980s, the arrests of increasingly younger
juveniles for violence, and the dramatic rise in homicide arrests
spurred public and political concerns about youth crime and
subsequent legal changes. 313
States changed their juvenile waiver and delinquency
sentencing laws in the early 1990s in response to two specific
changes in patterns of youth crime and violence. 314 Most of the
changes since the late 1980s reflect racial differences in arrest
rates for violent crimes committed by juveniles and the unique
role of guns in the dramatic surge in homicides. 315 Lethal
violence and victimization are highly concentrated among the
socially disadvantaged, and "[v]ictimization rates for blacks are
about five times those of whites. . . ,,316 Since the mid-1960s,
police have arrested black juveniles for violent crimes-murder,
rape, robbery, and assault-at a rate about five times greater
than that of white youths, and arrested black youths for
homicide at a rate about seven times greater than that of
Whites. 317 Beginning in 1985, when youth homicide rates again
Blumstein, Disaggregating].
312. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 2, at 197-202; ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra
note 134, at 58 ("From 1964 to 1974 the national homicide rate doubled, fell off
slightly in the middle of the decade, then rose to ... 10.7 per 100,000
population in 1980. Through the first half of the 1980s the homicide rate fell
back, but it then moved up again from 1986 to 1991."); Cook & Laub, supra
note 306, at 51-58.
313. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 2, at 197-208; TORBET ET AL., supra note
256, at 3-9 (observing that more serious juvenile offenders are being
prosecuted in criminal court).
314. See TORBET ET AL., supra note 256, at 4; Feld, Responses to Youth
Violence, supra note 245, at 192-94.
315. See FELD, supra note 2, at 199-205.
316. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 134, at 64. Zimring and Hawkins
note that "[elvery aspect of serious violence in the United States is linked with
statistical and policy questions involving race. And very few of the important
aspects of race relations are not connected to concerns about violence: its
incidence, its consequences, and attitudes toward it." Id. at 73.
317. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS: 1993, at 447 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds.,
1994) (chart); FELD, supra note 2, at 203; ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note
134, at 76-77 (observing that Blacks are about seven times as likely as Whites
to be arrested for violent crimes and eight times as likely for homicide); Cook
& Laub, supra note 306, at 42-43 ("[H]alf of all juvenile violence arrests were
of blacks, implying an arrest rate over five times as high as for whites.").
Homicide is heavily concentrated in the biggest cities where Blacks live
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began to spike, the arrest rates of black and white juveniles
diverged abruptly.318 Between 1986 and 1993, police arrests of
white juveniles for homicide increased about 40%, while those
of black youths jumped by 278%.319
The use of guns by juveniles was the proximate cause of
this sharp increase in youth homicide. The number of deaths
that juveniles caused by means other than firearms averaged
just less than 500 per year and fluctuated within a "normal
range" of about 10%.320 So juveniles killed people with knives,
blunt objects, and their hands and feet about as frequently as
they always did. By contrast, between 1984 and 1992,
homicide arrests involving firearms increased by 229%.321
Thus, in the span of almost a decade, the juvenile homicide rate
more than doubled, and the use of firearms accounted for
disproportionately. For example, the twenty largest cities comprise slightly
more than one-tenth of the nation's population but experience more than one-
third of all reported homicides, with the corollary that suburban and rural
areas experience much lower levels of homicide than the national average.
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 134, at 65 (noting that the twenty largest
U.S. cities have 11.5% of the total population and 34% of reported criminal
homicides).
318. See Cook & Laub, supra note 306, at 39-44 (describing statistics
showing that boys and Blacks were the most frequently arrested for violent
crimes).
319. See, e.g., MAUER, supra note 45, at 84 (showing that between 1984 and
1993, homicide rate for white males ages 14-17 doubled from 6.9 to 14.4 per
100,000, while black male homicide rate quadrupled from 33.4 to 151.6 per
100,000); MELISSA SICKMUND, ET AL., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:
1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 13 (1997) (describing statistics on chart); HOWARD
SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A
NATIONAL REPORT 56 (1995) ("Between 1984 and 1991, the rate at which
juveniles committed murder increased by 64%, while the black juvenile
murder rate increased 211%."); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 134, at 66
("Homicide rates are highest in the slum neighborhoods of big cities that
exclusively house the black poor. The race of the residents, the socioeconomic
status of the neighborhood, and city size are all associated with elevated rates
of homicide victimization.").
320. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 2, at 207; Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Guns,
and Homicide: Policy Notes on an Age-Specific Epidemic, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 25, 28 (1996).
321. Zimring, supra note 320, at 27; see also Blumstein, Disaggregating,
supra note 311, at 29-30, 32 (observing that weapons involved in adolescent
conflict shifted to handguns and semi-automatic weapons; between 1985 and
1993, juveniles' use of guns nearly quadrupled); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra
note 134, at 108 (observing that guns account for more than twice as many
murders as all other methods combined); ZIMRING, supra note 219, at 35
(finding that the most important reason for the sharp increase in youth
homicide was escalation in assaults with firearms).
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virtually the entire increase.32 2 Because of the disproportionate
involvement of black youths in violence and homicide-as
perpetrators and as victims-almost all of these "excess
homicides" involving guns occurred within the black male
population.323
The violent drug industry that crack cocaine spawned in
large cities during the middle to late 1980s led to a dramatic
increase in black youth homicide arrests involving guns. 324 The
low price of crack increased the numbers of buyers and weekly
transactions, and thereby the number of sellers to
accommodate the demand.32 5  Drug distribution attracted
youths because they faced lower risks of severe penalties than
adults, and because, especially for black males, they lacked
alternative economic opportunities.326 Youths in the drug
industry are likely to arm themselves for self-protection and
take more risks than do adults. 327 The ready availability of
guns breeds lethal violence among those involved in illegal
markets because they cannot resolve their disputes through
322. See ZIMRING, supra note 219, at 89 (showing statistics that hold the
rate of homicide arrests for offenders under eighteen for gun killings more
than tripled between 1985 and 1994); Zimring, supra note 320, at 29.
323. See Alfred Blumstein & Daniel Cork, Linking Gun Availability to
Youth Gun Violence, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 15 (1996); Blumstein,
Youth Violence, supra note 258, at 16-22.
324. See, e.g., BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 8, 28 (finding the
high homicide rate attributable to interaction of numerous factors-prevalence
of guns, economic and racial inequality reflected in concentrated poverty,
traffic in illegal drugs such as crack, and a "code of the streets" that
encourages violent responses to disrespect); Blumstein, Disaggregating, supra
note 311, at 39 (observing that the prevalence of "crack in the mid-1980s;
recruitment of young minority males to sell the drugs in street markets;
arming of the drug sellers with handguns for self-protection; diffusion of guns
to peers; irresponsible and excessively casual use of guns by young people,
[led] to a 'contagious' growth in homicide"); Blumstein, Youth Violence, supra
note 258, at 29-32; MAUER, supra note 45, at 97 (noting that as many as half of
murders may be drug-related, so changes in drug markets affect homicide
rates). Cook and Laub point out that
[tihe leading explanation for why youth-homicide rates began
increasing in the mid-1980s is the introduction of crack cocaine and,
in particular, the conflict that attended its marketing .... For many
youths, the response to the increased threat of violence was to carry a
gun or join a gang for self-protection, while adopting a more
aggressive interpersonal style.
Cook & Laub, supra note 306, at 53-54.
325. Blumstein, Youth Violence, supra note 258, at 30.
326. Blumstein & Cork, supra note 323, at 10.
327. See id. at 10-11.
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recourse to the law.328 Although guns constitute a "tool of the
trade" in the drug industry, their proliferation within the wider
youth population for self-defense and status also contributed to
the escalation of homicides. 329 The drug industry, in turn,
contributed to the deterioration of urban neighborhoods by
driving out stable families, undermining community leaders,
weakening inhibitions against violence, and providing
adolescents with attractive criminal role models.330
Although "urban," "black," and "youth" each contribute to
the prevalence of crime, the elevated black youth homicide rate
reflects the pernicious intersection of all three. This
intersection did not occur by chance. It was the result of
macroeconomic forces and a host of public policy choices that
systematically disadvantaged urban minority groups. 331
[T]he influences that generate grossly disproportionate African-
American homicide rates are broadly present in the social structure
and behavior of the communities where rates are high. It is the
propensity to resolve conflict with maximum personal force rather
than any specific commitment to crime that is the precursor to high
rates of conflict-motivated homicide.
332
Thus, social conditions and social process create the
circumstances that produce high levels of lethal violence in
areas of concentrated poverty.
Despite the structural determinants of youth crime, the
intersections of race, guns, and homicide fanned the flames of
public "panic" and fed the fire for a political "crack down" that
led to the "get tough" reformulation of juvenile justice policies.
By the early 1990s, the apparent randomness of gang violence
and the disproportionate minority involvement in homicides
had inflamed public fears.333 The substantial racial differences
in rates of violent offenses had major implications for race
328. See id. at 10 ("Because [juveniles] cannot rely on access to the police in
ways that protect legitimate economic activity, they are forced to resort to
their own means of protection.").
329. See id. at 11; Cook & Laub, supra note 306, at 58.
330. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 276, at 67-68.
331. See supra Part III.A.
332. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 134, at 78. For example, even if the
homicide rate of Blacks were excluded from overall national totals, the
remaining average U.S. homicide rate still would be three to five times higher
than that of other western industrial democracies such as Canada, Germany,
France, and Britain. Id. at 80-81.
333. MAUER, supra note 45, at 50-55; JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND
DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 149-
58 (1996).
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relations and the politics of crime. Violent crime, especially
robbery, is the most frightening because it is common,
committed by strangers, and occurs when the victim is outside
of the home. 334 So the increase in violent crime left the public
vulnerable to "law and order" demagoguery.
Liberal Democrats failed to respond effectively to the rising
crime rates and social disorder that coincided with the passage
of federal civil rights laws and programs for the poor. 335 By
contrast, conservative politicians, unencumbered by racial
scruples, exploited those fears for electoral advantage. They
decried a coming generation of "super-predators" suffering from
"moral poverty."336 They demonized young people to muster
support for "wars" on crime and drugs. 337 They called for
policies to transfer youths to criminal court.338 The success of
these conservative politicians was made possible by
sensationalized media coverage of the increase in gun homicide
by young black males. 339 This aided calls for a "crack down" on
young offenders in general and violent minority offenders in
particular.340
B. MEDIA COVERAGE AND THE BLACK FACE OF YOUTH CRIME
As a result of the structural transformation of cities since
World War II, most black and white Americans live more
334. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 113.
335. Id. Edsall and Edsall observe that
[t]his is a dilemma that the Democratic party and liberals have been
reluctant to address, a reluctance motivated by compassion, by fear of
provoking backlash, and by the desire to preserve a basis for more
effective policy interventions. This reluctance, no matter how
understandable, has nonetheless eroded the political credibility of
liberalism and of the Democratic party.
Id.
336. WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT 25-34, 59, 117, 194 (1996).
337. See ZIMRING, supra note 219, at 11; MAUER, supra note 45, at 126.
338. MAUER, supra note 45, at 12 ("[A]s the image of the criminal as an
urban black male has hardened into public consciousness, so too, has support
for punitive approaches to social problems been enhanced."); cf. MILLER, supra
note 333, at 4-9; ZIMRING, supra note 219, at 63.
To talk of a "coming storm" creates a riskless environment for getting
tough in advance of the future threat. If the crime rate rises, the
prediction has been validated. If the crime rate does not rise, the
policies that the alarmists put in place can be credited with avoiding
the bloodbath. The prediction cannot be falsified, currently or ever.
ZIMRING, YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 219, at 63.
339. BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 133-36.
340. MAUER, supra note 45, at 132-40.
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residentially segregated lives now than they did at the
beginning of the century.341 About three-quarters of all Whites
live in cities and suburbs whose populations are less than 5%
black.34 2 While some Whites may have first-hand exposure to
urban squalor and crime victimization, most Whites' knowledge
about Blacks comes from the media.343 News reports depicting
the black face of illegitimacy, drugs, crime, and unemployment
all tend to reinforce racial prejudices. 344
People are "cognitive misers" and engage in habitual modes
of thinking to make sense of a complex world.345 "Stereotypes"
enable people quickly to simplify and organize complex social
experiences and to place people into meaningful and
manageable "types." Because of individual variability, judging
people by their social group membership invariably produces
errors and exaggerates differences among groups. 346
341. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 1 (noting that at the end of the
twentieth century, "most Blacks still lived apart from Whites and lagged
seriously behind in income, housing, health, and education").
342. J. Eric Oliver & Tali Mendelberg, Reconsidering the Environmental
Determinants of White Racial Attitudes, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 574, 575 (2000);
ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 2 (noting that "most Blacks and
Whites in the United States continue to live their private lives apart from one
another").
343. EDSALL & EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION, supra note 11, at 236.
344. See id. About three quarters (76%) of the public get their information
about crime from news and media reports rather than from personal
experience. DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 259, at 4.
345. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 57-58; MENDELBERG, supra
note 12, at 117-21.
346. GILENS, supra note 15, at 160; cf. John Hurwitz & Mark Peffley,
Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role of Racial Stereotypes, 41 AM.
J. POL. Sci. 375, 377-78 (1997) ("[S]tereotypes bias all stages of information
processing (e.g., attention, retrieval, inference), such that they become
strongly determinative of relevant judgments."); Mark Peffley et al., The
Intersection of Race and Crime in Television News Stories: An Experimental
Study, 13 POL. COMM. 309, 311 (1996) [hereinafter Peffley et al., Race and
Crime] ("[S]elf-perpetuating expectations about groups and their members, by
directing attention to information that is consistent with the stereotype.
Information that is inconsistent, on the other hand, tends to be ignored,
discounted, or interpreted so that it confirms the initial impression."); Mark
Peffiey et al., Racial Stereotypes and Whites' Political Views of Blacks in the
Context of Welfare and Crime, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 30, 31 (1997) [hereinafter
Peffley et al., Racial Stereotypes] (noting that "cognitive misers develop
expectations based on their impression (or theories) of others to direct their
attention to information that is consistent with the theory" and to disregard
information that is inconsistent or to reinterpret it to become confirmatory);
ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 14 (arguing that "people use mental
shortcuts (such as stereotypes) to interpret communications," the majority of
Whites hold negative racial attitudes toward Blacks which are embedded in
1524
2003] RACE, POLITICS, AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 1525
Stereotypes are "quick and dirty" ways of thinking, and the
shorthand judgments they produce "conceal complexity and
make it less likely that people will notice exceptions to
culturally driven, stereotyped expectation and
understanding."347 Stereotypes are socially constructed and
help to legitimate inequalities in the social order.348  The
stereotypes that Whites hold of Blacks function as a perceptual
"screen" that accepts information that supports the stereotype
and blocks evidence that contradicts it.349
The "subconscious stereotypes" of news reporters and
editors constitute one such screen that produces racially biased
news reports about crime, drugs, and welfare dependency. 350
News professionals may unconsciously cater to the stereotypes
of their audience.351  For instance, they may use images,
pictures, and stories with a racial content that their viewers
will recognize to create stronger emotional responses to a
story.352
their stereotypes, and media depictions that resonate with stereotypes
consciously or unconsciously affect Whites' thinking about race).
347. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 60.
348. See GILENS, supra note 15, at 161 (noting that "[s]tereotypes of social
groups are shared constructs that are learned from socializing agents such as
parents, schools, and the media" and "[als a consequence, people may hold
quite detailed (and wholly erroneous) stereotypes of social groups that they
have never come in contact with").
349. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 232; ENTMAN & ROJEcKI, supra
note 259, at 61-62 (arguing that "[s]kin color is often sufficient to stimulate
expectations of stereotypic behavior"); see GILENS, supra note 15, at 159
(disputing the notion that there is even a "kernel of truth" in stereotypes and
emphasizing that "the longevity of a stereotype appears to be more a
consequence of its attractiveness to those who hold it than of any truth that it
might contain").
350. See, e.g., GILENS, supra note 15, at 148 (arguing that the selection,
shaping, and content of news images may reflect a subconscious process rather
than deliberate bias). Gilens observes that
[tihe psychological notion of subconscious or "implicit" stereotyping
rests on the idea that people hold a variety of beliefs and perceptions
that influence their behavior but of which they are normally unaware.
When people act purposefully and reflectively, their conscious beliefs
and perceptions guide their actions, but when they act "on impulse"
their subconscious stereotypes can influence their decisions.
Id. at 150.
351. Id. at 148.
352. Id. at 6 (arguing that "the overly racialized images of poverty and the
association of blacks with the least sympathetic subgroups of the poor reflect
news professionals' own racial stereotypes, which operate as an unconscious
influence on the content of the news they produce"). Gilens asserts that
[n]ews professionals may cater to the perceived stereotypes of their
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"Crime" is a socially constructed phenomenon and "frames"
represent alternative interpretations or explanations of the
phenomena with different policy implications.353 The public
policy choices to "get tough" on youth crime reflect the
ascendance of certain ways of framing crime.354 Over the past
few decades, the media have reinforced conservative
interpretations of crime and put a black face on it.355 News
coverage often influences public attitudes by "priming" popular
perceptions through the weight of coverage attached to an
issue.356 Popular attitudes typically reflect the claims and
readers by choosing images that they think will be most easily
recognized as poor people or will be most likely to tap readers'
emotional connections with the topic of poverty. Such a process need
not entail a conscious effort to misrepresent the racial complexion of
the poor. It is just as likely to result from a lack of conscious
attention to the racial imagery that accompanies stories on poverty.
Id. at 147. Despite a lack of conscious prejudice, "[slocial psychologists have
demonstrated that even people who explicitly reject specific stereotypes often
use those same stereotypes subconsciously in evaluating members of the
relevant social group." Id. at 148; see also ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note
259, at 72 ("[Jlust like the largest portion of the audience, the mostly White
males who manage media organizations are themselves steeped in the tacit
assumption of a dominant culture that retains vestiges of prejudice.").
353. See BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 6-7. BECKETT, supra note
25, at 5 (arguing that public policies represent the ascendance of certain
interpretations of social phenomena over others).
Crime-related issues, then, are socially and politically constructed;
they acquire their meaning through interpretive, representational,
and political processes. Social actors-sometimes called
"claimsmakers"-struggle to gain acceptance for preferred ways of
framing these issues and vie for limited access to public venues in
order to promote them. In these battles over the signification of
crime-related problems, claimsmakers "deploy mediated symbols and
mobilize powerful cultural references."
Id. (citations omitted). Similarly to the use of stereotypes, people use mental
shortcuts like schema and frames as cognitive tools to simplify thought
processes. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 48-49 (defining schema as
"a set of related concepts that allow people to make inferences about new
information based on already organized prior knowledge"). A schema enables
a person to abstract from a specific word or symbol to a more generic category.
Id. at 49. A "frame" such as a news report selects out certain elements of a
story to evoke the viewers' schematic understanding about the event depicted.
Id.
354. BECKETT, supra note 25, at 6 (public policies represent the outcome of
symbolic struggles between contending actors framing social problems and
competing to establish their version); MAUER, supra note 45, at 54-55.
355. MENDELBERG, supra note 12, at 134-64; see, e.g., ENTMAN & ROJECKI,
supra note 259, at 78-93; cf. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 157-58.
356. See Nicholas A. Valentino, Crime News and the Priming of Racial
Attitudes During Evaluation of the President, 63 PUB. OPINION Q. 293, 294
(1999) (noting that the "media alters the weight attached to a given criterion
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narratives about crime that dominate political rhetoric and
media portrayals, 357 rather than reacting to real changes in
crime rates.358
News media coverage has systematically distorted reality
by overreporting violent crime and by overemphasizing the role
of minority perpetrators in the commission of violent crime. 359
The overemphases on violence and race reinforce racial
prejudices that, in turn, fuel harsher policies toward
criminals. 360 This distorted news coverage amplifies the claims
by 'priming' a relevant issue"); see also BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at
120 (concluding that "when a crime-related issue has risen to the top of the
popular agenda, the public appears to be taking its cues from politicians and
the news media-not the other way around"); GILENS, supra note 15, at 133-34
(noting that "news coverage has a special significance as a cultural product
because we know that it not only reflects, but also influences, public concerns
and beliefs"); Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. et al., Crime in Black and White: The
Violent, Scary World of Local News, 1 HARV. INT'L J. PRESS/POLITICS 6, 7
(1996) (noting that "in general, it has been well documented that the public
political agenda is heavily influenced by patterns of news coverage; as the
media become preoccupied with particular issues, so too does the public"
(citation omitted)). The "priming" effect of this "standard crime script" is so
powerful that in video experiments which made no reference to a perpetrator,
60% of respondents erroneously recalled seeing a perpetrator and in 70% of
those cases, they identified the perpetrator as black. See Franklin D. Gilliam,
Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local Television News
on the Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL. SCi. 560, 564 (2000).
357. See Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice,
16 CRIME & JUST. 99, 119-20 (1992); see, e.g., BECKETT & SASSON, supra note
208, at 85-88; BECKETT, supra note 25, at 6 ("Elite claimsmaking activities do
not merely express popular sentiment but also seek to shape and transform it
in accordance with particular visions of state and society."). Beckett argues
that "popular attitudes about crime and drugs have been shaped to an
important extent by the definitional activities of political elites. These actors
have drawn attention to crime and drug use and framed them as the
consequence of insufficient punishment and control." Id. at 27.
358. See BECKETT, supra note 25, at 25 (arguing that "[t]he public's
propensity to identify crime and drugs as the nation's most important
problems, then, is not primarily shaped by the reported incidence of those
phenomena but does appear to be consistently related to prior political
initiative on them"); BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 89-97 (noting the
political and media construction of the drug crisis to build support for the "war
on drugs").
359. DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 259, at 3-4. A similar distortion
occurs in the depiction of poverty, race, and welfare. See GILENS, supra note
15, at 149 (finding that "news coverage of poverty not only exaggerates the
percentage of blacks among the poor but consistently portrays poor blacks
more negatively than poor whites"); see also Gilliam et al., supra note 356, at 8
(finding that "local news programs are significantly distorted in two respects:
they disproportionately portray crimes of violence, and they overrepresent
African-Americans as perpetrators of violent crime").
360. See, e.g., BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 89-97.
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of politicians about the need to "get tough" on crime and allows
them to enact racial animus in the guise of crime policies.361
1. Media Coverage-Crime Is Violent
For most people, knowledge of the world around them
comes from their local television news. 362 The "construction" of
news is a complex process that reflects journalistic values, the
entertainment value of the content, and the sociopolitical
context of its creation. 363 In an effort to increase audience
shares and advertising revenues, local news programming
favors an "action news" format. 364 Crime news coverage focuses
on the most frightening and sensational forms of violence
361. See, e.g., id.
362. See, e.g., id. at 77 (reporting that crime is a primary staple of news
media coverage and accounts for about one-quarter of newspaper stories and
one-fifth of local television news coverage); ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note
259, at 79 (noting that 72% of Americans regularly watch local television news
compared with 56% who read daily newspapers and 41% who view national
network news); Robert M. Entman, Modern Racism and the Images of Blacks
in Local Television News, 7 CRITICAL STUD. MASS COMM. 332, 334, 342-43
(1990); Mary Beth Oliver, Caucasian Viewers' Memory of Black and White
Suspects in the News, J. COMM., Summer 1999, at 47 (noting that "most
individuals report that the media serve as their primary source of crime
information").
363. See BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 77; ENTMAN & ROJECKI,
supra note 259, at 211-12; see, e.g., DARNELL M. HUNT, SCREENING THE LOS
ANGELES "RIOTS": RACE, SEEING, AND RESISTANCE 29-32 (1997). Journalistic
values and practices prize objectivity as a means of legitimating content and
avoiding charges of subjectivity and bias. Id. at 29-30. Thus, live footage
creates the appearance of reality rather than the end-product of editorial
selectivity. Id. at 30. Journalistic routines rely on official sources in order to
simplify coverage. Id. at 31-32. At the same time, television and news is a
business whose ultimate goal is to deliver audiences to advertisers and it
accomplishes this by emphasizing entertainment values and the broadest
appeal to mass viewers:
News (and television news in particular) is a business dependent not
only on the timely coverage of "newsworthy" events, but also on the
attraction of audiences and advertisers. The program content of the
television apparatus-news programming included-serves as
commercials for the commercials. As such, this content must
maintain the interest of the audience, whose eyeballs advertisers
"rent" for the purposes of persuasion.... This news-as-business
reality has definite consequences for the format of news narratives.
News stories tend to conform to formulas, which stress action, a quick
pace, completeness, clarity with parsimony and high esthetic and
technical standards.
HUNT, supra, at 31 (citations omitted); see also ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra
note 259, at 44 (arguing that television producers respond rationally to the
economic need to attract audiences in order to increase advertising revenues).
364. Gilliam et al., supra note 356, at 7.
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because these stories are concrete, visual, and emotionally
powerful.365 Local news coverage of crime typically follows a
standard script that consists of two principle elements. 366 The
first element is that crime is violent-murder, rape, robbery, or
gang violence. 367 The second element features the presence of
the "usual suspects"--perpetrators colored with racial
imagery.368 Combining images of violence and race exerts a
pervasive and cumulative effect on public opinion; viewers
exposed to violent, racial imagery tend to support more
punitive policies.369
Crime news coverage tends to amplify, rather than to
challenge, the claims of politicians about the need to "get
tough" on crime. By focusing on the most frightening and
sensational forms of violence, it reinforces racial stereotypes.
News media depictions of crime do not reflect either rates of
365. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 80; Gilliam et al., supra note
356, at 7.
366. See TED GEST, CRIME & POLITICS: BIG GOVERNMENT'S ERRATIC
CAMPAIGN FOR LAW AND ORDER 266 (2001) (crime media coverage relies on
"formulaic methods"); see, e.g., Gilliam et al., supra note 356, at 8 ("[T]he
typical news story on crime consists of two 'scripts': crime is violent, and
criminals are nonwhite."). Gilliam and Iyengar argue that
local news coverage of crime follows a standard script that features
two distinct elements. First, crime is violent. Armed bank robberies,
homicides, "home invasions," carjackings, and gang-related activities
are now staples of local news. The second element of the crime script
is the presence of a particular suspect. Episodic reporting requires a
regular "cast" of characters the most prominent of which is the
suspect. Given the visual nature of the medium, the importance of
the suspect to the script means that crime news is often accompanied
by racial imagery.
Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 356, at 560.
367. See Gilliam et al., supra note 356, at 8.
368. Id.; see Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 356, at 561 ("[Wlhat viewers
learn about suspects is limited to visual attributes, most notably their race or
ethnicity. As depicted in the local news, crime is violent, and criminal
behavior is associated with race/ethnicity."); see also ENTMAN & ROJECKI,
supra note 259, at 78 ("[Clrime reporting fashions a hierarchical racial divide
that stereotypes Blacks and associates them with the wrong, dangerous side of
the cultural continuum.").
369. See, e.g., Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 356, at 561 ("Viewers exposed
to the 'racialized' element of the script become more supportive of capital
punishment, mandatory sentencing, and other deterrent measures. Not
unexpectedly, exposure to this version of the script also serves to substantiate
negative attitudes about racial minorities."); Peffley et al., Race and Crime,
supra note 346, at 310; Gilliam et al., supra note 356, at 7 (arguing that crime
news coverage highlights violence and "links the issues of race and crime by
overrepresenting minorities in the role of violent criminals and by according
them distinctive forms of coverage").
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crime generally, the proportion of violent crime, or the
proportion of crime committed by minorities. 370 Local and
network television news and news magazines devote more
coverage to crimes, especially violent ones, than they do to any
other subject.371 The mass media, especially the local electronic
news media, overreport on the rarest types of crime, such as
murder and rape: "[I]f it bleeds, it leads."372
Competition in the market for viewers had placed a
premium on entertaining and sensational stories rather than
serious, analytical news coverage. 373 During the 1990s, overall
violent crime decreased 20% while crime news coverage
increased 83%, and homicides declined by one-third while
network news coverage of them increased 473%.374 Although
homicide accounts for less than 1% of crime, it constitutes
about one-quarter of all crime news coverage. 375 The nearly
exclusive focus on violent crime coverage distorts the actual
distribution of serious criminal behavior in the real world
because most crimes are property crimes committed by white
370. DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 259, at 7 (noting that "depictions
of crime in the news are not reflective of either the rate of crime generally, the
proportion of crime which is violent, the proportion of crime committed by
people of color, or the proportion of crime committed by youth"); see ENTMAN &
ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 80 (reporting that a typical local news segment
depicts seven violent items that consumes about one-third of the broadcast
time). Local crime news systematically deviates from actual crime statistics
by "overrepresenting Black perpetrators, underrepresenting Black victims,
and overrepresenting White victims." Id. at 81.
371. Cf. Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 356, at 565.
372. See, e.g., ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 78 (observing that
the slogan "registers the assumption that violence sells news, not just
entertainment" and "[1]ocal news shows frequently broadcast more vivid
images of violence than 'entertainment'--real blood, smashed windows, loaded
guns, bodies on stretchers").
373. Gilliam et al., supra note 356, at 7 ("Television's insatiable demand for
'good pictures' and riveting stories means that the most gruesome or notorious
episodes of crime receive extensive attention while other forms of crime are
virtually ignored."); see also ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 74.
374. DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 259, at 10; see BECKETr &
SASSON, supra note 208, at 77 (noting that the homicide rate declined 13%
between 1990 and 1995, while network coverage of murder, excluding O.J.
Simpson's trial, increased by 336%); MAUER, supra note 45, at 172-73.
375. See, e.g., BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 78 (finding that less
than 1% of crimes involve murders, but homicides comprise 26% of news
stories); Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 356, at 562 (finding that murder
accounted for less than 1% of all crime in Los Angeles but comprised 17% of all
crime news stories); Gilliam et al., supra note 356, at 9-10 (finding that violent
crime comprised 30% of all crime but 78% of stories; homicide accounted for
2% of all felony incidents but 27% of crime news coverage).
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offenders. 376 Because the violent crime depicted in the media
typically involve strangers, even though acquaintances or
intimates commit most violent crimes, television news coverage
tends to reinforce the public perception of criminals as
outsiders and predators. 377
Crime coverage tends to focus on individual stories rather
than to place crime in its social context.378 Crime news stories
focus on specific events rather than crime trends, neighborhood
conditions, or the risk factors in a community that would place
the criminal behavior in a broader perspective. 379 Indeed, even
with additional context, concrete examples and compelling
anecdotes affect public perceptions more powerfully than
aggregate statistics, so simply providing accurate statistics
fails to counteract the impact of vivid examples.38 0
376. Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 356, at 562; cf. Gilliam et al., supra
note 356, at 15.
377. See, e.g., BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 78-79 (finding that
the media is more likely to report violent crimes committed by strangers than
by acquaintances).
378. See, e.g., DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 259, at 7, 12 (finding that
crimes are portrayed as distinct events unrelated to any broader context;
crime news reporting is isolated from social, historical, or environmental
contexts); see BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 80-81 (noting that crime
news provides detailed accounts of individual events rather than broader
trends or perspective); Gilliam et al., supra note 356, at 9 (finding that the
overwhelming majority of crime news stories were episodic in nature). While
poor black urban males commit violent crimes at higher rates than do Whites,
media crime reportage omits the fact that these youths experience
very much higher rates of discrimination, unemployment, ineffective
schooling, single-parent upbringing, and other experiences that
account for the differences in criminality. It is these experiences that
tend not to be reported within the narrative of each specific crime.
Stories that depict just the crimes themselves therefore provide a
context-free version of Black crime, both in the aggregate and in the
case of individual defendants (and victims).
ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 70.
379. See, e.g., ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 72 (noting that
professional norms almost militate against contextualizing crime stories or
providing a broader framework within which to understand criminal
behavior).
380. See, e.g., GILENS, supra note 15, at 135-37. Gilens notes that
[riesearchers have shown that mass media can exert a powerful
influence on public perceptions and attitudes, that concrete examples
are more powerful influences on readers' beliefs than is aggregate
information, that the content of news pictures is more likely to be
remembered than the content of news stories, and that the race of
people pictured in news stories is a salient and influential aspect of
the story for many viewers.
Id. at 137.
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The absence of reporting about context reinforces the
interpretation of crime favored by conservatives. This happens
because the missing context gives the impression that violent
crime is exclusively attributable to individual offenders' bad
choices rather than to structural features.3 81 Because news
coverage does not attend to the reality of crime rates and
trends, it fails to provide sufficient context for the public to
make reasoned judgments about crime and criminal justice
policies.38 2  News media coverage of criminal justice
administration typically emphasizes the "failures"-defendants
freed on legal "technicalities" and by lenient judges-and
presents advocates for more severe punishment as the
remedy. 383
Several structural and economic factors distort and skew
crime news coverage. "Availability"-access to news stories by
journalists operating under time and logistical constraints-
and "suitability"-importance, interest, and appropriateness to
the intended audience-significantly determine the content of
news reporting. 384 Large metropolitan media markets span
381. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 72. Entman and Rojecki
argue that
[tihe idea of an in-depth report on the upbringing and experiences of
even one criminal defendant, let alone on most of them would strike
most journalists as inappropriate. Culture intersects with elite
discourse and journalists' orientations to render such stories
politically suspect; they might appear liberal to many conservative
viewers, because delving into the context of crime as a way of
explaining it may seem to be a way to morally excuse it. Implying
that individuals are not fully in control of their destinies, that society
as a whole bears some responsibility for social problems, also insults
the conservative worldview.
Id.
382. See DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 259, at 10-11 ("The repetition
of the unusual has consequences for how audiences interpret crime. The
steady diet of violent crime, coupled with the absence of nonviolent crime and
general context, means that the rare crime looks like the normal crime;
homicide is the prototypical crime in the news."); Roberts, supra note 357, at
119-20.
383. BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 81 (observing that crime is
typically framed "as a consequence of the failures of the criminal justice
system" and "[c]riminals escape punishment because of legal technicalities,
liberal judges, and permissive laws").
384. See GILENS, supra note 15, at 140-41. News organizations and the
context in which they operate affect the "availability" of news subjects. Id. at
141. Organizations and individuals make themselves available to journalists
and the location of media producers primarily in urban centers affects the
content of reportage. Id. Editors' judgments about "suitability" reflects their
assessments of their audiences' expectations and their own conscious or
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dozens of political jurisdictions and tend to focus on broad
general coverage-sports, weather, crime, disasters, and
human interest features-rather than the politics or policies of
a particular municipality.385 Crime fascinates the public, and it
has greater "entertainment" value than longer analytical news
stories. 386 Journalists working under the pressure of deadlines
select subjects close at hand.387 Most news media producers are
located in urban areas with large concentrations of poor Blacks
in crime-ridden neighborhoods. 38 8 Such neighborhoods provide
easy access to attractive and dramatic stories, which leads to
their overrepresentation in stories about crime.389  The
resulting overrepresentation of minority suspects, in turn,
reinforces Whites' perceptions of the world and their
stereotypes about racial minorities. 390
subconscious valuations. Id. at 143-44. "While journalists' understandings of
society derive in part from their professional work, they inevitably share in
varying degrees the popular understandings, and misunderstandings, held by
the larger society in which they live." Id. at 144. "[A]vailability" affects
entertainment as well as new coverage of crime. MILLER, supra note 333, at
158-59.
385. See Entman, supra note 362, at 338 ("In large metropolitan areas,
where the media market consists of dozens of political jurisdictions, local TV
cannot focus too much on the politics and policy of any one jurisdiction, so it
has to go with material of broader human interest... [such as] crime, fires,
and accidents; human interest features; sports; and weather."); Gilliam &
Iyengar, supra note 356, at 572 ("The commercial realities of our time dictate
that local news will continue to cultivate misperceptions and prejudice. Local
television stations reach huge audiences, but face intense economic pressures.
Crime dominates other news because its emphasis on vivid pictures and
emotional personal accounts is believed to attract viewers.").
386. See GILENS, supra note 15, at 140-41; ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note
259, at 74; Gilliam et al., supra note 356, at 7; Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note
356, at 572.
387. ENTMAN & RoJEcKI, supra note 259, at 74 (contrasting the ease of
forcing a gang leader to be available for a "perp walk" with the inability to get
footage of a slumlord in violation of building codes).
388. See GILENS, supra note 15, at 140-50.
389. See ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 73 ("[Illlustrating welfare
with a Black face, as the networks and newsmagazines do frequently and
disproportionately, also reflects unthinking habit and ready physical access
from downtown news bureaus to the Black poor."); GILENS, supra note 15, at
140-42; KENNEDY, supra note 76, at 378 ("[Jlournalists... gravitate toward
drug scenes that are simultaneously dramatic and accessible. It might be that
crack abuse is peculiarly concentrated and open in black neighborhoods and
that therefore they have been the locales most attractive to journalists
interested in reporting the crack story."); Valentino, supra note 356, at 297.
390. See Valentino, supra note 356, at 295 ("[11f opinions about two
substantively unrelated issues, like welfare and crime, are linked in memory
to one's racial attitudes, then exposure to crime should also activate race and
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Social-structural features outside of newsrooms also affect
reporters' access to sources and crime coverage. Reporters can
produce crime news stories regularly and efficiently by using
official sources that impart an aura of objectivity and
credibility to the story.39' This tendency to use official sources,
such as law enforcement agencies, as sources for information
affects the depiction, coverage, and content of crime news
reporting. Police may focus on violent crimes-which they are
more likely to solve-to portray themselves in a more favorable
light.392 Similarly, public officials who serve as sources of crime
news may speak in populist and emotive terms and then
purport to respond to the passions they cultivate in the
media.393 Politicians generate crime news stories to shape
public attitudes and then promote the criminal justice policies
that they believe will provide them with a political
advantage. 394 Finally, because journalists and editors consume
the news they produce, their systematic distortion of reality
affects their own subjective perceptions, the editorial decisions
they make, and the stories they subsequently present.395
2. Media Coverage-Violent Criminals Are Black
The media bias in coverage of violence also reinforces the
connection between race and crime. The emphasis on black
suspects amplifies for Whites the threat posed by "violent" and
should subsequently activate other race-relevant issues, such as welfare.").
391. BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 81-82; HUNT, supra note 363,
at 31 ("The socio-political climate is important to news selection and
construction because newsworkers tend to favor 'legitimate' sources in the
news gathering process. That is, newsworkers typically favor government
officials or other elites as sources of 'news."'); ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note
259, at 73 ("Professional norms demand that journalists choose conventionally
credible sources, as certified by their rank and affiliation with the best-known
institutions, and their ability to influence those institutions' decisions.").
392. DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 259, at 28.
393. See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 6, at 157 ("TV has changed the rules of
political speech. The TV encounter-with its soundbite rapidity, its emotional
intensity, and its mass audience-has tended to push politicians to be more
populist, more emotive, more evidently in tune with public feelings.").
394. For example, after Republican politicians declared a "war on drugs"
during the 1980s, media coverage of drug stories increased sharply, shifted
focus to crack rather than powder cocaine, increasingly depicted cocaine users
and dealers as poor and non-white, participated in the creation of a "moral
panic" that reinforced "get tough" rhetoric, and thereby abetted political
advocacy of punitive sentencing laws. See BECKETT & SASSON, supra note
208, at 88-98.
395. See GILENS, supra note 15, at 147-50.
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"aggressive" black males.3 96 "Research of the Los Angeles local
news revealed that when black criminal behavior was covered,
black violent crime was covered disproportionately to black
nonviolent crime."397 Another study of Los Angeles local news
revealed that over half of the crime stories explicitly referred to
the ethnicity or race of the offender, 59% of violent crime
stories implicated minority offenders, and Blacks comprised the
largest group of minority offenders identified.3 98 When police
arrest offenders for violent crimes, media reports more
frequently portray black offenders anonymously, handcuffed,
spread-eagled, and poorly dressed than they do violent white
offenders.3 99 Such depictions create, in the minds of white
396. See Valentino, supra note 356, at 315-16; Entman, supra note 362, at
336 (finding from a study of one week of local news broadcasts that in eight
instances in which lead stories featured Blacks, six involved violent crimes).
397. Gilliam et al., supra note 356, at 12-13. "[T]he news tends to
exaggerate existing racial differences in actual crime rates by
disproportionately depicting blacks in the role of violent perpetrators and
whites as nonviolent perpetrators." Id. at 15.
398. See Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 356, at 562.
399. See, e.g., BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 79; DORFMAN &
SCHIRALDI, supra note 259, at 15 (reporting from Robert M. Entman's
collected research that "Black suspects were less likely to be identified by
name as were White suspects; were not as well dressed as White suspects on
the news; and were more likely to be shown physically restrained than
Whites"); MILLER, supra note 333, at 150 ("'[Tlhe suspects seen on television
being arrested in muggings and shootings are almost always black men in
their teens and 20's, and they figure hugely in the prevailing anxiety, among
blacks as well as whites over personal safety."' (quoting television critic Walter
Goodman)); Robert M. Entman, Blacks in the News: Television, Modern
Racism and Cultural Change, 69 JOURNALISM Q. 341, 349-53 (1992); Peffley et
al., Race and Crime, supra note 346, at 310 ("[B]lacks [are] more likely than
whites to be portrayed as criminal suspects ... [and] are also more likely to be
depicted as physically threatening and in ways that presume their guilt.").
In one analysis of local crime news coverage, "the accused black criminals
were usually illustrated by glowering mug shots or by footage of them being
led around in handcuffs, their arms held by uniformed white policemen,"
whereas no violent white criminal was shown in mugshots or in handcuffs
during the same period. Entman, supra note 362, at 337; see also MILLER,
supra note 333, at 174-75 ("The centerpiece of law enforcement was its
preoccupation with highly visible groups who could be relatively easily and
publicly arrested. The crown jewel was the handcuffed black youth or young
man paraded before TV cameras so all might behold this symbol of
lawlessness and disorder.").
Another study analyzed the differences in televised depictions of black
and white defendants and found Blacks more likely to be shown in the
physical control of police, dressed in street or jail clothing, depicted in
unflattering mug shots, and less likely to be named and described as an
individual, thereby creating a general impression of undifferentiated, generic
black criminals. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 82-84. By contrast,
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viewers, a heightened perception of threat by Blacks.400
Depicting black criminals as unidentified, "nameless" suspects
contributes to the racial stereotyping of Blacks.401
Conversely, news media disproportionately depict crime
victims as female, white, and affluent.40 2 In fact, these groups
experience less victimization than other demographic groups,
especially Blacks.40 3  The newsworthiness of crime stories
increases with white victims, decreases with black victims, and
is strongest when crime is interracial.40 4
The skewed emphasis on violence, the disproportionate
many of the accused violent Whites in the Chicago news reports were
alleged organized crime figures who had money. They could afford
bail, good legal representation, and advice on handling the press.
Since they were not in jail, these individuals naturally appeared less
often in scenes of physical custody, and they could dress more
formally.
Id. at 84-85.
400. See ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 94; Gilliam et al., supra
note 356, at 15; Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 356, at 570.
401. Entman, supra note 399, at 350.
Prejudice is fed by a tendency to homogenize, to assume there are no
significant differences among individual members of the outgroup. When
blacks are not given a name in a picture, it suggests the visual
representation can be assimilated to a larger, undifferentiated group, in
this case the stereotype of a dangerous black male.
Id.
402. BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 79; DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI,
supra note 259, at 13-14; ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 81-84.
403. See DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 259, at 13-14; ENTMAN &
ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 81-84.
404. See, e.g., BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 79-80 (overreporting
of white, affluent, and female victims); DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note
259, at 13; Entman, supra note 362, at 337 (observing that "white
victimization by blacks appeared to have especially high priority" in crime
news reporting); see also ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 81 (analyzing
the characteristics of and reporting about victims and finding that "White
victims outnumbered Blacks in news reports-even though Blacks in Chicago
and most core cities are more likely to be victimized"); GARLAND, supra note 6,
at 158 (contending that "[tielevision's selective coverage of factual crime
stories and its unrealistic crime dramas tend to distort public perceptions of
the problem"). Entman's analysis of crime news coverage of an incident
between white and black girls on a Chicago bus noted that
[tihe whites' perspective on the event dominated the story.... [T]he
whites' version was clearly favored through the order of presentation,
the amount of time devoted to it, and the visuals .... Television's
class bias apparently assumes that the middle class, loyal to the
forces of law and order, presumes accused perpetrators to be guilty,
especially when the offenses are those normally associated with the
lower classes (street crime).
Entman, supra note 356, at 337-38.
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coverage of black violent crime relative to coverage of black
crime generally, and their underrepresentation as victims
combine to systematically prevent public understanding of
crime and justice by reinforcing the pejorative stereotypes of
Blacks as dangerous and violent people.405 Media framing,
modern racism, 40 6 and distorted public attitudes have led to a
racialization of crime and public policy. 40 7 Media depictions of
crime in violent and racial terms activate white viewers' racial
stereotypes about minorities that skew their views about crime
and punishment.408 The structure of coverage reinforces the
conservative position that punishment is the most appropriate
response to the crimes.409 These portrayals reinforce racist
405. See Gilliam et al., supra note 356, at 8 ("Exposure to criminal activity
committed by nonwhites in and of itself makes viewers more concerned about
crime. Most important, the media has, in effect, defined crime in racial terms,
and this serves to activate widely shared stereotypes about racial minorities.");
Oliver, supra note 362, at 46-47 (research on Whites' perceptions of and
reactions to crime indicates that they associate violent crime with Blacks as
opposed to Caucasians, view minority suspects as more likely to be guilty of
the offenses with which they are accused than Whites, and have greater fear
for their personal safety from Blacks than Whites); see also ENTMAN &
ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 82 ("[Tlelevised violence promotes anxiety and
hostility in audiences. The racial subtexts raise the possibility that televisual
violence could be focusing those anxieties and hostilities, among Whites, most
intensely on Black persons.").
406. See infra notes 459-61 and accompanying text defining and describing
"modern racism."
407. Politicians have enacted many recent "tough on crime" measures-
Megan's law, Three Strikes, juvenile transfer laws, and the like-in the wake
of public outrage about a sensational crime and do so as much for cathartic
and expressive purposes to denounce crime and to reassure the public as for
their practical impact on crime. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 133 ("Typically
these measures are passed amidst great public outrage in the wake of
sensational crimes of violence, often involving a disturbingly archetypal
confrontation between a poorly controlled dangerous criminal and an innocent,
defenceless middle-class victim.").
408. See MENDELBERG, supra note 12, at 120-25. Gilliam and Iyengar
conclude from their survey that
exposure to local news coverage of crime conditions attitudes toward
crime and race. In particular, the racial element of the crime script
(as opposed to the violent element) has the most demonstrable
impact. Our experiments show that for white viewers, a brief five-
second exposure to a black perpetrator in the news is sufficient to
stimulate small increases in the percentage of people who believe
crime is caused by individual failings and who support punitive crime
policies.
Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 356, at 571.
409. See GARLAND, supra note 6, at 175 ("The offenders dealt with by
probation, parole, and the juvenile court are now less likely to be represented
in official discourse as socially deprived citizens in need of support.").
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attitudes, lend support to policies of segregation, sustain
popular perceptions of Blacks as dangerous and undeserving,
activate negative racial stereotypes, and foster more punitive
policies.410
C. THE POLITICS OF CRIME: "WEDGE ISSUES" AND "CODED"
RACIAL APPEALS
1. The Use of "Wedge Issues" to Form a New Conservative
Coalition
The widespread adoption of laws to "crack down" on youth
crime in the early 1990s culminated the politicization of crime
and juvenile justice policies that actually began several decades
earlier. Social problems, such as poverty or crime, may be
interpreted in different ways that have distinct policy
implications. Indeed, the definition of a particular condition as
a social problem at all emerges in a process of "social
410. See, e.g., DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 259, at 23 (reporting that
"'a mere five-second exposure to a mug shot of African American and Hispanic
youth offenders (in a 15-minute newscast) raises levels of fear among viewers,
increases support for 'get tough' crime policies, and promotes racial
stereotyping" (quoting F.D. Gilliam and S. Iyengar, The Superpredator Script,
52 NIEMAN REPORTS, Winter 1998, at 46)); GILENS, supra note 15, at 140-53;
KENNEDY, supra note 76, at 4-5; Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 356, at 570
("[Elxposure to the crime script significantly influences attitudes about both
crime and race .... [Ilt is the racial element of the crime script, however, that
is the dominant cue."); Hurwitz & Peffley, supra note 346, at 376 (individuals
link race with criminal activity and base views on crime on their judgments
about Blacks).
Experimental research reports that even brief exposure to a black male in
a televised crime story activates Whites' stereotypic reaction based on global
stereotypes about black male violence. Experimental participants with anti-
black attitudes were more likely to misidentify and recall a black subject of a
crime news story than a white one, thereby sustaining their stereotype by
discounting inconsistent information. See Oliver, supra note 362, at 56.
Viewers of a crime story who held more negative racial stereotypes also were
more likely to believe the black suspect was guilty, deserved more
punishment, and was more likely to be violent in the future. See Peffley et al.,
Race and Crime, supra note 346, at 321 (observing that study participants
who viewed video tapes with identical audio and visual content except for
manipulation of the race of the subject and who held negative racial
stereotypes of Blacks "clearly employed a racially discriminatory double
standard in the viewing of the black suspect in the crime story as more guilty,
more deserving of punishment, more likely to commit future violence, and
with more fear and loathing than a similarly portrayed white suspect");
BECKETT, supra note 25, at 84 (explaining that Whites tend to be more
punitive than Blacks, especially when the defendant is black or Latino).
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construction."411 "Claims-makers," such as politicians, compete
for public acceptance of their preferred interpretations, or
"frames."412 The mass media play a crucial role in shaping the
popular culture and creating the context within which issues
involving race are framed.413 Over the past three decades,
conservative politicians have altered public perceptions about
the nature and scope of crime, attributed the causes of crime to
individual choices rather than to social-structural forces,
assigned responsibility to excessively lenient criminal justice
agencies, and promoted policies to "crack down" as part of a
broader strategy for electoral advantage.414 Since the 1970s, a
reactionary quality has dominated American political
discourse-not simply as a political characterization of
conservatism, but also in a desire to restore a previous, more
stable social order.415
Conservatives linked race with crime as early as the latter
stages of the civil rights movement. Following Brown v. Board
of Education, civil rights activists responded to the southern
strategy of "massive resistance" with "direct action" and civil
disobedience, such as sit-ins, to desegregate public facilities. 416
411. See, e.g., BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 47 ("Crime-related
issues are thus socially and politically constructed: they acquire their meaning
through struggles over their interpretation and representation."); MILLER,
supra note 333, at 2-3 (explaining that "social problems 'are fundamentally
products of a process of collective definition' and do not exist 'as a set of
objective social arrangements with an intrinsic makeup').
412. BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 47-48 ("Social actors-
sometimes called 'claims makers'--compete for the public's attention and
attempt to gain acceptance for the frames they prefer.").
413. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 49 ("Lacking much
opportunity for repeated close contact with a wide variety of Blacks, Whites
depend heavily on cultural material, especially media images, for cataloging
Blacks.").
414. See BECKETT, supra note 25, at 85-88 ("The rise of racial attitudes as
the primary determinant of partisan loyalty and the association between
racial attitudes and beliefs about crime and punishment help to explain the
utility of crime-related issues to the Republican party.").
415. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 94-102; see also HACKER, supra note 48, at
209 ("Sometime during the mid-1970s, changes began to be observed in the
attitudes of white citizens who had earlier been willing to support measures
intended to bring black Americans to parity."); supra notes 238-40 and
accompanying text.
416. BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 49; OMI & WINANT, supra note
7, at 98. In addition to officially sanctioned public resistance to school
desegregation, in the first five years after Brown, white supremacists engaged
in numerous racially motivated crimes including six homicides, twenty-nine
armed assaults, forty-four beatings, and sixty bombings. KENNEDY, supra
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When southern intransigence forced the civil rights movement
to adopt disruptive strategies, however, southern political and
law enforcement officials reacted violently to suppress
protesters, and characterized them as "criminals" and "mobs"
who posed a threat to the social order.417 Subsequently, local
and national conservative politicians equated political dissent
with crime, identified the civil rights movement's use of civil
disobedience as a cause of crime, and urged its swift and severe
suppression. 418 Thus, the link between race and crime became
a key element in conservative political discourse very early on.
Divisions within the Democratic Party between social
policy liberals and conservative southerners first emerged in
1948.419 By the 1960s, the civil rights movement forced the
national Democratic party to choose between its white southern
and black northern constituencies. 420  Although most
note 76, at 63.
417. See, e.g., BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 49 (asserting that
southern officials called for a crackdown on the ""hoodlums,' 'agitators,' 'street
mobs,' and 'lawbreakers' who challenged segregation and Black
disenfranchisement, [and] these officials made rhetoric about crime a key
component of political discourse on race relations"); BECKETT, supra note 25,
at 28 (noting "the discourse of law and order was initially mobilized by
southern officials in their effort to discredit the civil rights movement").
418. Beckett argues that
the introduction and construction of the crime issue in national
political discourse in the 1960s was shaped by the definitional
activities of southern officials, presidential candidate Goldwater, and
other conservative politicians who followed his cue. Categories such
as street crime and law and order conflated conventional crime and
political dissent and were used in an attempt to heighten opposition
to the civil rights movement. Conservatives also identified the civil
rights movement-and in particular, the philosophy of civil
disobedience-as a leading cause of crime. These forms of protest
were depicted as criminal rather than political in nature, and the
excessive "lenience" of the courts was also identified as a main cause
of crime. Countering the trend toward lawlessness, they argued,
would require holding criminals-including protesters-accountable
for their actions through swift, certain, and severe punishment.
BECKETT, supra note 25, at 32.
419. See, e.g., BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 56. The Democratic
New Deal coalition included white southerners, urban ethnic groups, and the
recent black migrants to northern cities. In 1948, Democrats adopted a strong
civil rights platform, and white voters in four southern states reacted by
giving their electoral votes to the States Rights Party. See supra notes 70-72
and accompanying text. Subsequent Democratic efforts to win back
disaffected white southern "Dixiecrats" and to appease racist sentiments
enabled the Republicans to garner 21% of the black vote in 1952 and 39% in
the 1956 presidential elections. BECKETT, supra note 25, at 40.
420. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 34-35 (emphasizing that the
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Americans agreed in theory with principles of equality, many
disagreed with the specific mechanisms necessary to achieve
it.4 21 Moreover, by the 1960s, the burden of integrating schools,
housing, and employment fell more heavily on blue-collar and
lower middle-class white urban ethnic neighborhoods.4 22 The
expanding "rights revolution" and the associated social and
cultural changes disturbed and angered many members of the
white working and lower middle classes who bore the brunt of
the changes. 423
During the turbulent 1960s, the sharp rise in youth crime
and urban racial disorders evoked fears of "crime in the streets"
and provoked cries for "law and order."424  Conservative
political rhetoric framed the issue of "street crime" in terms of
dangerous and undeserving individuals rather than in terms of
reorientation of both political parties simultaneously around the issue of race
in the mid-1960s put them on a collision course over issues of race). Under
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the national Democratic party severed its
bonds with its segregationist electorate and formed a party alignment with the
civil rights movement and black America. Id. at 34-36. At the same time,
conservative Republicans, drawing heavily on southern support, toppled the
more liberal, pro-civil rights, eastern-establishment wing of Rockefeller
Republicans. Id. at 35. Kennedy's initial vacillation in support of civil rights
can be attributed to his hope to recapture white southern support. BECKETT &
SASSON, supra note 208, at 56 ("Indeed, only under the extreme pressure
generated by the civil rights activists did Kennedy finally declare his
allegiance to the civil rights cause.").
421. MENDELBERG, supra note 12, at 93-98. Mendelberg notes that while
Whites outside the South endorsed the norm of racial equality and repudiated
the ideology of white supremacy, "[a] s soon as the civil rights agenda called for
implementing change outside the South, support among whites plummeted."
Id. at 93. With the adoption of the Civil Rights Act, white Northerners
believed that racial equality of opportunity already existed and that any
further remedy was a matter of black efforts rather than eliminating
discrimination:
Working for integrated schools, targeting housing discrimination,
reining in the brutality of local white police forces, and examining the
hiring and promotion practices of employers were salient efforts of
both the southern civil rights movement and of northern activists.
Whites outside the South were much more sympathetic to these
efforts in the South than in their own towns and cities; the problem of
civil rights, they believed, had existed in the South, but never in the
North.
Id. at 94; see also, EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 57-64, 72-73.
422. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 57-61.
423. See id. at 71 ("Fairly or unfairly, rioting and black radicalism were
seen as fusing with a white student Left... which championed lifestyles and
rhetoric calculated to drive its most sought-after ally, the working class, into
the arms of conservative Republicanism.").
424. See id. at 59-61; GARLAND, supra note 6, at 97.
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criminogenic social conditions and promoted punitive criminal
justice policies rather than ameliorative social welfare
measures.425 During this period, the Republican party initiated
425. See, e.g., BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 10 (Responding to
"the civil rights movement and the expansion of the War on Poverty programs
of the 1960s, conservative politicians highlighted the problem of 'street crime'
and argued that this problem was caused by an excessively lenient welfare
and justice system that encouraged bad people to make bad choices.");
BECKETT, supra note 25, at 87 ("By attributing the very real economic plight of
'taxpayers' and 'working persons' to the behavior of the 'underclass,'
conservatives diminish the likelihood that these grievances will give rise to
policies aimed at redistributing opportunities and resources in a more
egalitarian fashion."); HACKER, supra note 48, at 210 ("[Pllaying on white
fears of 'black crime' has moved to the center of political campaigns. Even
though most white Americans do not live in or near areas where violence
stalks the streets, the issue crops up in every poll and has become a
conversational staple.").
The increased racial polarization between Democrats and Republicans
coincided with increased conservatism in public attitudes about other public
policies related to issues of race. Americans value individualism, self-reliance,
and personal responsibility values that tend to emphasize individual choices
rather than social structural determinants of criminal behavior. See
GARLAND, supra note 6, at 15; GILENS, supra note 15, at 5; see also BECKETT &
SASSON, supra note 208, at 132-33 (noting that American political culture is
rooted in values of self-reliance and individualism); BECKETT, supra note 25,
at 12. Beckett suggests that "get-tough discourse does resonate with
important sentiments and myths that characterize American political culture."
Id. "For example, the neoclassical depiction of crime as an individual choice is
consonant with the individualism that is so pronounced in American life." Id.;
see also HACKER, supra note 48, at 55-70 (discussing differences between
liberal and conservative views on the responsibility of Whites for the
circumstances of Blacks, the ways in which social structures and individual
choices affect the behavior of Blacks, and the appropriateness of governmental
programs to alleviate past or present causes of racial inequality); MASSEY &
DENTON, supra note 16, at 169.
The emphasis on individual responsibility and hard-work also influences
American attitudes toward public welfare to strongly differentiate between the
deserving and undeserving poor. See GILENS, supra note 15, at 5 (arguing that
"individualism does not lead to a principled rejection of government support
for the poor, but rather to a strong demand that welfare recipients, like
everyone else, share a commitment to individual effort and responsibility"); see
also BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 52; Donald R. Kinder & Tali
Mendelberg, Cracks in American Apartheid: The Political Impact of Prejudice
Among Desegregated Whites, 57 J. POL. 402, at 406 (analyzing survey data
that show Whites' attitudes toward Blacks characterize them as lazy, lacking
motivation, and preferring to live on welfare).
Ideology, media coverage, and politics interact to produce ever harsher
policies toward young offenders. See BECKETT, supra note 25, at 80 ("[T]he
trend toward greater public punitiveness did not precede the adoption and
implementation of tough anticrime policies; officials have played a crucial role
in framing the crime and drug issues in ways that imply the need for them.");
Alida V. Merlo, Juvenile Justice at the Crossroads: Presidential Address to the
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a full-scale attack on liberal social policies and ascribed
escalating crime, campus disorders, urban riots, welfare
dependency, and social upheavals to the permissive Warren
Court and its liberal Democratic supporters. 426
Crime and welfare policies acquired a distinctive racial
coloration as conservatives cast Blacks and their Democratic
allies as the villains.427 The polarization of the two political
parties on issues of race had its inception in the 1964
presidential confrontation between Lyndon Johnson, whose
leadership led to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and
Barry Goldwater, a staunch conservative and ideological
opponent of the Act.428 Democratic support of the civil rights
Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, 17 JUSTICE Q. 639, 639-41 (2000).
Since the 1960s, politicians' fear of being labeled by their opponents as "soft-
on-crime" and demagogic appeals in an era of 30-second commercials have led
to a constant ratcheting-up of punitiveness as politicians avoid thoughtful
discussions of complex crime policy issues. See BECKETT, supra note 25, at 86.
Michael Tonry, Racial Politics, Racial Disparities, and the War on Crime, 40
CRIME & DELINQ. 475, 489 (1994) (arguing that politicians quickly seize the
low ground in policy debates about crime).
426. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 51-73; GILENS, supra note 15, at
116-23; MENDELBERG, supra note 12, at 93-98.
427. On the matter of racial animus in welfare policies and politics, see for
example Gilens, who notes that
[t]he' distinction between the deserving and the undeserving poor is
an old one, as is the stereotype of blacks as lazy. But these two sets of
attitudes became entwined in the mid-1960s when poor blacks first
came to the widespread attention of the American media and the
American public. The already existing belief that blacks were lazy
contributed to the negative media coverage of the black poor over the
ensuing decades, and this coverage has in turn helped to perpetuate
the stereotype of blacks as lazy and the black poor as undeserving.
GILENS, supra note 15, at 205. See generally OMI & WINANT, supra note 7, at
88-89 (arguing that racial change occurs in the context of the interaction
between social and political movements and the State). They argue that in the
period after World War II, the civil rights movement challenged the prevailing
racial ideology in which the State itself supported, or at least condoned,
segregation and racial exclusion and inequality. Id. at 97-101. The civil rights
movement destabilized the State, which maintained that racial ideology and
led to a process of racial reform. Id. at 88. And, in response,
the reformed racial state became the target for further challenge, this
time from the right. Racial politics now take place under conditions
of "war of position," in which minorities have achieved significant
(though by no means equal) representation in the political system,
and in an ideological climate in which the meaning of racial equality
can be debated, but the desirability of some form of equality is
assumed.
Id.
428. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 35. The 1964 Republican
party convention rejected a party platform in favor of civil rights by a two-to-
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movement alienated white southern voters, and that presaged
the racial realignment of American politics as voters began to
identify clear differences between the two parties on a host of
race-related issues.429 Republican politicians seized on this
alienation by emphasizing crime, affirmative action, and
welfare-racially tinged "wedge issues" that distinguished
them from Democrats.4 30 Crime policies for the first time
became a central issue in partisan politics.
Although the initial civil rights agenda focused on
guaranteeing the fundamental rights of citizenship for Blacks,
such as the right to vote and equal access to public
accommodations, the post-1964 civil rights agenda focused on
broader goals such as assuring equality of outcomes, often
through the use of racial preferences.4 31 While liberals argued
that the state bore a responsibility to reduce the social-
structural forces, racial inequality, and limited economic
opportunity that they viewed as the "root causes" of crime and
poverty, conservatives argued that social programs only
encouraged poor choices by irresponsible individuals whom
they believed to be solely to blame for the phenomenon of
crime.432 During the mid-1960s, the long-standing distinctions
one margin. Id. at 44; see also Edsall & Edsall, supra note 1, at 62 ("By 1964
the Democrats had become the party of racial liberalism and the Republicans
had become the party of racial conservatism.").
429. See BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 52-58; EDSALL & EDSALL,
supra note 11, at 74-84; GILENS, supra note 15, at 116-23; MENDELBERG,
supra note 12, at 81-93.
430. See, e.g., BECKETT, supra note 25, at 30-43; EDSALL & EDSALL, supra
note 11, at 4 (noting that "race has become a powerful wedge, breaking up
what had been the majoritarian economic interests of the poor, working, and
lower-middle classes in the traditional liberal coalition"). In the pre-civil
rights era, poor southern Whites were among the most liberal constituencies
on a host of economic issues, supporting government intervention in support of
medical care, education, and employment. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11,
at 41. However, southern populism and economic liberalism foundered on
racial hostility to Blacks and the perception that federal programs primarily
benefited Blacks. Id. at 42; MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL
FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990s, at 149 (2d
ed. 1994) (describing how racial politics served as a powerful wedge issue to
fracture the liberal, New Deal economic coalition of the poor, working, and
middle-classes).
431. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 7; OMI & WINANT, supra note
430, at 106 (arguing that the state response to Civil Rights demands for
reform included tactics of "absorption" and "insulation," which defused, co-
opted and moderated the quest for equality).
432. See, e.g., BECKETT, supra note 25, at 11 (asserting that movements for
civil and welfare rights represented a battle over responsibility of federal
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between the deserving and undeserving poor and the
stereotypic belief that Blacks were lazy became intertwined
when poor urban Blacks came prominently to the attention of
the American media and public. 433 Conservatives strongly
opposed governmental actions to redistribute public and
private goods-jobs, education, housing, cultural authority, and
the like-in pursuit of greater racial equality. 434  Negative
media coverage only reinforced these public perceptions of
Blacks as criminals and undeserving.435
The civil rights movement changed the meanings of
liberalism and conservatism and the respective perceptions of
the Democratic and Republican parties. Increasingly, "the
Democratic party came to be perceived.., as promoting the
establishment of new rights and government guarantees for
government to create a more egalitarian society); ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra
note 259, at 43 ("Denials of these structural barriers tend to exonerate the
system, assume the openness and efficiency of the economic market, and
locate problems and solutions almost exclusively within the ambit of
individual activity."); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL
POLICY 1950-1980, at 38-40 (1984) (arguing that government welfare policies
created the black underclass by reducing the employment incentives for poor
people and decreasing women's incentives to marry by increasing the benefits
they received for out-of-wedlock childbearing).
433. See GILENS, supra note 15, at 3 (asserting that Americans hate
welfare because they believe that it rewards the undeserving poor, that the
majority of welfare recipients are black, and that Blacks are undeserving
because they evince less commitment to the work ethic than do other groups);
see also BECKETr & SASSON, supra note 208, at 10 (observing that
conservative politicians argued that immoral individuals rather than social
and economic conditions produced crime and welfare dependency, redefined
the poor and black population as undeserving and dangerous, and advocated
crime control instead of social welfare policies).
434. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 98; BECKETT & SASSON,
supra note 208, at 10-11. Edsall and Edsall explain that
[riace facilitated the beginning of an ideologically conservative
conversion of the electorate, as the social costs of programs such as
housing integration, busing, and affirmative action became
indissolubly fused in the minds of crucial numbers of voters with
steeply rising taxes, cultural metamorphosis, increases in violent
crime, expanding welfare rolls, greater numbers of illegitimate
children, and evidence of the deterioration of both black and white
family structures.
EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 98.
435. See, e.g., BECKETT, supra note 25, at 33-34; EDSALL & EDSALL, supra
note 11, at 151 (noting that "a wide range of social developments, including
the emergence of a growing urban underclass and the associated problems of
crime, joblessness, and urban school failure, were becoming, in the public
mind, indelibly associated with race through the growing body of statistical
information demonstrating disproportionate black involvement"); GILENS,
supra note 15, at 3.
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previously marginalized, stigmatized, or historically
disenfranchised groups, often at the expense of traditional
constituencies."436 Many of the remedies instituted by the
Warren Court to end racial segregation and to grant rights to
unpopular groups, such as criminal defendants, became
associated in the public mind with the liberal agenda of the
Democratic party.437 Finally, structural economic changes and
the expansion of the middle class encouraged many voters to
reconsider their previous support for progressive social welfare
policies in favor of more conservative positions.438
In 1968, George Wallace helped to redefine the white
backlash as a Right-wing populism against moral, racial, and
cultural liberalism.439 Wallace's populist rhetoric helped to
forge a coalition between working-class white voters and
traditionally affluent Republican voters against "an elitist
Democratic establishment intent on collecting higher taxes in
order to conduct what he described as liberal social
experiments." 440 Similarly, Richard Nixon's 1968 campaign
436. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 8. At a more theoretical level,
Omi and Winant described the changing perceptions as the contest among
social movements about the nature of political discourse and the role of race:
The state reforms won by minority movements in the 1960s, and the
racial definitions and meanings embodied in these reforms, provided
a formidable range of targets for "counter-reformers" in the 1970s and
1980s. "New right" and neoconservative currents ... were able to
carry on their own political "project." They were able to rearticulate
racial ideology and restructure racial politics once again.
OMI & WINANT, supra note 430, at 91.
437. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 46 (noting that "[1]argely
through its commitment to civil rights-of which the rights of blacks were the
primary focus-the Democratic party became the defender of an expanded
network of broader rights established in a sequence of far-reaching decisions
by the federal bench").
438. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 11 (viewing "[tihe
'embourgeoisement' of working and lower-middle-class white voters" as critical
to the establishment of conservative, upwardly redistributive Republican
legislation); GARLAND, supra note 6, at 96-97 (arguing that many voters who
traditionally had supported social democratic policies began to rethink their
relationship to the welfare state).
439. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 77 ("Wallace portrayed the
civil rights issue ... as the imposition on working men and women of intrusive
'social' policies by an insulated, liberal, elitist cabal of lawyers, judges,
editorial writers, academics, government bureaucrats, and planners .... "); see
also OMI & WINANT, supra note 430, at 124 (calling Wallace a law and order,
antistatist, southern populist who made racial appeals the centerpiece of his
campaign).
440. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 79; see also PHILLIPS, supra note
11, at 463 ("The common denominator of Wallace support, Catholic or
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attributed urban riots and rising crime rates to liberal
"permissiveness" 441 and criticized the Warren Court for
"coddling criminals" and "handcuffing the police."442 After
three years of urban riots, rising youth crime rates, anti-
Vietnam protests, and the assassinations of Robert F. Kennedy
and Martin Luther King, Jr., a climate of fear and anger
produced political demands for "law and order."443 Appeals for
"law and order" quickly acquired a racial subtext as
conservatives equated political dissent with crime. 444  Nixon
effectively straddled the conflict by professing support for the
abstract principle of racial equality while simultaneously
opposing government-driven enforcement mechanisms. 445 He
found a message that encompassed the position of the growing
majority of white Americans who had come to believe that
denying basic citizenship rights to Blacks was wrong, but
opposed the prospect of forced residential, economic, and
educational integration.446
Protestant, is alienation from the Democratic Party and a strong trend
toward the GOP. Although most of Wallace's votes came from Democrats, he
principally won those in motion between a Democratic past and a Republican
future.").
441. See BECKETT, supra note 25, at 38 (finding that as a result of political
and media attention to crime during the 1968 campaign, by 1969, 81% of poll
respondents asserted a breakdown in law and order had occurred and
attributed it to communists and Negroes who start riots).
442. POWE, supra note 8, at 399 (stating that Nixon's standard domestic
policy stump speech emphasized "crime in the streets" and urban riots); see
also GEST, supra note 366, at 14 (noting that during the 1968 presidential
campaign, Nixon gave seventeen speeches on law and order).
443. See supra notes 219-37 and accompanying text.
444. BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 51 ("The racial subtext of
these arguments was not lost on the public: Those most opposed to social and
racial reform were also most receptive to calls for law and order.").
445. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 74-80; see also MENDELBERG,
supra note 12, at 95-96 (arguing that "[a]s 1968 approached, it was clear to
Richard Nixon that racial appeals should play a key, though coded, role in his
campaign"). Nixon adopted his coded racial appeals from the success of
Goldwater's 1964 campaign in the South and Wallace's 1968 campaign in the
North, but he played the "race card" with deniability. See MENDELBERG,
supra note 12, at 97 ("Law and order for Nixon boiled down to the 'damn
Negroes,' but he could not say this in his ad .... He intended to convey racial
meaning implicitly. He wanted to appeal to racial stereotypes, fears, and
resentments, yet conform to the norm of racial equality.").
446. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 74-75; Edsall & Edsall, supra
note 1, at 63; see also Entman, supra note 362, at 334 (arguing that while the
overt expression of racist opinion has decreased, many Whites still oppose
policies to eliminate the historical effects of racism); ENTMAN & ROJECKI,
supra note 259, at 46-47 (arguing that over the past few decades Whites, in
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 87:1447
Republican political strategists concluded that they could
foster a political realignment on the basis of racial issues and
"coded" anti-black rhetoric.447 Pursuing the so-called "southern
strategy" for an electoral majority, Republicans courted the
new constituencies through the use of racially charged "code
words," such as "law and order," that indirectly invoked racial
themes without explicitly challenging egalitarian ideals.448
principle, have become more tolerant and supportive of residential integration,
black political participation, and equality as an abstraction, while in practice,
they tend to resist governmental policies or interventions that might achieve
those goals).
447. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 96-97 (arguing that "[slocial issues such as
growing crime, worsening race relations, family breakdown, growing welfare
rolls, and the decline of 'traditional values'-together with concerns about high
taxes, inflation, and declining economic performance-created a growing
anxiety about the effects of change that conservative politicians began to...
articulate"); LEMANN, supra note 39, at 201 ("The great migration then
delivered the coup de grace to the Democrats as a presidential party: it
hastened the movement of millions of middle-class white voters to the
Republican suburbs, and it caused millions more blue-collar voters who didn't
move to stop voting for the Democratic candidate for president.").
Other analysts link the changing social conditions with race and
accompanying political reforms:
[I]t was the collision of race and taxes with two additional forces over
the past twenty-five years that created a chain reaction, a reaction
forcing a realignment of the presidential electorate. These two
additional forces were, first, the rights revolution, a revolution
demanding statutory and constitutional protections for among others,
criminal defendants, women, the poor, non-European ethnic
minorities ... and, second, the rights-related reform movement
focusing on the right to guaranteed political representation that took
root within the Democratic party in the late 1960s and throughout
the 1970s.
EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 4. It required a shift of only five percent
of the electorate, mostly white working-class voters, to give either party a
national presidential majority. See Edsall & Edsall, supra note 1, at 62. For
example, Richard Nixon barely lost in 1960 and narrowly won the presidency
in 1968 on the margin of the white backlash vote in four states. LEMANN,
supra note 39, at 200-01.
448. See, e.g., BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 57 (arguing that "[in
the context of urban riots and reports that the crime rate was increasing, the
capacity of conservatives to mobilize, shape, and express these racial fears and
tensions became a particularly important political resource"); EDSALL &
EDSALL, supra note 11, at 98 (arguing that "[riace was central ... to the
fundamental conservative strategy of establishing a new, non-economic
polarization of the electorate, a polarization isolating a liberal, activist,
culturally-permissive, rights-oriented, and pro-black Democratic Party against
those unwilling to pay the financial and social costs of this reconfigured social
order"); OMI & WINANT, supra note 430, at 124 (describing how Phillips's book,
supra note 11, suggested a "coded" strategy of anti-black rhetoric to appeal to
conservative blue-collar and southern voters); PHILLIPS, supra note 11, at 22-
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This strategy allowed the Republican party to successfully
convert criminal justice and social welfare "from subjects of
policy to objects of politics" for the first time.449
23 (1969) (arguing that the "South is turning into an important presidential
base of the Republican Party" and "that this will not result from Republican
civil rights law enforcement procedures-the laws undoubtedly will be fully
enforced-but from erosion of the now meaningless Southern Democratic
tradition"); Kinder & Mendelberg, supra note 425, at 403 (arguing "that many
white Americans continue to harbor emotionally charged derogatory beliefs
about blacks and that such beliefs figure prominently in whites' opposition to
policies designed to narrow racial inequalities").
Mendelberg emphasizes that "coded" racial appeals must remain implicit
so as not to challenge directly democratic and egalitarian values.
MENDELBERG, supra note 12, at 95-106. She notes that the most effective
ways to confront implicit racial appeals is to make them explicit. Id. at 183-
88. As an example of the dangers of "explicit" racial appeals, on December 5,
2002, Republican Senate majority leader Trent Lott waxed nostalgic at a
tribute honoring Senator Strom Thurmond's 100th birthday. Referring to
Thurmond's 1948 "Dixiecrat" presidential campaign run on a platform of racial
segregation, supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text, Lott declared, "I want
to say this about my state: when Strom Thurmond ran for President, we voted
for him. We're proud of it. And if the rest of the country had followed our lead,
we wouldn't have had all these problems over all these years, either." Dan
Goodgame & Karen Tumulty, Tripped Up by History, TIME, Dec. 23, 2002, at
22. Within weeks, Lott was forced to resign his Republican leadership role
because his racial candor "may have tainted his party among educated
suburban professionals and managers who are sympathetic to the G.O.P. on
economic issues but are repulsed by any hint of coded appeals to prejudice."
Id. Political analysts noted that Lott's "supergaffe" was saying what he really
thinks. E.g., Michelle Cottle, Separate Ways, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 23,
2002, at 14, 14 (explaining that Lott's error was "accidentally saying what he
really believes"); Michael Kinsley, Lott's Adventures in Gaffeland, TIME, Dec.
23, 2002, at 31. Conservative political commentators denounced Lott's candor
because "[flor decades, since the Republicans became the repository for some
white Southern resentment of the civil rights era, the G.O.P. has walked a
delicate line between legitimate support for small government and strong
defense of and illegitimate reliance on racial resentments." Andrew Sullivan,
Why Lott's a Menace to His Party, TIME, Dec. 23, 2002, at 28. Other
commentators noted the Republican's electoral strategy for decades has been
to consolidate its hold on the white South and to play to the white backlash in
the North. E.g., Bob Herbert, Racism and the G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2002, at A39 ("The Republican Party has become a haven for white racist
attitudes and anti-black policies."). But analysts note that "[c]onservative
commentators were among the first to rebuke Trent Lott, because his candor
spoils the game. As they try to pry black voters away from their longstanding
Democratic allegiance, Republicans still need the good old boys in their core
voting base. They just don't need avowed segregationists as outspoken
leaders." Robert Kuttner, Having It Both Ways on Race, AM. PROSPECT, Jan.
13, 2003, at 2, 2003 WL 9383592.
449. TONRY, supra note 14, at 10. Similarly, Garland argues that
anxieties about crime, on top of the more inchoate insecurities
prompted by rapid social change and economic recession, paved the
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The Republican "southern strategy" ruptured the
Democratic New Deal economic coalition and produced
realignment along issues of race rather than socioeconomic
class. 450 Political reforms introduced in the Democratic party
after the 1968 convention proved more advantageous to the
articulate and well-educated veterans of the civil rights,
women's, and anti-war movements than to the traditional blue-
collar and ward politicians in the competition for delegates. 451
As more progressive forces dominated the national Democratic
party and worked to expand the rights of historically
marginalized groups, conservative Republicans depicted them
way for a politics of reaction in the late 1970s. This politics, in its
turn, helped shape these diffuse middle-class anxieties into a more
focused set of attitudes and understandings, identifying the culprits,
naming the problem, setting up scapegoats. As the middle classes
found themselves becoming regular victims of crime, they were
simultaneously encouraged to view themselves as victims of big
government, of tax and spend policies, of irresponsible welfare
programmes... [and] of affirmative action programmes. All of these
were said to work against the interests of "decent, hard-working
middle-class people" and to benefit the undeserving and increasingly
disorderly urban poor.
GARLAND, supra note 6, at 153; see Valentino, supra note 356, at 298
("Coverage that directly reinforces negative stereotypes about minorities
infuses the issue with racial significance. This combination of race and
crime should benefit Republican candidates most since they are seen both
as tough on crime and as the party that best represents whites.").
450. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 5-6.
[R]ace as a national issue over the past twenty-five years has broken the
Democratic New Deal "bottom-up" coalition-a coalition dependent on
substantial support from all voters, white and black, at or below the
median income. The fracturing of the Democrats' "bottom-up" coalition,
permitted, in turn, those at the top of the "top-down" conservative coalition
to encourage and to nurture, in the 1980s, what may well have been the
most accelerated upwards redistribution of income in the nation's
history-a redistribution fed by the tax, spending, and regulatory policies
of the Reagan and Bush administrations.
Id.
451. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 5 ("This intraparty reform
drive, erupting in the wake of the 1968 convention in Chicago, tapped for
Democratic party leadership the ranks of the civil rights, anti-war, women's,
and student movements, and became a vehicle for the ascendancy of an upper-
middle-class, college-educated culturally liberal elite within the Democratic
party."). The Democratic party reforms, nominally designed to increase access
to the process, actually served to reduce the role of white, lower-middle, and
working class voters and their more conservative, ethnic, and working-class
political leaders. Id. at 14. Activists from the civil rights, anti-war, and
women's movements, who were far more liberal on a host of issues than were
white working and lower-middle class voters, gained political power under the
new rules at the expense of traditional, white, male Democratic political
leadership. Id. at 80.
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as liberal elitists bent on imposing an alien racial and cultural
agenda.4 2 They courted the northern white blue-collar and
lower middle class, and the southern and suburban voters who
were alienated by redistributive national tax and welfare
policies.453 Divisive issues such as school busing to achieve
integration in northern cities brought home the implications of
the liberal agenda to the lower middle-class residents of ethnic
enclaves in the bigger cities.454 Moreover, because of the
association of race with violence, disorder, crime, and
illegitimacy, liberal Democrats failed to address the
increasingly conservative public attitudes spurred by rising
crime rates and welfare rolls.455 The inability of the Left to
deal with these issues enabled "the political Right to profit from
explicit and covert manipulation of symbols and images relying
upon assumptions about black poverty and crime-as in the
Republican's 1988 campaign focus on the death penalty, Willie
Horton, and the 'revolving prison door' television
452. See id. at 89-98; BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 52-58.
453. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 5-6 ("Race has crystallized
and provided a focus for values conflicts, for cultural conflicts, and for interest
conflicts-conflicts over subjects as diverse as social welfare spending,
neighborhood schooling, the distribution of the tax burden, criminal violence,
sexual conduct, family structure, political competition, and union
membership."); PHILLIPS, supra note 11, at 32-33. By the 1968 presidential
election,
[n]ot only had the civil rights revolution cut the South adrift from its
Democratic moorings and drawn the Northeast towards the Democrats,
but it had increased the Southern and Western bias of the GOP to a
point-the 1964 Goldwater nomination-where the party had decided to
break with its formative antecedents and make an ideological bid for the
anti-civil rights South.
Id.
454. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 87.
455. Id. at 15 ("The repudiation of racist expression had an unintended
consequence, however, for liberalism and for much of the Democratic party: an
almost censorious set of prohibitions against discussion of family structure
among the black poor, absent fathers, crime, lack of labor-force participation,
welfare dependency, illegitimacy, and other contentious race-freighted
issues."). Democratic liberals' intellectual intolerance for negative information
about the social circumstances of Blacks stemmed from a number of factors:
concern that confronting black welfare dependency and illegitimacy would
shift the policy focus from Whites' responsibility for the legacy of
discrimination to blaming the victims and Blacks' responsibility for a "culture
of poverty"; and fear that it would stigmatize Blacks and undermine the
liberal coalition. Id. at 52-53. The reluctance of liberal Democrats to address
crime, illegitimacy, welfare dependency and joblessness effectively conceded
these issues to the Republican right. Id. at 258-59.
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commercials." 456 The inability of liberals to debate on issues
associated with race enabled conservative Republicans to
propose simplistic but politically popular policies on a host of
contentious issues. 457 Only in the early 1990s, under Bill
Clinton, did national Democrats finally respond to the
Republican exploitation of the crime issue-and only by
capitulating and embracing an equally tough rhetoric and
punitive policy. 458 "Law and order" thus became the policy of
both major parties.
2. Political Rhetoric as "Code Words" to Appeal to Anti-Black
Sentiments
Because it is "politically incorrect" to express overtly racist
sentiments, research on "modern racism" attempts to identify
closely intertwined sentiments such as "anti-black affect,"
resistance to Blacks' political demands, and denial of the
456. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 114; see, e.g., BECKETT &
SASSON, supra note 208, at 68 (explaining that one of Bush's "political
operatives" described the Horton incident as "a wonderful mix of liberalism
and a big black rapist"); ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 92
(suggesting that Bush's blatant anti-black Horton advertisements deliberately
raised the crime issue to arouse the fear in many Whites of dangerous Blacks).
457. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 55; Tonry, supra note 425, at
491 ("By presenting crime control issues only in emotional, stereotyped ways,
conservative politicians have raised its salience as a political issue but made it
impossible for their opponents to respond other than in the same stereotyped
way.").
458. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 13-14 ("It is not just one party that has
moved away from the old correctionalist orthodoxy: they all have."); KENNEDY,
supra note 76, at 3-4 (stating that Clinton went to considerable lengths to
demonstrate that he was as tough on crime as Republicans). Both political
parties competed to demonstrate that they were "tough on crime," concerned
about public safety, and better able to impose law and order, discipline, and
morality. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 131. Following Dukakis's 1988 defeat,
the broad positions of the two major political parties on crime policy issues
became virtually indistinguishable. BECKETT, supra note 25, at 45 ("[M]any
Democratic policymakers attempted to wrest control of the crime and drug
issues from the Republicans by advocating stricter anticrime and antidrug
laws."); BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 69 (observing that as a result
of Clinton's support for increased police efforts and tough drug laws, "there
was little about Clinton's crime control record in Arkansas that Bush could
taunt him about the way he mocked Dukakis as a patsy for every dark-
skinned murderer in Massachusetts" (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); GEST, supra note 366, at 123; see, e.g., Anthony M. Platt, Social
Insecurity: The Transformation of American Criminal Justice, 1965-2000, 28
SOC. JUST. 138, 138 (Spring 2001) ("By 1992, the traditional liberal agenda on
crime-prevention, community development, rehabilitation, and abolition of
the death penalty-had, like liberalism itself, disappeared from official
political discourse.").
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continued existence of racism or racial discrimination as
indirect indicators of racial hostility. 459 Modern racism is
composed of a "general and diffuse 'anti-black affect' combined
with disaffection over the continuing claims of blacks on white
resources and sympathies, rancor rooted in an attachment to
traditional American, individualist values, and in a conviction
that racism has disappeared."460 Modern racism perceives
Blacks as overly demanding, undeserving, and threatening,
and it emerges in media coverage of politics, welfare, and
crime.461
"Code words" are symbols or phrases that indirectly
implicate racial themes without directly challenging egalitarian
ideals.462 Politicians can use them to evoke modern racist
459. Entman, supra note 362, at 332-33. Entman argues that "modern
racism" consists of
three closely intertwined but analytically distinct sentiments. The first
component of modern racism is anti-black affect-a general emotional
hostility toward blacks.... The second element of modern racism is
resistance to the political demands of blacks.... The third component of
modern racism is a belief that racism is dead and that racial
discrimination no longer inhibits black achievement.
Id.; see also Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 356, at 566 (contending that
"modem racism" consists of four elements: 1) a denial that discrimination
against Blacks persists; 2) a belief that Blacks do not subscribe to traditional
American values of hard work and individual responsibility; 3) a belief that
Blacks make unreasonable and excessive demands; and 4) a belief that Blacks
receive benefits from the government that they do not deserve).
460. Entman, supra note 362, at 333 (citation omitted). Entman further
argues that
[mlodern racists express "antagonism, resentment, and anger toward
blacks' wishes, and a lack of sympathy with them". [sic] They believe
that "the individual black's fate is not determined by treatment of
blacks as a group, and that demands for help and special favors
should not be granted to blacks as a group". [sic] After all, they
believe, discrimination is largely a thing of the past, and blacks have
the opportunity to compete in the marketplace like everyone else.
Id. at 33 (citation omitted); see also ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 19
(arguing that white racial animosity toward Blacks includes "stereotyping,
denial, political rejection and demonization, and fearful, angry emotions").
Whites who harbor animus deny the continuing existence of discrimination or
other structural barriers to Blacks' mobility. Id. In part, such denial reflects
Whites' ignorance of the continuing effects of discrimination in housing and
employment, and the impact of deindustrialization on Blacks' economic
opportunities. Id. "The gap in Whites' understanding of past and present life
for African Americans tends to support their beliefs that laziness and weak
will are now the chief impediments to Blacks' social mobility." Id.
461. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 78-93; Entman, supra note
362, at 333-35.
462. See supra text accompanying note 448.
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sentiments without seeming racist or discriminatory.463
Talking in code allows politicians to appeal to cultural
archetypes in the collective unconscious about the "alien other"
who poses a fearful and menacing threat to society.4 64 Crime
and welfare now widely serve as "coded" issues that enable
politicians to exploit white Americans' negative views about
Blacks without explicitly playing the "race card."465 By the
463. See, e.g., GILENS, supra note 15, at 67 ("Although political elites
typically use race-neutral language in discussing poverty and welfare, it is
now widely believed that welfare is a 'race-coded' topic that evokes racial
imagery and attitudes even when racial minorities are not explicitly
mentioned."); OMI & WINANT, supra note 430, at 123 (code words are "phrases
and symbols which refer indirectly to racial themes, but do not directly
challenge popular democratic or egalitarian ideals"); Richard Dvorak,
Cracking the Code: "De-Coding" Colorblind Slurs During the Congressional
Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611, 615 (2000) ("[L]egislators
can appeal to racist sentiments without appearing racist.").
464. For example, politicized criminological discourse evokes images and
archetypes to play to public anxieties and to depict criminals as fundamentally
different and threatening:
In its deliberate echoing of public concerns and media biases, and its
focus on the most worrisome threats, it is, in effect, a politicized
discourse of the collective unconscious .... In its standard tropes and
rhetorical invocations, this political discourse relies upon an archaic
criminology of the criminal type, the alien other. Sometimes
explicitly, more often in coded references, the problem is traced to the
wanton, amoral behavior of dangerous offenders, who typically belong
to racial and cultural groups bearing little resemblance to "us."
GARLAND, supra note 6, at 135; see also EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at
138 ("In facing an electorate with sharply divided commitments on race-
theoretically in favor of egalitarian principle but hostile to many forms of
implementation-the use of a race-free political language proved crucial to
building a broad-based, center-right coalition."); KENNEDY, supra note 76, at 4
(observing that "[flor some politicians, the law and order slogan has served as
a thinly veiled code with which to signal sympathy for and solidarity with
whites upset by the social, political, and cultural changes brought about by the
upheavals of the 1960s, particularly the Civil Rights Revolution"); Dvorak,
supra note 463, at 616 (arguing that "coded racist messages have served White
politicians well in appealing to Whites' fears of crime and drugs, economic
instability, a loss of 'values' and traditional notions of 'equality'); Martin
Gilens, "Race Coding" and White Opposition to Welfare, 90 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
593, 593 (1996) (arguing that "[mi]any believe that by engaging such issues [as
crime and welfare], politicians can exploit whites' racial animosity and
resentment while diminishing the appearance of race baiting").
465. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 430, at 123 (defining racial "code
words" as "phrases and symbols which refer indirectly to racial themes, but do
not directly challenge popular democratic or egalitarian ideals (e.g., justice,
equal opportunity)"); see also ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 259, at 20
("Whites whose animosity is inflamed-including ambivalent Whites
responding to specific situations and stimuli-become receptive to coded
campaign appeals designed to mobilize them into coalitions with traditional
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1970s, conservative politicians appreciated that terms such as
"law and order," "individual rights," and even "equality" could
be deployed to invoke racial themes, and by the 1980s,
"welfare," "fairness," and "groups" had acquired racial
meanings in the backlash against liberal policies. 466 Politicians
exploit these racially-tinged words for political advantage with
demagogic pledges to "get tough" and "crack down" on youth
crime, which have become "code words" for harsher treatment
of young black males.467
In the past thirty years, conservative politicians and the
mass media have pushed crime to the top of the political
agenda. They have done this by exploiting the mass media and
by focusing on sensational and violent crime to promote "get
tough" policies.468 Republican politicians in national elections
have strategically used coded anti-crime rhetoric to appeal to
white voters. 469 Moreover, they have used their positions as
racists."); Dvorak, supra note 463, at 615; Gilens, supra note 464, at 594-95.
466. See, e.g., EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, 198-216; Dvorak, supra
note 463, at 624. Republicans successfully converted their hostility to civil
rights enforcement into a principled support for fairness, equality, and
opposition to special privileges for minorities and women. See EDSALL &
EDSALL, supra note 11, at 183-86. This conservative egalitarianism shifted
public resentment away from economic inequality and the economic
exploitation of working people and toward minorities, the poor, and the federal
government's redistributive efforts. See, e.g., id. at 144; OMI & WINANT, supra
note 430, at 117 (arguing that the meaning of "equality" and the methods to
achieve it became part of the political debate and conservatives recast the
dispute not as a quest for racial equality, but as avoiding a form of "reverse
discrimination" in which the state went too far in trying to eliminate
discrimination).
467. See BECKETT, supra note 25, at 8-9. "Code words" convey a well-
known but implicit meaning-such as an appeal to Whites' racial hostilities-
while resisting any overtly racist interpretation. See MILLER, supra note 333,
at 149 (arguing that "welfare and crime have never been far from the reach of
any politician who wishes to posture on race without ever having actually to
mention it"); Gilens, supra note 464, at 602 (arguing that public officials who
use crime and welfare as "code" to mobilize anti-black sentiments for electoral
advantage among white voters practice a politics of division). While the public
can debate some explicitly racial issues such as school integration and
affirmative action, race-coded issues are attractive to some politicians
precisely because they can exploit the power of racial suspicion and animosity
while insulating themselves from charges of race-baiting. See MENDELBERG,
supra note 12, at 134-38.
468. See, e.g., BECKETT, supra note 25, at 62-78; BECKETT & SASSON, supra
note 208, at 75-98.
469. See, e.g., EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 224 ("Crime became a
shorthand signal, to crucial numbers of white voters, of broader issues of
social disorder, tapping powerful ideas about authority, status, morality, self-
control, and race."); TONRY, supra note 14, at 11-12; Tonry, supra note 425, at
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sources of crime news to shape public attitudes in favor of
criminal justice policies that they advocate. 470 For example,
when Republican politicians declared a "war on drugs," they
volunteered for a steady stream of interviews and media
coverage of drug stories increased sharply.4 71 These stories
focused on crack rather than powder cocaine and emphasized
that crack was a drug of the black inner city. 472 Such media
complicity reinforced "get tough" political rhetoric and abetted
conservatives' advocacy of punitive laws, such as the
differences in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines between crack
and powder cocaine that had a dramatically disproportionate
impact on black conviction and incarceration rates. 473
Similarly, the 1988 Bush presidential campaign's focus on
Willie Horton-a convicted black murderer released on
furlough who burglarized and stabbed a white middle-class
man and raped a white woman-tapped into voter anger
through the threatening archetype of the black male rapist of a
white woman.474 Although the Bush campaign claimed that the
475.
470. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 13 ("The politicization of crime control has
transformed the structure of relationships that connects the political process
and the institutions of criminal justice .... This constitutes a sharp reversal
of the historical process whereby the power to punish was largely delegated to
professional experts and administrators.").
471. See BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 88-99; TONRY, supra note
14, at 83-104.
472. See BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 88-99; MAUER, supra note
45, at 60-63; see also TONRY, supra note 14, at 188-89 (contrasting the
sentencing guidelines for powder cocaine offenses with the guidelines for crack
cocaine offenses).
473. See, e.g., BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 88 (explaining how in
the 1980s, the media attributed the inner-city crack cocaine problems to
"insufficient control and punishment"); KENNEDY, supra note 76, at 364-86;
MILLER, supra note 333, at 82-83. The Republicans' "War on Drugs"
represented a cynical political strategy to assert toughness about crime, even
though it clearly would have a disproportionate and disastrous impact on the
minority community and would do very little to alleviate the problems of drugs
and crime. TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT, supra note 14, at 104-23.
An analysis of network coverage of the "war on drugs" between 1981 and
1988 reported that as the focus of law enforcement shifted from powder to
crack cocaine, "the media frame shifted dramatically from white, suburban
drug users in need of therapy to riveting images of violent black drug
offenders in the inner city who were beyond the point of rehabilitation."
Hurwitz & Peffley, supra note 346, at 395; see also BECKETT & SASSON, supra
note 208, at 90.
474. See DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA: How
THE WILLIE HORTON STORY CHANGED AMERICAN JUSTICE (1995); EDSALL &
EDSALL, supra note 11, at 222-25; Dvorak, supra note 463, at 626 (stating that
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Horton campaign commercials were about his opponent's "soft
on crime" attitudes,47 5 "[bly 1988, the assumption that black
men were dangerous had soaked deeply into America's urban
consciousness, powerfully reinforced by the steady flow of news
coverage depicting black men under arrest, in court, [and] in
prison."476 In fact, the appeal mobilized racial prejudices rather
than concerns about crime.477 This, in turn, fostered great
resistance to public policy efforts to reduce racial inequality.478
the Bush campaign used Horton "to appeal to Whites' fears of Black male
criminals"); Tali Mendelberg, Executing Hortons: Racial Crime in the 1988
Presidential Campaign, 61 PUB. OPINION Q. 134, 134 (1997) (suggesting that
the Horton issue is the most representative campaign tactic to demonstrate
playing the "race card" in contemporary politics).
475. The 1988 Bush campaign used a variety of potent symbols and
images-ACLU, Willie Horton, the death penalty-to appeal to voters'
concerns about race, morality, and cultural values and to associate Dukakis
with criminal defendants' rights, black crime, and the erosion of traditional
values. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 215-16. Because Dukakis, as
Governor of Massachusetts in 1976, had vetoed a bill that would have denied
furloughs to convicted murderers such as Horton, "Willie Horton represented
for key sectors of the electorate the consequences of an aggressively expansive
liberalism, a liberalism running up against public opinion, against 'traditional'
values, and, to a certain degree, against common sense." Id. at 224.
476. See ANDERSON, supra note 474, at 217.
477. See MENDELBERG, supra note 12, at 178 (analyzing the Republican's
successful play of the race card with the Willie Horton message during the
1988 election). See generally JAMIESON, supra note 12.
478. See Mendelberg, supra note 474, at 151. Mendelberg argues that
It]he Horton appeal was.., about race rather than crime; it mobilized
whites' racial prejudice, not their worries about crime. The
consequences of this mobilization were greater resistance to
government efforts to address racial inequality, heightened
perceptions of racial conflict, and greater resistance to policies
perceived as illegitimately benefiting African Americans.
Id.
As with violent crime, white American's hostility to public welfare
reflects the majority's erroneous perception that most welfare recipients are
black, that Blacks evince less commitment to the work ethic, and that "welfare
has become a 'code word' for race." See GILENS, supra note 15, at 3; MILLER,
supra note 333, at 1 ("[Plolitics of crime and welfare came with a decidedly
racial cast."). As poor peoples' adaptations to social and economic
disadvantage appeared increasingly alien to the well-to-do, economic and
criminal justice policies increasingly punished the poor and minorities, and
discredited social explanations of problematic behavior:
Crime-together with associated 'underclass' behaviours such as drug
abuse, teenage pregnancy, single parenthood, and welfare
dependency-came to function as a rhetorical legitimation for social
and economic policies that effectively punished the poor and as a
justification for the development of strong disciplinary state. In the
political discourse of this period, social accounts of the crime problem
come to be completely discredited. Such accounts, so it was said,
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There is a correlation between punitiveness and hostility
toward Blacks; those who report great racial prejudice also
tend to support more punitive crime control policies.479
Conservatives' "law and order" rhetoric and other such veiled
references to race support and encourage such attitudes and
policies. The political success of those who practice "coded"
racial appeals obviously guarantees its continued use.480 As a
result of the recent emphasis on the connection between race
and youth crime, black juveniles have become the "Willie
Horton" of the 1990s. 48 1
D. INCREASED PUNITIVENESS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE WAIVER
AND SENTENCING POLICIES
The connection in the public mind between race and rising
youth crime in the 1980s provided a powerful political incentive
to transform juvenile justice jurisprudence. 482 A tension has
always existed between social welfare and social control;
between a concern for the "best interests" of the young offender
and punishment for the offense; and between safeguarding
children and protecting society.483 After the escalation of youth
violence rates in the late 1970s and the early 1990s, the
balance shifted sharply from rehabilitation to retribution.484
denied individual responsibility, excused moral fault, watered down
punishment, encouraged bad behavior and in that respect were
emblematic of all that was wrong with welfarism.
GARLAND, supra note 6, at 101-02; see also ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note
259, at 20 (describing how racial hostility prevents blue-collar and middle-
class Whites and Blacks from forming political coalitions to support policies
that would emphasize greater equality in the distribution of public goods and
services).
479. See BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 208, at 135.
480. See, e.g., Mendelberg, supra note 474, at 152 (negative racial style of
the 1988 presidential campaign emulated in subsequent senatorial and
gubernatorial elections).
481. See, e.g., BECKETT, supra note 25, at 58; BECKETT & SASSON, supra
note 208, at 184-85; Feld, Transformation-Part II, supra note 5, at 361.
482. See ZIMRING, supra note 219, at 12 ("Legislation becomes the result of
a felt need to do something about crime, a need that may be totally external to
the operations of the legal systems that respond to juvenile and late
adolescent violence.").
483. See FELD, supra note 2, at 289-97; GARLAND, supra note 6, at 27-28
(describing some of the antinomies between welfare and control that juvenile
justice practices reconciled); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 154
(noting the "tension between social welfare and social control-that is,
focusing on the best interests of the individual child versus focusing on
punishment, incapacitation, and protecting society from certain offenses").
484. See supra notes 314-30 and accompanying text; see also JEFFREY
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The shift was aided by the public perception of youth crime as
an urban black male phenomenon.485
Questions about the effectiveness and legitimacy of the
"Rehabilitative Ideal" that began to emerge in the 1960s eroded
the traditional rationale of the juvenile justice system.48 6
Politicians amplified these criticisms by claiming that sanctions
for juveniles were too lenient and did not sufficiently protect
the public.48 7  The growing perception that rehabilitative
programs do not work fueled a greater legislative emphasis on
punishment.488 The overarching themes of these legislative
amendments include a shift from individualized justice to just
deserts; from rehabilitation to retribution; from offender to
offense; from "amenability to treatment" to proportionality; and
a shift of sentencing authority from the judicial to the
legislative and executive branches.489 The unifying theme of all
these policies is punitive segregation-strategies to incapacitate
and exclude young offenders rather than to change and
reintegrate them.490
BUTTS & JEREMY TRAvIS, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE:
1980 TO 2000, at 2-4 (2002) (discussing the sharply growing rates of youth
violence during the late 1980s and early 1990s, followed by even sharper
decline since 1994).
485. BECKETT, supra note 25, at 62-78; Feld, Transformation-Part II,
supra note 5, at 367-69.
486. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
487. See, e.g., BERNARD, supra note 34, at 3-5 (noting a cyclical pattern of
oscillation between severity and leniency in juvenile justice policy); GARLAND,
supra note 6, at 108.
488. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 223. McCord
states that
[p]olicies of the last decade have become more punitive toward
delinquent juveniles, but especially toward juveniles who commit
violent crimes. Punitive policies include easier waivers to adult court,
excluding certain offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction, blended
juvenile and adult sentences, increased authority to prosecutors to
decide to file cases in adult court, and more frequent custodial
placement of adjudicated delinquents.
Id.
489. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 210 ("State
legislative changes in recent years have moved the court away from its
rehabilitative goals and toward punishment and accountability... includ[ing]
blended sentences, mandatory minimum sentences, and extended
jurisdiction."); MAUER, supra note 45, at 137-38 (sentencing discretion shifted
from judges to prosecutors and "judicial discretion is exercised in an open
courtroom subject to public scrutiny, but the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion is conducted behind closed doors with little accountability"); Feld,
Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 245, at 194.
490. See GARLAND, supra note 6, at 140.
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1. Waiver of Juveniles to Criminal Court
Jurisdictional waiver is a type of sentencing decision.491
Juvenile courts traditionally assign primary importance to
rehabilitation and attempt to individualize treatment.492
Criminal courts, in contrast, look to the seriousness of the
offense committed and attempt to proportion punishment
accordingly. 493  All of the theoretical differences between
juvenile and criminal courts' sentencing philosophies are
visible in the legislative policy debates about transfer
proceedings. Transfer laws reflect both fundamental crime
control concerns and the ambivalence embedded in our cultural
construction of youth. The jurisprudential conflicts reflect
many current sentencing policy debates: tensions between
rehabilitation or incapacitation and retribution; between
focusing on characteristics of the offender and the seriousness
of the offense; between discretion and rules; and between
indeterminacy and determinacy.
Although the technical and administrative details of
transfer legislation vary by state considerably, judicial waiver,
legislative offense exclusion, and prosecutorial choice of forum
are the three generic approaches employed. 494 These laws
emphasize a different balance of sentencing policy values, rely
on different organizational actors and administrative processes,
and elicit different information to determine whether to try and
sentence a particular young offender as an adult or as a child.
Judicial waiver represents the most common transfer
policy in virtually all states.495 A juvenile court judge may
491. Jurisdictional waiver refers to the process by which a youth's case can
be transferred to criminal court for prosecution as an adult. E.g., PATRICK
GRIFFIN ET AL., TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURT: AN
ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER PROVISIONS 3-10 (1998); SNYDER & SICKMUND,
supra note 319, at 85-89 (discussing judicial waiver, concurrent jurisdiction,
and statutory offense exclusion as three legislative methods to transfer
juveniles for criminal prosecution).
492. E.g., Feld, Criminalizing American Juvenile Court, supra note 156, at
233-43; Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 245, at 195-98.
493. E.g., Feld, Criminalizing American Juvenile Court, supra note 156, at
233-43; Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 245, at 195-98.
494. See generally FELD, supra note 2, at 208-19 (describing types of waiver
laws); GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 491, at 2 (summarizing state transfer
provisions); SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 319, at 85-89 (analyzing three
main types of jurisdictional transfer statutes); Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes,
supra note 245 (classifying states by judicial waiver, offense exclusion, and
prosecutorial "direct file" laws).
495. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE:
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waive juvenile court jurisdiction on a discretionary basis after
conducting a hearing to determine whether a youth is
amenable to treatment or poses a danger to public safety.
496
These case-by-case clinical assessments reflect the traditional
individualized sentencing discretion characteristic of juvenile
courts.
Legislative offense exclusion frequently supplements
judicial waiver provisions. This approach emphasizes the
seriousness of the offense committed and reflects the
retributive values of the criminal law.497 Because legislatures
create juvenile courts, they possess considerable latitude to
define their jurisdiction and to exclude youths from juvenile
court based on their age and the seriousness of their offenses.
498
Prosecutorial waiver, the third method, is used in about a
dozen states to remove some young offenders from the juvenile
justice system.499 With this strategy, juvenile and criminal
courts share concurrent jurisdiction over certain ages and
offenses, typically older youths and serious crimes, and
prosecutors have discretion to select either forum.500 Because
of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, courts
ordinarily do not review discretionary executive decisions, and
most judicial opinions characterize prosecutorial transfer as an
ordinary charging decision.50 1
Each type of waiver strategy has supporters and critics.
JUVENILES PROCESSED IN CRIMINAL COURT AND CASE DISPOSITIONS (1995);
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 319, at 85.
496. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966) (mandating
procedural due process in judicial waiver hearings); Feld, Juvenile Waiver
Statutes, supra note 245, at 487-94.
497. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 319, at 88; Feld, Juvenile
Waiver Statutes, supra note 245, at 494-99.
498. See generally Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History and Critique, in THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL
COURT 83, 85 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) [hereinafter
Feld, Legislative Exclusion].
499. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 319, at 87; Feld, Legislative
Exclusion, supra note 498, at 98-101.
500. See Manduley v. Superior Court of San Diego, 2002 WL 287665 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. 2002); SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 319, at 87; Francis Barry
McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case for
Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 629,
656-67 (1994).
501. See United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973); Manduley v. Superior Court of San Diego, 41 P.3d
3, 12-13 (Cal. 2002); Feld, Legislative Exclusion, supra note 498, 91-101.
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Proponents of judicial waiver endorse the juvenile court's
rehabilitative philosophy and argue that individualized
decisions provide an appropriate balance of flexibility and
severity.50 2 Critics object that judges lack the accurate clinical
tools to assess amenability to treatment or to predict
dangerousness and that their exercise of standardless
discretion results in abuses and inequalities.50 3 Proponents of
offense exclusion favor "just deserts" sentencing policies; they
advocate sanctions based on relatively objective factors such as
seriousness of the crime, culpability, and criminal history; and
they value uniform treatment of similarly situated offenders. 504
Critics question whether legislators can remove discretion
without making the process excessively rigid and
overinclusive. 50 5 Proponents of prosecutorial waiver claim that
prosecutors can act as more objective gatekeepers than either
"soft" judges or "get tough" legislators. 50 6 Critics observe that
prosecutors often succumb to political pressures on crime
issues, exercise their discretion just as subjectively and
idiosyncratically as judges, and create extensive geographic
variability in the administration of juvenile justice.50 7
Within the past two decades, and particularly in reaction
to the sharp increase in black youth homicides in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, almost every state revised its transfer laws to
facilitate the prosecution of more juveniles in adult criminal
court.50 8  Juvenile justice policies have become especially
502. See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in
THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS
TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 207, 216-17 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring
eds., 2000) [hereinafter Zimring, Punitive Necessity]; Franklin E. Zimring &
Jeffrey Fagan, Transfer Policy and Law Reform, in THE CHANGING BORDERS
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT
407, 415-17 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
503. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Elizabeth Piper Deschenes, Determinates of
Judicial Waiver Decisions for Violent Juvenile Offenders, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 314, 345-47 (1990); Feld, Legislative Exclusion, supra note 498,
89-90.
504. See, e.g., Feld, Legislative Exclusion, supra note 498, at 102-03.
505. See, e.g., Zimring, Punitive Necessity, supra note 502, at 217-20.
506. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 500, at 658-59.
507. See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles
to Criminal Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 281, 299 (1991); Feld, Legislative
Exclusion, supra note 498, at 117-19.
508. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 204-09, 214-18;
TORBET ET AL., supra note 256, at 3-8; Feld, Responses to Youth Violence,
supra note 245, at 194; Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case
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punitive toward youths charged with violent crimes, the offense
category to which black youths contribute disproportionately. 50 9
Statutory changes make it easier for judges to transfer youths
to criminal court, exclude certain serious offenses from juvenile
court jurisdiction, and increase prosecutors' discretion to file
cases in adult court.510
These changes in waiver laws reflect a fundamental
cultural and legal reconceptualization of youths from innocent
and dependent children to responsible and autonomous adult-
like offenders. 511 The characterization of youths as responsible
Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 966-97 (1995)
[hereinafter Feld, Violent Youth].
509. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 216 ("A high proportion
of the juveniles transferred to adult court are minorities.... The
preponderance of minorities among transferred juveniles may be explained in
part by the fact that minorities are disproportionately arrested for serious
crimes."); EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A. JONES, AND JUSTICE FOR
SOME 12-14 (2000).
510. Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 245, at 205-08; see
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 214-20. Traditionally, juvenile
court judges and clinicians used indeterminate and discretionary processes to
make predictions about offenders' future life course and criminal propensity.
See Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 245, at 494-511. By contrast,
legislative offense exclusion reflects a more retributive, offense-based just
deserts framework. Waiver statutes embody and attempt to resolve the same
tensions between individualized evaluations of the offender and more
mechanical dispositions based on the offense that animate sentencing policy
debates. Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 245, at 195-98.
Proponents of just deserts contend that juvenile court judges lack valid or
reliable bases upon which to make accurate determinations of "amenability" or
dangerousness and that standardless discretion results in inconsistent and
discriminatory decisions. Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 508, at 1006-13.
Legislative offense exclusion laws that define chronological juveniles as adults
on the basis of a serious offense reflect a retributive, just deserts alternative to
individualized, rehabilitative juvenile justice jurisprudence.
511. Garland describes the changing imagery and policy implications of the
reconceptualization of youth:
Crime has been re-dramatized. The stock welfarist image of the
delinquent as a disadvantaged, deserving, subject of need has now all
but disappeared. Instead, the images conjured up to accompany new
legislation tend to be stereotypical depictions of unruly youth,
dangerous predators, and incorrigible career criminals.
Accompanying these projected images, and in rhetorical response to
them, the new discourse of crime policy consistently invokes an angry
public, tired of living in fear, demanding strong measures of
punishment and protection.
GARLAND, supra note 6, at 10. Public officials' statements reflected these
changing perceptions. For example, Alfred Regnery, the head of the U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
during the Reagan administration, described violent 16-year-olds as "criminals
who happen to be young, not children who happen to commit crimes." GEST,
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 87:1447
reflects a broader criminological reconfiguration of criminality
as ordinary, routine behavior and the product of rational
choice, rather than as aberrational, deviant, and determined
conduct. 512 The focus on adolescent criminality as a "rational
choice" has led to an emphasis on "pricing" penalties, 513 efforts
to assure that penal consequences are swift and severe, and
"functioned to legitimate these tougher policies and give them a
gloss of respectability. '514 "Get tough" politicians' sound bites-
"adult crime, adult time" or "old enough to do the crime, old
enough to do the time"-exemplify the reformulation of
adolescents as responsible for their actions and advance crime
policies that provide no formal recognition of youthfulness as a
mitigating factor in sentencing.515
supra note 366, at 89.
512. See GARLAND, supra note 6, at 127-28 (describing the changing
interpretation of criminal behavior). Garland further elaborates:
The new criminologies of everyday life are a set of cognate theoretical
frameworks that includes routine activity theory, crime as
opportunity, lifestyle analysis, situational crime prevention, and some
versions of rational choice theory. The striking thing about these
various criminologies is that they each begin from the premise that
crime is a normal, commonplace, aspect of modern society. . . . To
commit an offence thus requires no special motivation or disposition,
no abnormality or pathology. In contrast to earlier criminologies,
which began from the premise that crime was a deviation from
normal civilized conduct and was explicable in terms of individual
pathology or faulty socialization, the new criminologies see crime as
continuous with normal social interaction and explicable by reference
to standard motivational patterns.
Id.
513. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 130 (stating that the rational choice model
"regards criminal acts as calculated, utility-maximizing conduct, resulting
from a straightforward process of individual choice" and that "[tihis model
represents the problem of crime as a matter of supply and demand, with
punishment operating as a price mechanism").
514. Id. Garland points out the irony of contemporary criminological
interpretations and criminal policy:
After more than a century of social scientific research that
complicated and refined the understanding of criminal offending;
after a mass of evidence has been accumulated to show that criminal
acts are typically embedded in, and produced by, definite social and
psychological relations; rational choice analyses have, abruptly and
without ceremony, swept aside all such complexity and empirical
findings. With the certainty of armchair philosophers and economic
modelers they insist that crime is, after all, simply a matter of
individual choice-or anyway can be treated as if it were.
Id.
515. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness,
Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 68, 97-107 (1997) (arguing that adolescent developmental
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Even prior to the recent "crack down" on juveniles, studies
consistently reported racial disparities in waiver decisions by
juvenile court judges. 516  As a result of the "get tough"
reformulation, state legislatures use offense criteria in waiver
laws either as dispositional guidelines to structure and limit
judicial discretion, to guide prosecutorial charging decisions, or
automatically to exclude certain youths from juvenile court
jurisdiction. 5 7 After controlling for the seriousness of the
offense, juvenile court judges are more likely to transfer
minority youths than white youths to criminal court; the
disparities are greatest for youths charged with violent and
drug offenses. 518 In nearly every jurisdiction, the proportion of
minority youths judicially transferred to criminal court greatly
exceeded their proportional make-up of the general
population. 519 A study of juvenile transfer and criminal court
psychology supports differences in culpability of juveniles and adults, which
require formal recognition of youthfulness as a mitigating factor in
sentencing).
516. See, e.g., DONNA M. HAMPARIAN ET AL., MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE
JUSTICE, INFORMATION AND TRAINING: YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETWEEN
TWO WORLDS 104-05 (1982) (nationally, 39% of all youths transferred in 1978
were black and, in eleven states, minority youths constituted the majority ofjuveniles waived); Joel Peter Eigen, The Determinants and Impact of
Jurisdictional Transfer in Philadelphia, in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE
JUSTICE, INFORMATION AND TRAINING: READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 330, 339-
40 (John C. Hall et al. eds., 1981) (interracial effect in transfers in which black
youths who murder white victims are significantly more at risk for waiver);
Jeffrey Fagan et al., Racial Determinants of the Judicial Transfer Decision:
Prosecuting Violent Youth in Criminal Court, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 259, 276
(1987) ("[It appears that the effects of race are indirect, but visible
nonetheless."). An analysis by the U.S. General Accounting Office in four
states that examined the effects of race on judicial waiver decisions found that
blacks were more likely than whites to have their cases waived for
violent, property, and drug offenses. For violent offenses, the
differential rates are fairly consistent across states, with blackjuveniles having waiver rates from 1.8 times to 3.1 times higher than
whites. The differences varied more widely for drug offenses....
Pennsylvania black juveniles were more than twice as likely to have
their cases waived than whites .... Arizona's waiver rates for whites
were twice those of California; while for blacks, Arizona's rates were
55 times those of California.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 495, at 59.
517. See, e.g., TORBET ET AL., supra note 256, at 3-8; Feld, Responses to
Youth Violence, supra note 245, at 206-12; Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 508,
1028-32.
518. See supra note 509.
519. See POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 509, at 17 ("The minority
proportion of youth transferred to criminal court was 5 times or more their
proportion in the general population in Connecticut, Massachusetts,
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sentencing practices in Los Angeles reported that "[c]ompared
to white youths, minority youths are 2.8 times as likely to be
arrested for a violent crime, 6.2 times as likely to wind up in
adult court, and 7 times as likely to be sent to prison by adult
courts."5 20  Once youths make the transition to the adult
system, criminal court judges sentence them as if they were
adults, send them to adult prisons, and even execute them for
the crimes they committed as children.521 As a result of the
successive screening and differential processing of youths by
race, the vast majority of juveniles transferred to criminal court
and sentenced to prison are minority youths.522
2. Sentencing Delinquents in Juvenile Court
The political pressures to waive more serious young
offenders to criminal courts also impel juvenile court judges to
"get tough" on those criminal delinquents who remain. The
jurisprudential and legislative shifts in waiver policies-from
offender to offense and from treatment to punishment-also
affect the sentences that judges impose on these delinquent
offenders. Progressive reformers envisioned the juvenile court
as a social welfare system rather than as a justice system. 523
The Progressive reformers advocated that primary attention
should be focused on a youth's social circumstances and "best
interests" rather than on proof of guilt of a specific offense. 524
Even after Gault, the presumed differences between juvenile
treatment and criminal punishment provided the rationale for
the Court in McKeiver to deny a right to jury trials in
delinquency proceedings. 525 As juvenile sentencing laws and
judicial practices increasingly "get tough," they blur further the
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.").
520. MIKE MALES & DAN MACALLAIR, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: AN
ANALYSIS OF JUVENILE ADULT COURT TRANSFERS IN CALIFORNIA 7-8 (2000).
521. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (upholding
the constitutionality of death penalty for juveniles sixteen- and seventeen-
years of age); Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 245, at 212-20.
522. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 220 ("In 1997,
minorities made up three-quarters of juveniles admitted to adult state prisons,
with blacks accounting for 58 percent, Hispanics 15 percent, and Asians and
American Indians 2 percent.").
523. The juvenile court's parens patriae ideology combined social welfare
and penal social control, eschewed criminal procedural safeguards, and
maximized judicial discretion to diagnose and treat. See supra notes 29-31
and accompanying text.
524. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
525. See supra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
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always tenuous distinctions between treatment and
punishment. The "crack down" on delinquents
disproportionately affects minority youths who experience
higher rates of pretrial detention and post-adjudication
incarceration in the more punitive juvenile system.5 26
Several indicators suggest that juvenile court judges
increasingly punish youths for their past offenses rather than
treat them for their future welfare. Legislative preambles and
court opinions now explicitly endorse punishment as an
appropriate component of juvenile sanctions. 527 Juvenile codes
increasingly employ the rhetoric of accountability,
responsibility, punishment, and public safety rather than a
child's welfare or "best interests."528  States' juvenile
sentencing laws increasingly emphasize individual
responsibility and provide for determinate or mandatory
minimum sentences keyed to the seriousness of the offense. 529
Some states use sentencing guidelines to impose presumptive,
determinate, and proportional sentences on delinquents based
on a juvenile's age, seriousness of the offense, and prior
record. 530 Other states impose mandatory minimum sentences
that prescribe mandatory minimum lengths of confinement or
the level of security placement based on the nature of the
offense for which the youth is convicted.5 31 A number of state
526. See, e.g., POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 509, at 9, 14.
527. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.012(A) (Vernon 2002) (including
"to promote the concept of punishment for criminal acts" as a purpose of the
title); Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 245, at 222-23; CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(b) (West 2003) (providing that minors under the
jurisdiction of juvenile courts receive guidance including "punishment that is
consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter").
528. See, e.g., Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 245, at 838-47;
Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 245, at 222-23; Linda F.
Giardino, Statutory Rhetoric: The Reality Behind Juvenile Justice Policies in
America, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 223, 238-46 (1996).
529. See, e.g., TORBET ET AL., supra note 256, at 11-16; Feld, Responses to
Youth Violence, supra note 245, at 220-28. About half the states use some type
of determinate or mandatory minimum offense-based sentencing criteria to
govern judicial dispositions. See, e.g., TORBET ET AL., supra note 256, at 11-16;
Sheffer, supra note 245, at 491-92.
530. See, e.g., Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 245, at 850-79;
Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 245, at 224-28; Sheffer, supra
note 245, at 489-91.
531. See, e.g., TORBET ET AL., supra note 256, at 14 ("Since 1992, 15 States
and the District of Columbia have added or modified statutes that provide for
a mandatory minimum period of incarceration of juveniles committing certain
violent or other serious crimes." (citation omitted)); Sheffer, supra note 245, at
491-92.
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departments of corrections use administrative security
classification and release guidelines that employ offense factors
to determine the length or mandatory minimum term of
confinement. 532  All of these provisions emphasize
proportionality of sanctions and explicitly link the length of
time that delinquents serve to the seriousness of their crime
rather than to their "real needs. '533 These statutory provisions
use principles of proportionality and determinacy to rationalize
sentencing decisions, to increase the severity of delinquency
sanctions, and to enable legislators to demonstrate how "tough"
they are on youthful offenders.
Empirical evaluations of juvenile court sentencing
practices report two consistent findings. The ordinary
principles of the criminal law-present offense and prior
record-explain most of the variance in juvenile court
sentences. Because every state defines the juvenile court's
delinquency jurisdiction based on the commission of a criminal
act,534 juvenile court judges' sentencing practices focus
primarily on the seriousness of the present offense and prior
record when they sentence delinquents. 535 Because juvenile
532. See Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 245, at 227-28.
533. The recent report of the National Research Council analyzed juvenile
court sentencing practices and concluded that
State legislative changes in recent years have moved the court away
from its rehabilitative goals and toward punishment and
accountability. Laws have made some dispositions offense-based
rather than offender-based. Offense-based sanctions are to be
proportional to the offense and have retribution or deterrence as their
goal. Strategies for imposing offense-based sentences in juvenile
court include blended sentences, mandatory minimum sentences, and
extended jurisdiction.
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 210.
534. Feld, Transformation of Juvenile Court-Part. II, supra note 5, at 382
("[S]tates define juvenile court jurisdiction based on a youth committing a
crime, a prerequisite that detracts from a compassionate response....
Juvenile courts' defining characteristic strengthens public antipathy to 'other
people's children' by emphasizing primarily that they are law violators.").
535. See PETER GREENWOOD ET AL., YOUTH CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE
IN CALIFORNIA 53 (1983).
[C]omparisons of juvenile and adult sentencing practices suggest that
juvenile and criminal courts in California are much more alike than
statutory language would suggest, in the degree to which they focus on
aggravating circumstances of the charged offense and the defendant's
prior record in determining the degree of confinement that will be
imposed.
Id.; see also Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Race Effects in Juvenile
Justice Decision-Making: Findings of a Statewide Analysis, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 392, 401 (1996).
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court judges emphasize legal variables when they process
youths, real differences in rates of criminal behavior by black
youths account for part of the racial differences in justice
administration. Various measures of delinquency-official
arrest and conviction data, self-report surveys, and surveys of
crime victims-all indicate that black youths engage in higher
rates of serious offenses than do white juveniles. 536 Part of
these real differences in black youths' offense rates reflect their
differential exposure to a host of risk factors associated with
crime and violence-poverty, segregation and isolation in
impoverished neighborhoods, and poor health care, for
example-as a result of the structural changes described
earlier. 537
After controlling for variables that account for differences
in rates of offending by race, the individualized justice of
juvenile courts consistently produces racial disparities in
sentencing. 538 To the extent that parens patriae ideology
legitimates individualized dispositions, it subjects
disadvantaged youths to more extensive controls. In a society
marked by economic and racial inequality, minority youths are
most "in need" and therefore most "at risk" for juvenile court
intervention.539  The structural context of juvenile justice
administration also may place minority youths at a
dispositional disadvantage. Urban juvenile courts are
536. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 235-38.
537. See supra Part III.A; see also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
33, at 238. The authors report that
from the early days of childhood, black juveniles have more
experience with poor health care and health conditions and with poor
economic conditions, and they are more likely to live in segregated,
isolated neighborhoods with concentrated poverty than are white
juveniles. Concentrated disadvantages in poor neighborhoods, with
low mobility and little racial heterogeneity, have been found to be
strongly correlated with [involvement in crimes].
Id.
538. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 2, at 267-72; ; Charles E. Frazier & Donna
M. Bishop, Reflections on Race Effects in Juvenile Justice, in MINORITIES IN
JUVENILE JUSTICE 23-27 (Kimberly Kempf Leonard et al. eds., 1995); BARRY
KRISBERG & JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE 116-34 (1993)
(noting that discretionary decisions at various stages of the juvenile process
amplify racial disparities as minority youths proceed through the system and
produce more severe dispositions than for comparable white youths).
539. E.g., FELD, supra note 2, at 271-72 (recognizing that more affluent
white parents can purchase private services for their troubled children,
whereas poorer minority juveniles proceed by default through the juvenile
justice system).
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procedurally more formal and sentence all delinquents more
severely. 540 Urban courts also have greater access to detention
facilities, and detained youths typically receive more severe
sentences than those who remain at liberty.541  Because
proportionally more minority youths live in urban
environments, the geographic and structural context of juvenile
justice administration may interact with race to produce
minority overrepresentation in detention facilities and
correctional institutions.542
The juvenile justice process entails a succession of
decisions-intake, petition, detention, adjudication or waiver,
and disposition-and the compound effects of even small
disparities produce larger cumulative differences. In 1997,
black youths comprised about 15% of the population aged ten to
seventeen, 26% of juvenile arrests, 30% of delinquency
referrals, one-third of the petitioned delinquency cases, and
540. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 162, at 158-62; Barry C.
Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variations in
Juvenile Justice Administration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 185, 190
(1991).
541. E.g., Stevens H. Clarke & Gary G. Koch, Juvenile Court: Therapy or
Crime Control, and Do Lawyers Make a Difference?, 14 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 263,
294 (1980) ("[Bleing detained before adjudication had an independent effect on
the likelihood of commitment, entirely apart from the fact that both detention
and commitment had common antecedents."); Barry C. Feld, The Right to
Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and
the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1337-39 (1989)
(noting additional studies finding "negative effects of pretrial detention on
subsequent sentencing").
542. See generally FELD, supra note 2, 271-72 (noting that minority youths
are more likely to be adjudicated and committed to state facilities than their
more affluent white counterparts who can afford alternative treatment);
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 319, at 154-55 (finding that black youths
were nearly twice as likely to be detained than white youths for similar
offenses). Poe-Yamagata and Jones summarize the racial differentials in rates
of detention:
Of White youth referred to juvenile court, a smaller percentage were
locked up in detention facilities (66% referred vs. 53% detained). Of
African American youth referred to juvenile court, a larger percentage
were locked up in detention facilities (31% vs. 44%). ...
... This pattern of disproportion was across all offense categories
but was most dramatic among drug offense cases. Cases involving
White youth were 66% of those referred but only 44% of those
detained. In contrast, drug offense cases involving African American
youth were 32% of those referred but 55% of those detained. In every
offense category, a substantially greater percentage of African
American youth were detained than White youth.
POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 509, at 9.
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40% of the inmates in long-term public institutions.543
Minority youths, especially Blacks, are overrepresented at each
successive step of the decision-making process, with the
greatest disparities occurring in the initial stages. 544  For
example, probation officers who decide whether or not to file a
formal delinquency petition often perceive minority juveniles as
more threatening and more likely to offend in the future than
they do similarly situated white juveniles. 545 A recent analysis
of the effects of discretionary decision making reported that "at
almost every stage in the juvenile justice process the racial
disparity is clear, but not extreme. Because the system
operates cumulatively, however, the risk is compounded and
the end result is that black juveniles are three times as likely
as white juveniles to end up in residential placement."546
In 1988, Congress amended the Juvenile Justice and
543. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 231; see also POE-
YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 509, at 9 (finding similar proportional
discrepancies in 1994).
544. MILLER, supra note 333, at 69-72 (noting previous studies concluding
that racial disparities occur most often in the earlier and latest stages of
juvenile justice processing); POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 509, at 16
(using an index constructed by dividing minority youth proportion in pretrial
detention by minority proportion in the youth population at risk indicated that
in forty-three of forty-four states to determine that the proportion of minority
youths in detention was 2.8 times (280%) higher than their make-up in the
general population); SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 219, at 141-62.
Edmund F. McGarrell, Trends in Racial Disproportionality in Juvenile Court
Processing: 1985-1989, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 29, 46 (1993) (concluding that
disproportionate referrals of minority youths result in corresponding increases
in pre-trial detention).
545. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 251 (finding
"pronounced differences in officers' attributions about the causes of crime
committed by white and minority youth"); George S. Bridges and Sara Steen,
Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile Offenders: Attributional
Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554 (1998).
546. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 257; see also POE-
YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 509, at 18, 20 (finding that the minority
proportion of youths in public correctional facilities about double that of
Whites (66% vs. 34%) and that black youths with no prior admissions were six
times more likely than white youths to be confined). A review ofjuvenile court
sentencing studies found that
race discrimination appears most widespread-minorities (and youth
in predominantly minority jurisdictions) are more likely to be
detained and receive out-of-home placements than whites regardless
of "legal" considerations. Because processing in the juvenile justice
system is deeply implicated in the construction of a criminal (or
"prior") record, experiences as a juvenile serve as a major predictor of
future processing.
Sampson & Lauritsen, supra note 287, at 363.
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Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act and required states that
receive federal juvenile justice funds to assure equality of
treatment on the basis of race and to examine what accounts
for minority overrepresentation in detention facilities and
institutions. 547 A number of states responded to the JJDP Act
mandate and reported racial disparities in their juvenile justice
systems. 548 After controlling for offense variables, forty-one of
forty-two states found minority youths overrepresented in
secure detention facilities; all of the thirteen states that
analyzed other phases of juvenile justice decision making and
institutional confinement reported disproportionate minority
confinement. 549 When judges sentence delinquents, minority
juveniles receive disproportionately more out-of-home
placements than do white youths, 550 while Whites receive
disproportionately more probationary dispositions than do
black youths. 551  Black youths with two or fewer prior
admissions have much higher rates of commitment to state
institutions than do white youths. Finally, black youths
confined in institutions serve longer periods in custody than do
white youths committed for similar offenses. 552
The recent "get tough" amendments to juvenile sentencing
statutes have had a substantial and disproportionate impact on
minority youths in correctional confinement. Examining the
proportional changes in the racial composition of institutional
populations for the period 1985-95, which corresponds with the
era of "get tough" changes in sentencing laws, reveals that the
overall numbers of youths in custody on any given day
increased almost 40%.553 Despite the overall increase of youths
in correctional custody, the proportion of white juveniles
confined in public facilities declined 7%, while the percentage of
black juveniles confined increased 63%. 554 Thus, the overall
increases in the numbers of youths confined and proportional
changes in the racial composition of the correctional inmates
reflect the sharp growth of minority youths in institutions. As
547. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 228-29; see 42 U.S.C.
§ 5633(a)(16) (2000).
548. See FELD, supra note 2, at 268.
549. Carl E. Pope, Racial Disparities in Juvenile Justice System, 5
OVERCROWDED TIMES 1, 4 (1994).
550. POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 509, at 14-15.
551. Id.
552. Id. at 18-21.
553. See FELD, supra note 2, at 270-71.
554. Id. at 271.
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a result, the proportion of white juveniles in custody declined
from 44% to 32% of all incarcerated delinquents, while the
proportion of black youths increased from 37% to 43% and that
of Hispanics increased from 13% to 21% of all confined
youths. 555
CONCLUSION
The issue of race has had two distinct and contradictory
influences on juvenile justice theory and practice during the
second half of the twentieth century. Initially, the Warren
Court's "Due Process Revolution" attempted to enhance civil
rights, protect minority citizens, and limit the coercive powers
of the State. Gault's expansion of procedural rights to juvenile
court, however, legitimated punishment and fostered a
procedural and substantive convergence with criminal courts.
Three decades of judicial decision, legislative amendments, and
administrative changes have converted the juvenile court into a
second-class criminal court for young offenders that provides
neither therapy nor justice.
The second phase of juvenile justice "reform" and the
adoption of "get-tough" policies in the 1980s and early 1990s
reflected the confluence of macro-structural, economic, and
racial demographic changes that occurred in America's cities
between the 1960s and the 1980s; the emergence of a black
underclass living in concentrated poverty; and the rise in gun
violence and youth homicides. Mass media portrayals and
political rhetoric have established in the public mind the
connection between race and youth crime. Increasingly,
political discourse and public policy depict the poor as
undeserving and responsible for their own circumstances. 556
Politicians exploit these racially-tinged perceptions with
555. See id. at 270-71; see also KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 538, at 125-
28 (noting the disproportionate minority confinement in institutions).
556. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 196; see also BECKETT, supra note 25, at
107 (noting that proponents of "get tough" crime policies are "fundamentally
uninterested in the social causes of criminality or in reintegrating offenders
and assume instead that punishment, surveillance, and control are the best
response to deviant behavior"). It has been argued that
few white Americans feel any obligation to make any sacrifices on
behalf of the nation's principal minority. They see themselves as
already overtaxed, feel that the fault is not theirs, and have become
persuaded that public programs cannot achieve a cure. Instead, calls
are heard for a tougher posture toward what is seen as the
misbehavior of many blacks.
HACKER, supra note 48, at 225.
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pledges to "get tough" on youth crime, which the public
understands as a "code word" for harsher treatment of young
black males.
The transformation of the juvenile court and the "crack
down" on juveniles represents only one of several public policy
responses to the recent social-structural changes and rise of
youth crime. A century ago, Progressive reformers had to
choose between undertaking social reforms that would
structurally alter criminogenic forces or ministering to the
people whom those adverse conditions damaged. Because of
their social class and ethnic antagonisms, Progressive
reformers ignored the structural implications of their
delinquency theories and chose instead to "save children." A
century later, the same "conservative" versus "liberal" policy
choices remain-between controlling and punishing errant
individuals and initiating social-structural changes to reduce
the developmental risks that some young people face.
Ultimately, the prevalence of violent crime in certain urban
areas is about power, politics, and social inequality.557
Concentrated poverty, racial isolation, and the ensuing youth
crime are the cumulative consequences of public policies that
produce patterned inequality among certain demographic sub-
groups.
Unfortunately, contemporary public policy discourse about
poverty, political economy, the allocation of societal resources
and benefits, inequality, and crime have all become intertwined
with questions of race. The mass media convey biased and
misleading images that incite white viewers' fear and
indignation, and activate stereotypes and prejudices.
Conservative politicians exploit voters' sensitivities to matters
of race with "coded" messages designed to sustain a Right-wing
coalition and promote racial animus.558 As a result, Americans
557. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 148. According to Edsall and
Edsall,
Race was embedded in conflicts surrounding tax, spending, education,
welfare, regulatory, and industrial policy. The racial consequences of
policy alternatives-inescapable because of racial differences in
income, in reliance on government benefits, in job and family
patterns, in rates of criminality, in demographics, in suburban versus
urban residential trends, as well as in a host of other measures-
became integral to the structuring of the political debate, sometimes
explicitly, sometimes implicitly.
Id. at 148.
558. Id. at 281. "Race will remain an exceptionally divisive force in politics
as long as the debate is couched in covert language and in coded symbols-and
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engage in a subterranean discourse on race based on
misleading images and potent symbols.5 59 As long as the public
and politicians identify long-term poverty and its associated
problems-unemployment, drug abuse, criminality, illegitimacy
-as a black condition separate from the mainstream of
American society, policy makers can evade a sense of
governmental responsibility or public obligation.560  The
as long as major participants fail to be explicit about their goals." Id. The
Edsalls further contend that the stigmatization of racism has prevented
politicians from explicitly discussing the costs and benefits of various
strategies to achieve equality because they implicate frank discussions of
differences among the races. "To raise for public consideration not only the
costs of equality, but a host of other potentially racially-tinged subjects-from
street violence to illegitimacy to welfare dependency to joblessness-has come
to risk, among Democrats and liberals (both white and black) accusations of
racism." Id. at 282; see also Hurwitz & Peffley, supra note 346, at 396
(arguing that "[a] debate on crime policy which is fundamentally designed to
elicit visceral and angry images of race is both irrational and divisive .... To
the degree that political discourse is based on the unnecessary infusion of race,
public anticrime policy will turn more on passion than on reason).
559. See, e.g., MENDELBERG, supra note 12, at 268 (arguing that "racial
stereotypes, fears and resentments shape our decisions most when they are
least discussed .... It is this strong but implicit reference to race that is most
effective in priming racial predispositions and racializing the political choices
of white citizens"); Gilens, supra note 464, at 602 (arguing that explicit claims
associated with race can be debated and rebutted, "but when blacks are linked
with crime, welfare, or drug use only implicitly, such links are less likely to be
challenged").
560. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 243. The growth of white
suburbs around the deindustrialized urban core isolates poor Blacks and the
issues of joblessness, criminality, and welfare dependency associated with life
at the bottom of the income distribution, and separates the concerns of the
poor and minorities from those of mainstream voters.
[Tihese developments further incorporate race as a pervasive factor in
the public perception of the country's social and economic structure.
That incorporation, in turn, establishes race as pervasive in political
and public policy decisions. Long-term poverty, and all the problems
associated with it, becomes identified as a black condition,
increasingly separable from the mainstream of society, and, for many
whites, separable from governmental and public obligation.
Id. While HACKER, supra note 48, at 228-29, agrees that black youth homicide
results from the confluence of guns and drugs in the inner city, see supra notes
320-30 and accompanying text, he also argues that it is important to ask
why so many young men are engaging in what amounts to a self-
inflicted genocide. While in one sense these are "free" acts, performed
of personal volition, when they become so widespread, they must also
be seen as expressing a despair that suffuses much of their race.
These are young men who do not know whether they will live another
year, and many have given up caring. If they are prepared to waste
the lives of others, they will hardly be surprised if their turn comes
next. No other American race is wounding itself so fatally. Nor can it
be said that black Americans chose this path for themselves.
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political, media, and public association of urban black males
with crime have fostered punitive policies rather than efforts to
expand the employment and educational opportunities that
prevent crime. For adult offenders, harsher policies such as
those associated with the "war on drugs," have quadrupled
rates of confinement and have had a disproportionate impact
on Blacks.561 The transformation of the juvenile court into a
punitive agency for the social control of "other people's
children" is another example of the political exploitation of the
connection in the public mind between race and youth crime.5 62
The overrepresentation of minority youths in the juvenile
justice system, as well as in concentrated poverty, makes
imperative the pursuit of racial and social justice. Politicians
and the public view youth crime, violence, and child poverty
through a prism of race, as the private problems of minority
families and children rather than as matters of public concern
for the entire community. They do so, in part, because media
depictions systematically distort the public's understanding of
social reality.563 Analysts have proposed a number of policies to
reduce the distorting aspects of media coverage-analyzing
crime statistics and claims of law enforcement officials more
critically, broadening the scope of crime coverage, and
reporting crime in a way that identifies the relationships
between a single incident and the broader structural context. 564
Social-structural conditions and poverty affect the distribution
of crime and violence and cause their disproportionate
concentration within minority communities. 565 Unfortunately,
public policy debates systematically exclude class from the
agenda and thus fail to address the fundamental sources of
inequality for both Blacks and Whites. 566 A variety of public
policies can help to equalize opportunity for all individuals,
regardless of race or ethnicity: economic policies to combine
So, in allocating responsibility the response should be clear. It is
white America that has made being black so disconsolate an estate.
Legal slavery may be in the past, but segregation and subordination
have been allowed to persist. Even today, America imposes a stigma
on every black child at birth.
HACKER, supra note 48, at 228-29.
561. MAUER, supra note 45, at 142-60; TONRY, supra note 14, at 113-16.
562. See FELD, supra note 2, at 245-86.
563. See supra Part III.B.
564. DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 344, at 27-34.
565. See supra Part III.A.
566. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 11, at 281-88.
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growth and full employment with job training; education
programs to enhance employment prospects of the concentrated
poor;567 raising the minimum wage; enforcing child-support
orders; and enacting government-financed "fringe benefits" for
all poor working men and women similar to the benefits that
the tax code provides upper-income households-housing
subsidies, income subsidies-or that private employers give
their workers-medical insurance. 568 Rather than addressing
issues of public policy and political economy that contribute
both to racial inequality and the skewed distribution of crime,
politicians manipulate and exploit racially tinged perceptions of
young offenders for electoral advantage. Ultimately, we must
recognize that for every complex problem, such as crime, there
is a simplistic solution, such as "getting tough," and it is
wrong.569
567. See WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 207, at 140-64;
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS, supra note 207, at 183-206.
568. See JENCKS, supra note 277, at 87-91; KATZ, supra note 62, at 205-15,
223-35.
569. See GEST, supra note 366, at 270 (observing that "[p]erhaps the single
most important, and most difficult to achieve, reform in America's battle
against crime would be a transformation of the debate over crime policy from
an orgy of emotional but largely hollow and oversimplified talk into rational
decisionmaking").
1577
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 87:14471578
